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"The 2008 financial crash was the worst financial crisis and the most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression. It triggered a complete overhaul of the global regulatory environment, ushering in a stream of new rules and laws to combat the perceived weakness of the financial system. While the global economy came back from the brink, the continuing effects of the crisis include increasing economic inequality and political polarization. Ten Years After the Crash is an innovative analysis of the crisis and its ongoing influence on the global regulatory, financial, and political landscape, with timely discussions of the key issues for our economic future. It brings together a range of expert and practitioner perspectives, including the Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz, the former congressman Barney Frank, the former treasury secretary Jacob Lew, the former deputy governor of the Bank of England Paul Tucker, and Steve Cutler, general counsel of JP Morgan Chase during the financial crisis. Each poses crucial questions: What were the origins of the crisis? How effective were international and domestic regulatory responses? Have we addressed the roots of the crisis through reform and regulation? Are our financial systems and the global economy better able to withstand another crash? Ten Years After the Crash is vital reading as both a retrospective on the last crisis and analysis of possible sources of the next one."
In: Political economy of institutions and decisions
David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion. Professors Epstein and O'Halloran produce their own deductive specification of the conditions for making or delegating policy, gather a rich, original data set on delegation and discretion in the postwar era to test the propositions derived from their model, and devise appropriate statistical tests to assess the validity of their propositions. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers
SSRN
In: American journal of political science, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 367
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 187-191
ISSN: 1537-5943
In his critique of our earlier paper on majority-minority voting districts, David Lublin suggests that our conclusions with respect to the election of minorities to office are flawed, and that we incorrectly estimate optimal districting strategies for the substantive representation of minority interests in Congress. Subjecting these claims to direct empirical examination, we find that our previous results are unaltered by the inclusion of Latino voters in our estimates of equal opportunity, and that incumbency advantage cannot fully explain the recent victories of minority candidates in the South. Neither do the critiques of our results regarding substantive representation stand up to systematic analysis: Evidence at both the state level and over time confirm our conclusion that districts on the order of 45% black voting age population maximize the expected number of votes for minority-supported legislation.
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 187-191
ISSN: 0003-0554
Lublin, David: Racial redistricting and African-American representation. In: American Political Science Review (Washington/D.C.), 93 (March 1999) 1, S. 183-186
World Affairs Online
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 367-395
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 37-56
ISSN: 0951-6298
In: American political science review, Band 93, Heft 1, S. 187-192
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 37-56
ISSN: 1460-3667
Congress uses varying degrees of specificity when passing legislation. Sometimes it writes very detailed, exacting laws; other times it leaves these details to implementing agencies. A natural positive question then arises: what factors are critical for understanding the degree of delegation used by Congress in a particular circumstance? This paper exploits the tradeoff between the distributive and informational effects of organizational design to examine congressional delegation. We argue that variations in the relative preferences of committee, floor (congressional median voter), and executive actors cause a rational floor voter to choose different forms of collective decision making. We find that homogeneity of committee-floor preferences leads to less delegation, while preference homogeneity between Congress and the executive leads to more delegation. We also argue that delegation emerges when actors are more risk averse or when the uncertainty characterizing the collective choice environment is large. We develop our logic using a game theoretic model of the policy-making process and draw out the empirical implications of our approach.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 373-397
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: International organization, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 301-324
ISSN: 0020-8183
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 373-397
ISSN: 0022-3816