Suchergebnisse

In the months following the July 7, 2005, attack that killed 52
people and injured hundreds more, the British government was at
pains to deny allegations that Britain was targeted by homegrown,
al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists because of its Middle East foreign
policy. Yet the government was privately aware by May 2004 that a
"particularly strong cause of disillusionment amongst Muslims … is a
perceived 'double standard' in the foreign policy of western
governments (and often those of Muslim governments), in particular
Britain and the U.S" (FCO/HO 2005).
Specific causes cited were bias towards Israel vis-à-vis
Palestinians; non-action on Kashmir and Chechnya; and "active
oppression" in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the wider "war on terror."
Other alleged causes included social and economic deprivation,
Islamophobia (particularly following 9/11), and intergenerational
clashes between first, second, and third generation Muslims. But
little attempt was made either before or after July 7, 2005, to
examine the interaction between these domestic and foreign sources
of radicalization. This paper attempts to do so by examining the
rhetoric and actions of a range of young British Muslims including:
examples of 48 persons convicted of, charged for, or killed by
violent jihad—evidence of young Muslim opinion on extremism and
causes of violent jihadi terror in Britain. The evidence from this
preliminary study, though not large enough to draw reliable
statistical inferences, does suggest that not only is British
foreign policy a significant source of alienation among young
British Muslims, but that attitudes towards British foreign policy
interact with and often reinforce domestic social, cultural, and
economic sources of discontent. As explained in the literature
review below, examining the links between perceptions of foreign
policy towards the wider Muslim Ummah and sources of domestic
discontent offers a more satisfying account of British Muslim
radicalization than those offered by the dominant structural (social
network theories) and "aggrieved actor" interpretations. I would like to thank Jonathan
Githens-Mazer for organizing the PSA panel at the 2007 APSA
Annual Meeting where I presented this paper. I would also like
to thank Shah Miah for allowing me to cite evidence from his BA
research project (Queen Mary, University of London); Emily
Mclean Inglis and Anthony de Silva for research assistance; and
Zamila Bunglawala for advice and data on British Muslims and the
labor market.

Abstract. The fundamental improvement between the Sunningdale and Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreements as conflict regulation processes is the recognition of opposing nationalisms as the core cause of conflict and, by extension, the development of a more symmetrical intergovernmental relationship between British and Irish governments which maximised the basis of consent for addressing conflicting claims to national self‐determination. While the Agreement reflects a liberalisation of opposing nationalisms, it does not represent a 'post‐nationalist' solution; the evolution of conflict regulation from 1985 to 1998 reflects a bi‐national trend. The key to cultivating a 'ripe moment' for a constitutional settlement was based on the recognition that Northern Ireland's constitutional status needed to be redetermined and that the processes of self‐determination needed to address and modify 'constitutive' aspects of sovereignty which preceded partition, as well as 'regulative' aspects which have evolved since the Anglo‐Irish Agreement of 1985.

The fundamental improvement between the Sunningdale & Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreements as conflict regulation processes is the recognition of opposing nationalisms as the core cause of conflict &, by extension, the development of a more symmetrical intergovernmental relationship between British & Irish governments that maximized the basis of consent for addressing conflicting claims to national self-determination. While the Agreement reflects a liberalization of opposing nationalisms, it does not represent a "postnationalist" solution; the evolution of conflict regulation from 1985 to 1998 reflects a binational trend. The key to cultivating a "ripe moment" for a constitutional settlement was based on the recognition that Northern Ireland's constitutional status needed to be redetermined & that the processes of self-determination needed to address & modify "constitutive" aspects of sovereignty that preceded partition, as well as "regulative" aspects that have evolved since the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. 4 Figures, 87 References. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. This article, which is presented in two parts, analyses the changing conceptions of the status of the two sovereigns (the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic) whose competing claims to sovereignty over Northern Ireland has been the ultimate cause of conflict. In Part I (presented here) I adapt Ian Lustick's theory of state contraction and expansion to the British‐Irish relationship as it affected the negotiation of the Sunningdale Power‐sharing Agreement of 1973–1974. I argue that the failure to address the competing claims to sovereignty limited the possibilities of achieving and maintaining the consent of sufficient proportions of each ethno‐national community. Part I of the article (forthcoming) will extend the analysis to explain the relative equalisation of sovereignty status between Britain and Ireland and presents a modification of a 'liberal intergovernmentalist' explanation of the evolution of the Anglo‐Irish Agreement (1985) and Belfast Agreement (1998).

Discusses performance of the major political parties and their strategies for success, in elections which resulted in defeat of the coalition government. Fine Gael, Labour, Democratic Left coalition, Fianna Fáil, Progressive Democrats, and Greens, Reds, and independents.