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Growing environmental concern has fueled the discussion about the establishment of an international institutional arrangement for cooperation on Earth observation. The Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) comes as a timely solution, bundling data, technologies and existing observation systems, and providing crucial information about the state of our Earth. However, the implementation of GEOSS faces challenges; some of them are related to the fact that contribution to GEOSS is voluntary. Additionally, benefits of GEOSS are enjoyed by contributors and non-contributors alike, such that GEOSS can be classified as a public good, whose provision is usually corrupted by "freeriding". This paper identifies challenges in managing and implementing GEOSS as a public good. To figure out resolutions and scenarios we examine how these problems are discussed in economic and game theoretical literature. We further examine problems concerning the user integration of GEOSS, and the interaction between Earth observation science and policy.

Growing environmental concern has fueled the discussion about the establishment of an international institutional arrangement for cooperation on Earth observation. The Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) comes as a timely solution, bundling data, technologies and existing observation systems, and providing crucial information about the state of our Earth. However, the implementation of GEOSS faces challenges; some of them are related to the fact that contribution to GEOSS is voluntary. Additionally, benefits of GEOSS are enjoyed by contributors and non-contributors alike, such that GEOSS can be classified as a public good, whose provision is usually corrupted by "freeriding". This paper identifies challenges in managing and implementing GEOSS as a public good. To figure out resolutions and scenarios we examine how these problems are discussed in economic and game theoretical literature. We further examine problems concerning the user integration of GEOSS, and the interaction between Earth observation science and policy.

Empirical findings on determinants of long-term economic growth are numerous, sometimes inconsistent, highly exciting and still incomplete. The empirical analysis was almost exclusively carried out by standard econometrics. This study compares results gained by cross-country regressions as reported in the literature with those gained by the rough sets theory and rule induction. The main advantages of using rough sets are being able to classify classes and to discretize. Thus, we do not have to deal with distributional, independence, (log) linearity, and many other assumptions, but can keep the data as they are. The main difference between regression results and rough sets is that most education and human capital indicators can be labeled as robust attributes. In addition, we find that political indicators enter in a nonlinear fashion with respect to growth.

Empirical findings on determinants of long-term economic growth are numerous, sometimes inconsistent, highly exciting and still incomplete. The empirical analysis was almost exclusively carried out by standard econometrics. This study compares results gained by cross-country regressions as reported in the literature with those gained by the rough sets theory and rule induction. The main advantages of using rough sets are being able to classify classes and to discretize. Thus, we do not have to deal with distributional, independence, (log) linearity, and many other assumptions, but can keep the data as they are. The main difference between regression results and rough sets is that most education and human capital indicators can be labeled as robust attributes. In addition, we find that political indicators enter in a nonlinear fashion with respect to growth.

The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is estimated by integrated assessment models and is widely used by government agencies to value the climate impacts of rulemakings, however, the core discussion around SCC so far was focused on validity of obtained numerical estimates and related uncertainties while largely neglecting a deeper discussion of the SCC applicability limits stemming from the calculation method. This work provides a conceptual mathematical background and the economic interpretation that is behind the SCC calculation in the three widely used integrated assessment models. Policy makers need to be aware of the difference between the commonly implied and the actual meaning of SCC that substantially limits its applicability in practice. The presented results call for a critical revision of the SCC concept and the SCC calculation methods in integrated assessment models.

The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is estimated by integrated assessment models and is widely used by government agencies to value the climate impacts of rulemakings, however, the core discussion around SCC so far was focused on validity of obtained numerical estimates and related uncertainties while largely neglecting a deeper discussion of the SCC applicability limits stemming from the calculation method. This work provides a conceptual mathematical background and the economic interpretation that is behind the SCC calculation in the three widely used integrated assessment models. Policy makers need to be aware of the difference between the commonly implied and the actual meaning of SCC that substantially limits its applicability in practice. The presented results call for a critical revision of the SCC concept and the SCC calculation methods in integrated assessment models.

