Suchergebnisse

Decyzja o wycofaniu wojsk USA z Afganistanu w 2021 roku spowodowała natychmiastową reakcję afgańskich talibów, którzy od razu rozpoczęli działania na rzecz przejęcia władzy. Obecnie minęło już ponad dwa lata od kiedy Afganistan znajduje się pod ich rządami. W tym czasie doszło do zmian polityczno-gospodarczych i przewartościowaniu uległa międzynarodowa percepcja Afganistanu. Na bazie metody systemowej dokonano w artykule analizy, która pomogła odpowiedzieć na postawione pytania badawcze dotyczące sytuacji polityczno-gospodarczej Afganistanu; stanu zagrożenia terroryzmem oraz miejsca i roli Afganistanu w polityce międzynarodowej z uwzględnieniem przede wszystkim Pakistanu i Iranu. Hipotezą badawczą postawioną w tekście jest twierdzenie, że przejęcie władzy przez talibów w 2021 roku doprowadziło do marginalizacji państwa na arenie międzynarodowej i uniemożliwiło konstruktywne rozwijanie afgańskiego potencjału polityczno-gospodarczego. Afganistan w dalszym ciągu pozostaje jednym z najbiedniejszych i zrujnowanych państw na świecie. Po weryfikacji hipotezy i odpowiedzi na pytania badawcze wyciągnięte zostały wnioski, że Afganistan w dalszym ciągu jest marginalizowany politycznie na arenie międzynarodowej, chociaż wiele państw utrzymuje z nim nieoficjalne relacje polityczno-gospodarcze. Sytuacja gospodarcza, pomimo podjętych działań naprawczych przez rząd talibów w dalszym ciągu jest bardzo trudna, a miliony obywateli tego państwa żyją w ubóstwie.

The aim of this paper is to present the outline of planned and already implemented social, political and economic changes in the context of gradual transition of power in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The main thesis put in this paper relates to Mohammed bin Salman's leading project – "Vision 2030" which assumed gradual multi-dimensional transition in Saudi Arabia. Many of changes implemented already, including the limitation of clergy's activity will not bring about quick social-political transition due to long-lasting and deeply rooted alliance between Saudi ruling clan and radical movement of Wahhabis, that determines conservative regime in the country. Basing on the main thesis Author tries to give the answer to research questions correlated with the thesis and touching the issue of possibility for implementation political, economic changes in Saudi Arabia by Mohammed bin Salman. In the paper following research methods has been applied: historical method, which refers to analysis of historical process of shaping and development Saudi monarchy; documentary analysis - relating to governmental project "Vision 2030" particularly; elements of systemic approach in which system is constituted by political regime of Saudi Arabia; elements of statistical method employed in the context of variable economic or social data and elements of predictive referring to the model of Saudi Arabia's development under the rule of Mohammed bin Salman.

Since the 2011, Iran is deeply engaged in Syrian war in order to support and keep President Bashar al-Assad in power. Firstly, Iran started with political and diplomatic support and later turned into military and economic assistance. At the moment, it is believed that Syria is financially sustained by Iran. The main reason that Iran has determined for wide-scale engagement was the existential need for maintaining and then expanding its own regional power influences in the Middle East. If Syrian regime collapsed, Iran would be dealt with a big dilemma and it would loss Syria as a key military and political ally. Thus, Iran would have cut off his transit route to supply weapons to Lebanon for Hezbollah, as these transports still go across Syrian territory. It would surely diminish the Iranian position in the Middle East. Preventing such a case, Iran has been determined to engage in the Syrian conflict to a great extent, which, as a consequence, is charged with heavy costs. Although there is no exact data of Iran's expenses for the Syrian War, it is supposed that this is in the range of 6 billion USD to 35 billion USD. At the moment, it can be said that engagement in Syrian war was beneficial for Iran, mainly in political sphere, yet the full consequences of this involvement will only be known in many months.

Since the 2011, Iran is deeply engaged in Syrian war in order to support and keep President Bashar al-Assad in power. Firstly, Iran started with political and diplomatic support and later turned into military and economic assistance. At the moment, it is believed that Syria is financially sustained by Iran. The main reason that Iran has determined for wide-scale engagement was the existential need for maintaining and then expanding its own regional power influences in the Middle East. If Syrian regime collapsed, Iran would be dealt with a big dilemma and it would loss Syria as a key military and political ally. Thus, Iran would have cut off his transit route to supply weapons to Lebanon for Hezbollah, as these transports still go across Syrian territory. It would surely diminish the Iranian position in the Middle East. Preventing such a case, Iran has been determined to engage in the Syrian conflict to a great extent, which, as a consequence, is charged with heavy costs. Although there is no exact data of Iran's expenses for the Syrian War, it is supposed that this is in the range of 6 billion USD to 35 billion USD. At the moment, it can be said that engagement in Syrian war was beneficial for Iran, mainly in political sphere, yet the full consequences of this involvement will only be known in many months. ; Od 2011 roku Iran jest mocno zaangażowany w wojnę w Syrii, tak aby prezydent Baszar al- Asad utrzymał się u władzy. Początkowo Iran zaczął od wsparcia dyplomatycznego i szerokich działań politycznych na rzecz rządu syryjskiego. W późniejszym etapie jego wsparcie przyjęło formę militarną i finansową. Aktualnie można nawet przyjąć, że Syria jest dotowana przez Iran w szerokim zakresie. Głównym powodem, dla którego Iran jest tak zdeterminowany, aby wspierać reżim al-Asada jest egzystencjalna potrzeba utrzymania oddziaływania Iranu w regionie i tym samym swojej pozycji na Bliskim Wschodzie. Jeśli rządy B. al-Asada upadłyby, Iran stanąłby przed dużym wy¬zwaniem strategiczno-politycznym, a jego pozycja i znaczenie w regionie znacznie by osłabło. Syria do tej pory jest jedynym państwowym sojusznikiem polityczno-militarnym Iranu i brak "sy¬ryjskiego ogniwa" w polityce Iranu byłby również katastrofalny dla wsparcia militarnego, jakiego Iran udziela libańskiemu Hezbollahowi, które odbywa się przez terytorium Syrii. Aby uniknąć sytuacji, w której pozycja Iranu poprzez utratę Syrii jako sojusznika osłabnie, Iran podjął się udzielenia wsparcia, które generuje olbrzymie koszty. Szacuje się, że roczne wydatki Iranu na wojnę w Syrii i dotowanie państwa syryjskiego sięgają od 6 do 35 mld USD.

