Suchergebnisse

Few problems raised by the Spanish civil war are more interesting than those growing out of the fact that a state of war, in the legal sense, does not exist; belligerent rights have been accorded to neither of the contestants by third Powers. Consequently, on January 8 of this year, Germany turned over to the rebel authorities two Spanish loyalist vessels captured in retaliation to an "act of piracy"—an indictment earned by the loyalist government for its seizure of the German freighter, Palos. One may feel justifiably surprised that a government almost universally recognized as legitimate can be charged with piratical activities. Further reflection reveals that the Spanish situation presents many more questions concerning the rights and duties of the contestants as against third parties. In the absence of the recognition of belligerency, what are the rights of loyalist and rebel ships on the high seas? In the territorial waters of Spain? May the fascist or socialistic factions establish blockades? What are the powers and validity of their prize courts? Who is answerable for the illegal acts of the rebels should they lose—or be victorious? What claims will the Spanish Government have as against third Powers should one or the other prove successful? May the loyalist authorities by simple decree close to neutral trade the ports held by the insurgents? Moreover, how would all of these matters be affected if the maritime Powers of the world were to recognize the existence of a state of war, i.e., belligerency, in Spain? And, finally, in view of the magnitude and duration of the struggle, is there any justification for withholding such recognition?

Before British India can ever be given complete home rule, the knotty problem of the relation of the native states to such a dominion must be considered. Nationalists in British India maintain that whenever complete dominion status is offered to their country, it will assume in respect to the states the same position that the crown holds toward them; meanwhile, spokesmen for the princes insist that such a step can and should never be taken without their consent. Whatever viewpoint prevails, before India can function as an independent, self-sufficient unit, some arrangement, presumably of a federal character, must certainly be effected.An analysis of the numerous views held concerning the legal relation of the native states to the British Empire enables one to discern three principal theories: first, that held by most crown officials and Indian nationalists, which maintains the sovereignty of the crown; second, the view of the Indian princes, which attempts to prove the retention by them of the "residuary" sovereignty; and, third, the intermediate opinion of many publicists, both of Europe and of India, which asserts the existence of a divided sovereignty.Desiring to ascertain the location of the legal sovereign in the political tangle presented by the apparently anomalous position of the princes, one is obliged to discard the theory of a divided sovereignty. Speaking in juridical terms, it is necessary to posit in some agency the source of legal sovereignty, even though its political exercise may be vested in more than one entity. There thus remains but two diametrically opposed theories, one that predicates the existence of supreme legal authority in the crown, and the other which confers it upon the rulers of the Indian states.