Climate mitigation will have significant impacts on government spending necessary to finance large-scale deployment of Negative Emission Technologies (NETs). The required expenditure might consume up to a third of general government expenditure in advanced economies. The Paris Agreement aims to limit global temperature increase to 2 °C above preindustrial levels and to balance GHG sources and sinks in the second half of this century. The technical feasibility of these targets has broadly been demonstrated by the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Recent publications, however, raise concerns about the broader political and economic feasibility of compatible emission trajectories, which typically rely on large-scale deployment of Negative Emission Technologies (NETs)—a type of pilot backstop technology that is often associated with enormous amounts of natural land loss, stranded assets by 2100, a potentially dangerous emission overshoot level and resulting fundamental ethical issues of intergenerational equity. Here, we argue that the financial viability of late-century NETs has thus far not been adequately addressed and show that NETs enter IPCC scenarios for the wrong (discounting), not for the right reason (hedging uncertainties).

Climate mitigation will have significant impacts on government spending necessary to finance large-scale deployment of Negative Emission Technologies (NETs). The required expenditure might consume up to a third of general government expenditure in advanced economies. The Paris Agreement aims to limit global temperature increase to 2 °C above preindustrial levels and to balance GHG sources and sinks in the second half of this century. The technical feasibility of these targets has broadly been demonstrated by the 5th Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Recent publications, however, raise concerns about the broader political and economic feasibility of compatible emission trajectories, which typically rely on large-scale deployment of Negative Emission Technologies (NETs)—a type of pilot backstop technology that is often associated with enormous amounts of natural land loss, stranded assets by 2100, a potentially dangerous emission overshoot level and resulting fundamental ethical issues of intergenerational equity. Here, we argue that the financial viability of late-century NETs has thus far not been adequately addressed and show that NETs enter IPCC scenarios for the wrong (discounting), not for the right reason (hedging uncertainties).

Environmental modelling is a commonly used tool to assist the policy dimension of sustainability problems. Model evaluation is an important process in such decision-making contexts to ensure credibility, and it is often considered a purpose-dependent activity. Models are increasingly used for the purpose of scenario generation to deal with non-probabilistic uncertainties. This change in the model purpose implies a change in the evaluation process, and may require different validation techniques. In this paper, we investigate the existing validation viewpoints and approaches, and compare the general modeling context to the scenario generation purpose in particular. We employ three methods for this investigation: (i) A literature review about validation in environmental modeling, (ii) a text-mining analysis on a large dataset of validation-related publications, and (iii) an online survey conducted among model developers and users in academia, governmental and non-governmental policy organizations, and industry. The results indicate a data-orientation for systematic validation, and that conventional validation approaches are adopted even for models used for the purpose of scenario exploration. Future studies can develop a validation framework for models used specifically for generating scenarios and decision-making under non-probabilistic uncertainty.

Environmental modelling is a commonly used tool to assist the policy dimension of sustainability problems. Model evaluation is an important process in such decision-making contexts to ensure credibility, and it is often considered a purpose-dependent activity. Models are increasingly used for the purpose of scenario generation to deal with non-probabilistic uncertainties. This change in the model purpose implies a change in the evaluation process, and may require different validation techniques. In this paper, we investigate the existing validation viewpoints and approaches, and compare the general modeling context to the scenario generation purpose in particular. We employ three methods for this investigation: (i) A literature review about validation in environmental modeling, (ii) a text-mining analysis on a large dataset of validation-related publications, and (iii) an online survey conducted among model developers and users in academia, governmental and non-governmental policy organizations, and industry. The results indicate a data-orientation for systematic validation, and that conventional validation approaches are adopted even for models used for the purpose of scenario exploration. Future studies can develop a validation framework for models used specifically for generating scenarios and decision-making under non-probabilistic uncertainty.

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from the trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from the trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.

