Suchergebnisse

The impact of recent advances in information technology on output and productivity growth has been one of the key research questions in the past few years. A consensus has emerged that the use of information and communications technology (ICT) capital has had a significant impact on aggregate economy-wide labour productivity growth through the capital deepening channel in the United States in the 1990s (see the discussion and references in the papers below). Evidence is also emerging of a delayed but nonetheless significant impact in European and other OECD economies. These findings have stimulated additional research using microeconomic data focusing on both the industry or company level.

For most of the postwar period both labour and total factor productivity growth in the EU was higher than in the US. The 1990s witnessed a change in this trend with the US experiencing higher growth rates for the first time in decades. This was partly due to the end of catch-up growth as many larger EU Member States had reached US levels by the beginning of the decade with also some evidence of a higher 'New Economy' impact in the US. The productivity record of the UK was poor relative to its major European competitors throughout most of the postwar period, although this relative decline appears to have come to an end. This paper presents figures on relative productivity for the total EU and individual Member States in the 1990s. Both postwar convergence and trends in the 1990s are discussed in terms of a number of factors which result in the emergence of differences across European countries. These include the skill composition of the workforce, the rate of introduction of new technology and the institutional environment in which firms operate. The latter include the stability of the macroeconomic environment and aspects of competition and regulation. The paper concludes that trends in productivity largely reflect long-term structural aspects but that EMU membership might have a small favourable effect on UK productivity.

This paper investigates the role of broad capital in explaining Anglo‐German labour productivity differences in manufacturing, where broad capital includes physical capital, workforce skills and R&D expenditure. All three forms of capital are found to have a significant impact on relative productivity but only workforce skills have a coefficient greater than that implied by standard 'growth accounting' methods. This is interpreted as supporting the idea that there are some external effects from human capital formation which raise the productivity of all workers in an industry. After allowing for broad capital the results suggest that Britain had a multifactor productivity advantage over Germany in the late 1980s.

This article presents measures o f competitiveness in manufacturing comparing Britain to Germany, France and the United States. Data from the National Accounts and the Census of Production are combined to derive new estimates of relative unit labour costs for a number of manufacturing industries. The results show that British manufacturing had a competitive advantage over Germany and France in 1993. This arose primarily from the devaluation of Sterling and followed a period, from 1989 to 1992, when unit labour costs in British manufacturing were generally close to those in Germany and France. Unit labour costs in American manufacturing, however, were considerably lower than in the European countries in 1993. The results by industry show that Britain performs relatively poorly in much of the engineering sector while being relatively more competitive in consumer goods industries. Over time changes in the market exchange rates and nominal wage inflation have large impacts on the relative competitive position of total manufacturing in the four countries whereas productivity growth plays a minor role. However, at the industry level productivity growth is important. In the face of similar movements in relative nominal wages across industries, differences in productivity performance distinguish those British industries which gained ground over their rivals abroad from those whose competitive position worsened.

Relative levels of labour productivity are estimated to have been about 22 per cent higher in German than in British manufacturing in 1987. The German productivity advantage was most pronounced in non-electrical engineering, vehicles and metals. The British performance was relatively better in food, drink and tobacco and textiles and productivity levels appear to be about equal in the two countries in chemicals and electrical engineering. About 80 per cent of the productivity gap in aggregate manufacturing can be accounted for by differences in the levels of both physical and human capital. The aggregate productivity ratio of 22 per cent is lower than that found for 1968. The time pattern of relative productivity in the intervening two decades shows a considerable increase in the 1970s followed by a rapid narrowing of the productivity gap in the 1980s.

The productivity performance of the UK relative to its major competitors has been a concern for much of the postwar period. There is a general perception that, in recent years, its position has improved, however, most work stops short of the period in question. Newly constructed data from the EU KLEMS productivity and growth accounts database provides an insight into UK productivity performance and that of its major competitors. This paper provides an overview of recent UK performance relative to France, Germany and the US and finds that the UK has seen a rise in output and employment growth since 1995. Growth has been particularly strong in ICT producing sectors and market service sectors. With this in mind, there are perhaps some grounds for optimism for the future of productivity growth in the UK.