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Why do so many states adopt a position of non-recognition of gains from war?Despite being proven ineffective as a coercive tool or deterrent, the international community has actively withheld recognition in numerous instances of territorial conquest since the 1930s. Joseph O'Mahoney systematically analyses 21 case studies – including the Manchurian Crisis, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and Russia's annexation of Crimea – to explore why so many states have adopted a policy of non-recognition of the spoils of war. By drawing on historical sources including recently declassified archival documents, he evaluates states' decision-making. He develops a new theory for non-recognition as a symbolic sanction aimed at reproducing common knowledge of the rules of international behaviour.Key FeaturesChapter-length case studies of two major instances of non-recognition: the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of Manchukuo in the 1930s, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern CyprusIncludes discussion of cases including Russia's annexation of CrimeaCompares non-recognised cases with two cases where force was used but the results were recognised as legitimate: the Italian conquest of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935 and the Indian invasion of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971Challenges conventional IR theory that symbolic sanctions are either failed attempts at coercion or mere posturing for domestic audiencesElucidates a model of rule maintenance, combining rationalist and constructivist insights, which could be applied to other fields in international politics

Historical or political science research using primary source evidence faces a major barrier to transparency and replicability: the archival documents used are often difficult to access. The Annotation for Transparent Inquiry Initiative developed a digital overlay tool that enables researchers to create enhanced annotations in articles and link to digital copies of archival sources in trusted repositories. Dr Joseph O'Mahoney was involved in the project to pilot this tool and has published a practical guide based on his experience.

When we do historical research, or political science research using primary source historical evidence, a major barrier to transparency is the fact that the archival documents used are inaccessible. Whereas citations to journal articles and, increasingly, books and some other data sources, can usually allow a reader to check evidence within minutes, citations to archival documents can require months or years to verify, if it is even ever possible. This is a serious problem for qualitative and multi-method research in my field, international relations and the study of foreign policy decision-making, which often relies heavily on archival documentary evidence (Moravcsik 2014). Elman, Kapiszewski, and Lupia (2018) claim that scholars "may be unable to imagine a practical way to share" the archival documents they use in their analyses (41). In this symposium contribution, I describe and analyze such a method, that is, annotating a journal article using Annotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI). This new approach to transparency allowed me to create a digital overlay on top of my published article comprising "annotations." Through those annotations, I could provide instant access to annotated copies of the archival documents my research is based on, and expanded commentary on citations to those archival documents. The annotations thus increase both data access transparency and analytic transparency (see Elman, Kapiszewski, and Lupia 2018, 34 for a discussion of the latter). I also discuss some thoughts on the benefits and costs of using ATI for both the author and the reader, inspired by my experience annotating.

When we do historical research, or political science research using primary source historical evidence, a major barrier to transparency is the fact that the archival documents used are inaccessible. Whereas citations to journal articles and, increasingly, books and some other data sources, can usually allow a reader to check evidence within minutes, citations to archival documents can require months or years to verify, if it is even ever possible. This is a serious problem for qualitative and multi-method research in my field, international relations and the study of foreign policy decision-making, which often relies heavily on archival documentary evidence (Moravcsik 2014). Elman, Kapiszewski, and Lupia (2018) claim that scholars "may be unable to imagine a practical way to share" the archival documents they use in their analyses (41). In this symposium contribution, I describe and analyze such a method, that is, annotating a journal article using Annotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI). This new approach to transparency allowed me to create a digital overlay on top of my published article comprising "annotations." Through those annotations, I could provide instant access to annotated copies of the archival documents my research is based on, and expanded commentary on citations to those archival documents. The annotations thus increase both data access transparency and analytic transparency (see Elman, Kapiszewski, and Lupia 2018, 34 for a discussion of the latter). I also discuss some thoughts on the benefits and costs of using ATI for both the author and the reader, inspired by my experience annotating.

Joseph O'Mahoney systematically analyses 21 case studies – including the Manchurian Crisis, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and Russia's annexation of Crimea – to explore why so many states have adopted a policy of non-recognition of the spoils of war.

Starting with the Stimson Doctrine in the early 1930s, the international community has adopted, on numerous occasions, a policy of nonrecognition in response to international boundary changes gained through the use of force. Why? This article uses an investigation of the Manchurian Crisis to reconceptualize nonrecognition as a symbolic sanction against a norm violation. Existing accounts often view symbolic sanctions like nonrecognition as either failed attempts at coercion or mere posturing for domestic audiences. Against this view, this article explains how collective symbolic sanctions create or recreate common knowledge of what the rules of international behavior are in the face of a lack of effective rule enforcement. This common knowledge, or intersubjective understanding, shapes future expectations and interpretations. Nonrecognition of the spoils of war is thus a means to reinforce the norm of nonaggression within international society by reestablishing a shared valuation of the rule.

