Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1. Naval Policy in Great Britain and the United States -- Part I: Before the War -- 2. British Naval Power from the Two-Power Standard to 1908 -- 3. Theodore Roosevelt and American Naval Power -- 4. The 1909 Naval Estimates Crisis -- 5. From Taft to Wilson -- Part II: The Interwar Years -- 6. Anglo-American Naval Rivalry and the Paris Peace Conference -- 7. The Washington Conference and the Question of Naval Parity -- 8. The Geneva Conference. A Crisis in Anglo-American Relations -- 9. The Highpoint and Collapse of the Naval Arms Control Process -- Conclusion -- Appendix I: United States Navy Annual Construction Programs and Recommendations: 1900-1914 -- Appendix II: Surface Warships Begun by Great Britain, the United States, Japan and Germany: 1930-1939 -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y.

World War II is usually seen as a titanic land battle, decided by mass armies, most importantly those on the Eastern Front. Phillips Payson O'Brien shows us the war in a completely different light. In this compelling new history of the Allied path to victory, he argues that in terms of production, technology and economic power, the war was far more a contest of air and sea than land supremacy. He shows how the Allies developed a predominance of air and sea power which put unbearable pressure on Germany and Japan's entire war-fighting machine from Europe and the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Air and sea power dramatically expanded the area of battle and allowed the Allies to destroy over half the Axis' equipment before it had even reached the traditional 'battlefield'. Battles such as El Alamein, Stalingrad and Kursk did not win World War II; air and sea power did