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This report summarizes the results of several laboratory andfield studies in-vestigating antecedents to and consequences of the intentional distortion of information by senders in organizational communication networks. Lab-oratory studies were used to examine the impact of two interpersonal vari-ables (trust in the receiver, perceived influence of the receiver over the sender) and directionality of information flow (upward, lateral, and down-ward) on senders' propensities to block or suppress information. Field studies were used to establish the external validity of the laboratory investi-gations and to relate information distortion by senders to job satisfaction and performance. Results of these studies demonstrate that (1) a bias exists towards screening certain types of information from upward transmission; (2) low trust in the receiver of a message results in significantly more sup-pression by senders of information, especially information which reflects unfavorably on the senders; and (3) a measure of information distortion is significantly and inversely associated with job satisfaction and individual and group performance. Results of these studies differ in several respects from previous studies of organizational communication. Implications of the results reported here for decision-making are discussed and a model relating antecedents and consequences to information distortion is pre-sented.

The authors integrate two complementary streams of research on "fit" that document positive impacts of similarity and negative effects of dissimilarity. Fit with an organization's culture typically focuses on similarity in values whereas relational demography examines similarity in demographic attributes. Although both streams emphasize fit and draw on similar underlying theories, little research investigates both simultaneously. In a field study with intact teams, both cultural and demographic fit had independent effects on subsequent performance; however, "deeper" value fit effects were stronger than "surface" demographic fit. Analyses by demographic group suggest that person-group fit has the greatest impact for individuals whose demographic background puts them at risk for poorer outcomes, particularly for socioeconomic status.

This study investigates the role of work group norms in promoting innovation in high-technology organizations. Through structured discussions, samples of senior executives identified organizational patterns and norms associated with successful innovation. Based on the results, a survey was developed and administered to a set of managers. Results show four norms associated with increased group innovation: support for risk taking, tolerance of mistakes, teamwork, and speed of action. An instrument to assess these norms is developed.

Previous research on goal setting and feedback is placed in the context of an organizational control system model. Using a sample of 100 managers, the independent impacts of three components of a control system (goal setting, measurement, and corrective actions) on managerial satisfaction and performance are examined. Results show that aspects of each of the three model components are independently related to performance but not to satisfaction. Respondents' perceptions of top management's support for the performance-appraisal system, a factor not considered in most research on feedback and goal setting, emerges as an important correlate of high performance.

In this study we propose that norms of fairness are salient to top decision makers and show that over- or underpayment of the CEO cascades down to lower organizational levels. Moreover, it appears that CEOs use their own power not only to increase their own salaries, but also those of their subordinates. One implication of such a process may be that the overpayment of a top executive has higher costs than have previously been realized. We also find evidence suggesting that CEOs serve as a key referent for employees in determining whether their own situation is "fair," and this influences their reactions to their own compensation. More specifically, we find that when lower-level managers are underpaid relative to the CEO—that is, underpaid more than the CEO or overpaid less—they are more likely to leave the organization. Results obtained from testing our hypotheses on a sample of more than 120 firms over a five-year period demonstrates the importance of considering fairness in the setting of CEO pay. Implications for the design of executive compensation packages are discussed.