AbstractDo normative arguments change what political actors do and if so, how? Rather than using the pure force of abstract moral reasoning, states often try to move the locus of contestation to an arena where they can make practical progress—the evidence or the empirical facts in support of their argument. This paper analyzes how states try to bolster their position first by constructing an argument in which an action represents part of their argument and then by performing that action to make the argument seem more convincing. I call this mechanism rhetorical adduction. The paper challenges theories of communication that deny a causal role to the content of normative arguments and diverges from a leading view on argumentation that arguments have their effects through persuasion. Integrating strategic argumentation theory with theory from psychology about how people make choices based on compelling reasons rather than cost-benefit analysis, I also use theory from sociology on how people resolve morally complex situations through the performance of "reality tests." I illustrate the mechanism using a case from the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 when initial resistance to recognizing the putative state of Bangladesh after India's invasion of East Pakistan was reversed as a result of an argument that Indian troop withdrawal meant that international norms were not violated.

'Why did they do that?' is one of the most common questions in International Relations. However, we cannot access other people's reasons for action the same way that we perceive our own; we cannot introspect the reasons of other actors. This paper provides a unifying framework that delineates different types of knowledge claims regarding reason attribution. There are three possible methodological responses: (1) assume a possible reason and explain behavior in terms of that reason; (2) avoid the direct attribution of reason to individuals and locate explanatory leverage at an analytical level beyond the individual actor reason; and (3) use empirical evidence to adjudicate between possible reasons. Excessive skepticism of evidence of reasons lessens our understanding of the causes of action. When using empirical evidence, contrary to existing arguments, the paper shows that private settings do not systematically favor the true revelation of reasons. The paper also proposes a general principle, consilience, that allows evaluation of empirical claims of reason attribution that subsumes several existing methodological considerations, organizes them, and gives a consistent means of choosing between alternative reason attributions.

When and under what conditions do norms and rules change? Dominant conceptions of institutional change in International Relations theory are based on the idea that it is the result of a shift in power: new actors become able to impose their vision on the world. However, the source of change need not be the power or preferences of actors in society, but could come from the internal dynamics of the rule system governing these actors. This article develops recent research in this area by linking Sandholtz's model of norm change to recent dynamic institutionalist work and exploring and specifying particular mechanisms, or types of tensions, in rule systems that produce change. Institutions and complexes of rules exhibit rule tensions: inconsistencies, ambiguities, and inadequacies that can lead to disputes over the application of the rules. Actors then have to solve problems or disputes over rule interpretation. Change can thus occur without the introduction of new actors or a shift in the power of existing actors. I apply these ideas to a significant change in the rules of war in the early 20th century: the shift from the rule 'to the victor go the spoils' to the Stimson Doctrine, or the rule that states should not profit from aggression. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

When and under what conditions do norms and rules change? Dominant conceptions of institutional change in International Relations theory are based on the idea that it is the result of a shift in power: new actors become able to impose their vision on the world. However, the source of change need not be the power or preferences of actors in society, but could come from the internal dynamics of the rule system governing these actors. This article develops recent research in this area by linking Sandholtz's model of norm change to recent dynamic institutionalist work and exploring and specifying particular mechanisms, or types of tensions, in rule systems that produce change. Institutions and complexes of rules exhibit rule tensions: inconsistencies, ambiguities, and inadequacies that can lead to disputes over the application of the rules. Actors then have to solve problems or disputes over rule interpretation. Change can thus occur without the introduction of new actors or a shift in the power of existing actors. I apply these ideas to a significant change in the rules of war in the early 20th century: the shift from the rule 'to the victor go the spoils' to the Stimson Doctrine, or the rule that states should not profit from aggression.

The psychological health and safety of firefighters has become a significant issue for fire services in Ireland owing both to recent legislative changes and to increasing awareness of the potentially stressful nature of dealing with emergency situations. Critical incident stress management (CISM) initiatives have been introduced with a view to supporting the psychological health of fire crews and with the aim of protecting individuals from developing a psychiatric illness, namely post-traumatic stress disorder. While research has consistently questioned the efficacy of such interventions, there has been little attention paid to how firefighters themselves actually construct their own experiences of dealing with emergency situations in the course of their work. This thesis addresses this imbalance by conducting both a qualitative and quantitative investigation into how firefighters in Ireland talk about the incidents they respond to. The first study details a discourse analysis which was conducted on the transcripts of seven focus groups which was conducted with 89 participating retained firefighters. Key discursive constructions were identified and explored in light of how best to provide psychological supports to fire crews. In order to further investigate these discursive constructions a quantitative study was then conducted with an alternate group of firefighters (n=40) using Q methodology. This triangulation allowed for subject positions to emerge that had not heretofore been considered when providing psychological supports tofirefighters. A number of important findings emerged. First, many of the subject positions explored highlight how firefighters primarily draw upon discourses of professionalism and how constructs of the "crew" can strongly mediate their experiences of the "critical 3 incident". Secondly, the research highlights how many of the notions inherent in the Mitchell model of CISM were not actually borne out in the fire fighter's own constructions, particularly with regard to the focus on the "critical incident' as being always/already a source of a traumatic response. These insights were then used by the Researcher to propose a framework of psychological support for fire services in Ireland.