Palm oil production has boomed over the last decade, resulting in an expansion of the global oil palm planting area from 10 to 17 Million hectares between 2000 and 2012. Previous studies showed that a significant share of this expansion has come at the expense of tropical forests, notably in Indonesia and Malaysia, the current production centers. Governments of developing and emerging countries in all tropical regions increasingly promote oil palm cultivation as a major contributor to poverty alleviation, as well as food and energy independence. However, being under pressure from several nongovernmental environmental organizations and consumers, the main palm oil traders have committed to sourcing sustainable palm oil. Against this backdrop we assess the area of suitable land and what are the limits to future oil palm expansion when several constraints are considered. We find that suitability is mainly determined by climatic conditions resulting in 1.37 billion hectares of suitable land for oil palm cultivation concentrated in twelve tropical countries. However, we estimate that half of the biophysically suitable area is already allocated to other uses, including protected areas which cover 30% of oil palm suitable area. Our results also highlight that the non-conversion of high carbon stock forest (>100 tC/ha) would be the most constraining for future oil palm expansion as it would exclude two-thirds of global oil palm suitable area. Combining eight criteria which might restrict future land availability for oil palm expansion, we find that 234 million hectares or 17% of worldwide suitable area are left. This might seem that the limits for oil palm expansion are far from being reached but one needs to take into account that some of this area might be hardly accessible currently with only 18% of this remaining area being under 2 hours transportation to the closest city- and that growing demand for other agricultural commodities which might also compete for this land has not been yet taken into account.

Palm oil production has boomed over the last decade, resulting in an expansion of the global oil palm planting area from 10 to 17 Million hectares between 2000 and 2012. Previous studies showed that a significant share of this expansion has come at the expense of tropical forests, notably in Indonesia and Malaysia, the current production centers. Governments of developing and emerging countries in all tropical regions increasingly promote oil palm cultivation as a major contributor to poverty alleviation, as well as food and energy independence. However, being under pressure from several nongovernmental environmental organizations and consumers, the main palm oil traders have committed to sourcing sustainable palm oil. Against this backdrop we assess the area of suitable land and what are the limits to future oil palm expansion when several constraints are considered. We find that suitability is mainly determined by climatic conditions resulting in 1.37 billion hectares of suitable land for oil palm cultivation concentrated in twelve tropical countries. However, we estimate that half of the biophysically suitable area is already allocated to other uses, including protected areas which cover 30% of oil palm suitable area. Our results also highlight that the non-conversion of high carbon stock forest (>100 tC/ha) would be the most constraining for future oil palm expansion as it would exclude two-thirds of global oil palm suitable area. Combining eight criteria which might restrict future land availability for oil palm expansion, we find that 234 million hectares or 17% of worldwide suitable area are left. This might seem that the limits for oil palm expansion are far from being reached but one needs to take into account that some of this area might be hardly accessible currently with only 18% of this remaining area being under 2 hours transportation to the closest city- and that growing demand for other agricultural commodities which might also compete for this land has not been yet taken into account.

Water is not an infinite resource and demand from irrigation, household and industry is constantly increasing. This study focused on including global water availability including environmental flow requirements with water withdrawal from irrigation and other sectors at a monthly time-step in the GLOBIOM model. This model allows readjustment of land-use allocation, crop management, consumption and international trade. The GLOBIOM model induces an endogenous change in water price depending on water supply and demand. In this study, the focus was on how the inclusion of water resources affects land-use and, in particular, how global change will influence repartition of irrigated and rainfed lands at global scale. We used the climate change scenario including a radiative forcing of 8.5 W/m2 (RCP8.5), the socio-economic scenario (SSP2: middle-of-road), and the environmental flow method based on monthly flow allocation (the Variable Monthly Flow method) with high and low restrictions. Irrigation withdrawals were adjusted to a monthly time-step to account for biophysical water limitations at finer time resolution. Our results show that irrigated land might decrease up to 40% on average depending on the choice of EFR restrictions. Several areas were identified as future hot-spots of water stress such as the Mediterranean and Middle-East regions. Other countries were identified to be in safe position in terms of water stress such as North-European countries. Re-allocation of rainfed and irrigated land might be useful information for land-use planners and water managers at an international level to decide on appropriate legislations on climate change mitigation/adaptation when exposure and sensitivity to climate change is high and/or on adaptation measures to face increasing water demand. For example, some countries are likely to adopt measures to increase their water use efficiencies (irrigation system, soil and water conservation practices) to face water shortages, while others might consider improving their trade policy to avoid food shortage.