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If the welfare state embodies a collective obligation to give to those in need, it also attests to the failure of individual, private giving, which from the advent of industrialization has been far too modest and capricious to care adequately for the sick and indigent. Private, individual giving simply cannot compete with state help when it comes to guaranteeing people's welfare. But its failure to do a job better handled by the state does not mean that private giving is an irrelevant anachronism. Even the welfare state's most ardent supporters should appreciate its value. Private giving has intrinsic worth. It reveals how humane society is. Giving and helping palpably enrich public life, although, unlike high per capita income or low crime rates, they elude statistical composites of collective well-being. Private giving also has instrumental value. In so many ways – ranging from assisting an old lady off a bus to saving a drowning stranger – people can help each other when the state may be helpless. Privately-given funds, time, attention and ideas can supplement what the state offers; limited state resources inevitably leave some people with less than they need, and the gaps in state aid can be filled, at least in part, by private efforts.

ABSTRACTThis article examines some of the assumptions that underlie the use of aggregate data for policy analysis, In particular, it explores the consequences of the assumption of antagonistic attitudes between "haves" and "have nots" on social welfare policies. Use of public opinion data demonstrates the low salience of regressiveness of taxation and thereby calls into question the validity of a common indice in aggregate analysis. The use of this and related examples is intended to demonstrate the value of supplementing aggregate data analysis of public policy with direct evidence about public attitudes toward those policies.

Two assumptions which underlie the use of aggregate data for policy analysis are examined in view of the consequences of antagonistic attitudes between "haves" & "have nots" on social welfare policies. These assumptions are: (1) that the poor are united in their support for redistributive politics, & (2) that the poor disagree with Uc & Mc groups. These assumptions are the basis of the political argument which contends that the substance of social & fiscal policies hinges on the political influence of self-interested, rational poor people who support redistributive policies. In order to test the plausibility of these assumptions, some results from the 1969 Southeastern Regional Survey are examined. Rs, stratified according to region & race, were asked their attitudes on taxation based on: (A) individual spending, (B) individual earnings, & (C) the value of a person's property. Use of this PO data demonstrates the low salience of regressive taxation & calls into question the validity of a common index in aggregate analysis. This position & related examples demonstrate the value of supplementing aggregate data analysis of public policy with direct evidence about relevant public attitudes. 4 Tables. Modified HA.