Iraq is a specific ethno-religious mosaic. By except Arabs and Kurds there are a lot of minorities which since ancient times were present on this territory. Among them are: Yazidis, Mandaneans, Shabaks, Assyrians, Turkmen and Marsh Arabs.
After the collapse of Saddam Husein regime the U.S., British and allied troops began to control Iraq. In the face of such a situation many different radical Muslim groups has evolved and started to fight foreign soldiers. In result, Iraq plunged into instability and chaos and many minorities became a main victims of political and military conflict. Such societies like Yazidis, Mandaneans, Shabaks were persecuted, forced to flee and killed. by now Iraqi state has no any capabilities to protect such minorities which still feel insecure in their own country.

In this paper Author has defined and classified a "militarized non-state actor" pointing that this term comprises many different non-state actors like for example: political parties with their military wings, international criminal groups, terrorist organizations, private military companies or independence movements. It is also a disputable issue if armed forces deployed within governmental organizations (like theUNorNATO) are treated as militarized non-state actors or not.Lebanese Hizballah has been used here as an example to describe the specificity of a militarized non-state actor. Hizballah has its own armed forces and has been active in international relations. As a result of the analysis, such actors like Hizballah are well adoptable to new phenomena and processes which occurred in international relations, they are challenging states in their activities, moreover: they are used in many cases by states to achieve their goals. It shows the ambiguity in functioning of such a non-state actor. ; In this paper Author has defined and classified a "militarized non-state actor" pointing that this term comprises many different non-state actors like for example: political parties with their military wings, international criminal groups, terrorist organizations, private military companies or independence movements. It is also a disputable issue if armed forces deployed within governmental organizations (like theUNorNATO) are treated as militarized non-state actors or not.Lebanese Hizballah has been used here as an example to describe the specificity of a militarized non-state actor. Hizballah has its own armed forces and has been active in international relations. As a result of the analysis, such actors like Hizballah are well adoptable to new phenomena and processes which occurred in international relations, they are challenging states in their activities, moreover: they are used in many cases by states to achieve their goals. It shows the ambiguity in functioning of such a non-state actor.

W artykule podjęto się próby zdefiniowania i sklasyfikowania "zmilitaryzowanego aktora niepaństwowego" wskazując przy tym, że termin ten obejmuje szeroka grupę podmiotów niepaństwowych takich jak: partie polityczne ze swoim skrzydłem zbrojnym, międzynarodowe grupy przestępcze, organizacje terrorystyczne, prywatne firmy wojskowe czy ruchy narodowo- wyzwoleńcze. Dyskusyjna pozostaje obecność w tej grupie kontyngentów wojskowych rządowych organizacji międzynarodowych. Posługując się przykładem libańskiego Hezbollahu, który od początku swojego istnienia dysponuje własnymi siłami zbrojnymi i wykazuje dużą aktywność w stosunkach międzynarodowych, dokonano próby charakterystyki zmilitaryzowanego aktora niepaństwowego. Okazało się, że tego typu aktorzy jak Hezbollah dobrze adaptują się do nowych zjawisk i procesów międzynarodowych ; stanowią spore wyzwanie dla państw, które dysponują zaawansowanymi siłami zbrojnymi oraz jednocześnie są wykorzystywani przez inne państwa do realizacji swoich celów. Zatem rola takiego uczestnika we współczesnych stosunkach międzynarodowych ma charakter złożony. ; In this paper Author has defined and classified a "militarized non-state actor" pointing that this term comprises many different non-state actors like for example: political parties with their military wings, international criminal groups, terrorist organizations, private military companies or independence movements. It is also a disputable issue if armed forces deployed within gov - ernmental organizations (like the UN or NATO) are treated as militarized non-state actors or not. Lebanese Hizballah has been used here as an example to describe the specificity of a milita - rized non-state actor. Hizballah has its own armed forces and has been active in international re - lations. As a result of the analysis, such actors like Hizballah are well adoptable to new phenomena and processes which occurred in international relations, they are challenging states in their activities, moreover: they are used in many cases by states to achieve their goals. It shows the ambiguity in functioning of such a non-state actor.

Middle East at the crossroads, ed. Joanna Marszałek-Kawa, Hassan Ali Jamsheer