Suchergebnisse

To evaluate the effectiveness of self-employment assistance to the unemployed in Hungary and Poland more than 5,500 follow-up interviews were conducted in early 1997 by employees of local labor offices with persons in self-employment participant and comparison group samples. Wide ranging differences were observed between the demographic composition of self- employment samples and the general population of unemployed. Program effects were therefore computed as net impact estimates controlling for systematic sample selection using observable characteristics including information on job search assistance from the employment service. While self-employment assistance yielded a favorable set of net impact estimates in both countries, there was a significant dead weight in the operation of programs. Many of those receiving self- employment assistance probably would have gained reemployment without government assistance. However, even after accounting for sample selection, program impacts in both countries on unemployment compensation savings were large, and impacts on employment outcomes were large and positive. In Poland there were also large and positive earnings impacts. A negative estimated earnings impact in Hungary may have been due to a reluctance for full disclosure to tax authorities. In both countries there were appreciable secondary employment effects of between 0.31 and 0.83 additional workers hired per person given self-employment assistance. Among subgroups, self- employment appeared to be more effective in high unemployment areas in Hungary, among females in Poland, outside of service industries in Hungary, and outside of manufacturing and construction in Poland.

AbstractThis paper presents estimates of the impact on re‐employment and earnings of the two most popular active labour programmes used during the economic transition in Hungary: retraining and public service employment (PSE). To adjust for non‐random assignment of programme participants, net impacts were computed using matched pair samples and regression models. The evidence suggests retraining may improve the chance for reemployment, is unlikely to improve re‐employment earnings, but may improve job durability. Net societal benefits could be improved by retraining relatively more males, older persons, and those with less education. PSE does not appear to provide a reliable path to a regular non‐subsidized job, and may even lower re‐employment earnings. PSE might best be viewed as an income transfer programme having the collateral benefit of maintaining basic work habits. The net societal impact of PSE could increase if it involved relatively more females and older persons.

To ease the hardship associated with worker dislocation and to maintain social stability during the transition to markets, the governments of Hungary and Poland provide labor force members with unemployment compensation and a variety of active labor programs (ALPs). Follow-up surveys of participants in retraining, public works, wage subsidies, self-employment, and comparison groups were done in Hungary and Poland in early 1997. Preliminary analysis suggests positive net impacts for most ALPs and additive benefits from the use of the employment service in both countries. Strong evidence of nonrandom assignment to programs means that great care should be used in interpreting the preliminary results and that further examination of the findings is necessary. Adjusted impact estimates for Hungary are provided, but supplementary data is needed from Poland to assess how representative the comparison groups are of the general population of registered unemployed workers.

Most states have exhausted their unemployment insurance (UI) trust fund and borrowed from the federal government at least once during the past 35 years. Under such circumstances, states are required by law to raise UI taxes to replenish their trust funds and to pay off their debts to the federal government. Since higher UI taxes increase employer costs, replenishment forces states into a trade-off between economic competitiveness and trust fund adequacy. Competitive pressures have raised questions about prevailing standards of adequacy and the speed at which they should be attained. Consequently, several states are contemplating tax reductions despite low reserves. This article provides background information and analysis intended to clarify issues underlying the UI policies of New England in general and a tax reduction under consideration in Massachusetts in particular. The main point is that alternative UI policies should not be judged solely by the yardsticks of economic competitiveness and trust fund adequacy. Allocative neutrality and economic stabilization are also relevant concerns. UI systems necessarily force some industries to subsidize others, thereby distorting the allocation of resources in favor of subsidized firms. Yet, many of the same features responsible for these allocative distortions affect economic stability. Every UI alternative entails trade-offs among these rival concerns.

This study traces the origin and evolution of the partnership between the employment service and unemployment insurance programs in the United States. We examine objectives of the framers of the Wagner-Peyser and Social Security Acts that established these programs. Using primary sources, we then analyze early actions of the architects of social insurance to facilitate cooperation between the two programs to meet economic exigencies, grapple with political cronyism, and surmount legal barriers. We also discuss factors that caused changes in the employment service-unemployment insurance partnership over time. We identify reasons for the erosion in cooperation starting in the 1980s, and explain why ever since there has been a continuous decline in service availability. Reviewing evidence on the effectiveness of in-person employment services for unemployment insurance beneficiaries, we suggest ways to revitalize the employment service-unemployment insurance partnership. We explore the source of Wagner-Peyser Act funding, how it was formalized, then eroded, and how it can be renewed.

Regular state unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are paid from state reserves held in unemployment trust fund accounts at the U.S. Treasury. Employers covered by the federal-state UI system make contributions to reserve accounts based on taxable wages. The federal government provides incentives for forward funding of benefits to support UI as an automatic macroeconomic stabilizer in the economy. However, the Great Recession exhausted UI reserves for the majority of states, and not all of them have yet replenished those reserves. Based on patterns observed over the past 40 years, in this paper we simulate the effects on state and systemwide reserves supposing that a mild, moderate, or severe recession emerges in the coming months. Our results suggest that even a moderate recession would cause a majority of states to exhaust UI reserves and be forced to borrow to pay regular UI benefits. We note that recent experience with federal funding of extended and emergency benefits may have contributed to the current state UI financing posture, and we suggest that the taxable wage bases are insufficient. The UI system exists to help involuntarily jobless Americans while they are between jobs. By accepted standards of adequacy, benefit provisions are not excessive, but limits in the financing system make it slow to recover from debt. State reserve funds have not yet reached levels sufficient to weather another economic storm.

The federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI) in the United States was established by the Social Security Act of 1935 during the Great Depression. Under the program, states provide temporary partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers with significant labor force attachment. The federal government induced states to establish UI programs through two means: 1) a uniform federal tax imposed on employer payrolls, with a 90 percent reduction granted in states operating approved UI programs, and 2) grants to states to administer their programs. The system has evolved into a collection of separate state programs adapted to different regional, economic, and cultural contexts that all meet the same standards. This paper reviews state practices concerning applicant eligibility, benefit generosity, and benefit financing, with the aim of revealing lessons for a possible European unemployment benefit system (EUBS). We examine areas of federal leadership, explicit federal-state cooperation, and state innovation. While the U.S. system offers some good ideas for setting up an EUBS, there are also lessons in some shortcomings of the U.S. experience. We identify areas of risk for individual and institutional moral hazard in a multi-tiered UI system, and give examples of monitoring methods and incentives to ameliorate such risks. We suggest approaches for gradual system development, encouraging lower-tier behavior, benefit financing, and responses to regional and system-wide crises.