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Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel thematisiert Whistleblowing als ein wichtiges Instrument einer transparenten und fairen Finanzwirtschaft. Dabei werden bereits bestehende Mechanismen und Regelungen zum internen und externen Whistleblowing in Deutschland insbesondere im Finanzsektor hervorgehoben und mit anderen Bereichen und Ländern verglichen. Es werden zudem Limitationen und Best Practices sowie die Auswirkung der aktuellen europäischen Richtlinie zum Hinweisgeberschutz diskutiert. Die Arbeit schließt mit einem Ausblick sowie Forderungen zur Ausweitung und Ergänzung bestehender Whistleblowing-Regelungen, durch die der Finanzplatz Deutschland gestärkt werden kann.

Prospect theory describes people as bounded rational decision maker. What sparked widespread discussion after its initial introduction in 1979 is today criticized for lack of applicability. I use the debate about whistleblowing laws to show that prospect theory may be applied prescriptively in economics as a tool to design effective legislation. Whistleblowing is often seen as an important way to uncover fraud, which causes billions of USD in damages annually. I first examine the fragmented legal landscape across Europe, showing that it can be framed as one favoring rewards or the prevention of losses. I conduct an experiment with 39 university students, wherein legislative incentives are evaluated under a prospect theoretical frame in a setting of ambiguity and high stakes. Results suggest that people exhibit the typical s-shaped value function and loss aversion in line with prospect theory. In addition, their intention to whistleblow is more heavily reduced by losses than increased by gains. The study adds to the scarce literature of prospect theory on decisions in ambiguous contexts-as well as to the applicability of the theory as a prescriptive instrument in designing institutional frames. For whistleblowing in particular, a protection-based approach seems most promising.

Intro -- Preface -- References -- Contents -- About the Authors -- Chapter 1: State of Research and Methods -- 1.1 State of Research and Methods -- 1.1.1 Previous Study in 2015 -- 1.1.2 Selection and Representativeness of the Sample -- 1.1.3 Description of Sample -- 1.1.4 Analysis Methods Applied -- References -- Chapter 2: Cultural and Structural Conditions of Corruption -- 2.1 State of Research -- 2.1.1 Prevalence of Corruption on a Country-by-Country Basis -- 2.1.2 Cultural Orientations of the Countries -- 2.1.3 Trust in Central Institutions -- 2.1.4 Social Control and Whistleblowing Culture -- 2.1.5 Knowledge of the Law and Acceptance of the Prohibition of Corruption -- 2.2 Descriptive Results -- 2.2.1 Prevalence of Corruption -- 2.2.2 Corruption Immunity -- 2.2.3 Cultural Orientations -- 2.2.4 Trust in Central Institutions (``Tone from the top´´) -- 2.2.5 Whistleblowing Culture -- 2.2.6 Knowledge of Criminal Liability and Attitudes Toward Corruption -- 2.3 Multivariate Model -- 2.3.1 Variable and Construct Analyses -- 2.3.2 Effects of Country Variables on Corruption Immunity in the Country Context -- 2.4 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Impact of Law and Market Mechanisms on CMS -- 3.1 Research Background -- 3.1.1 Legal Obligation to Implement a CMS in the Comparison Countries -- 3.1.2 International Legal Obligations to Implement a CMS -- 3.1.3 Significance of International Competition and the Capital Market -- 3.2 Results -- 3.2.1 Operationalization of a CMS -- 3.2.2 Diffusion and Quality of CMS in the Comparison Countries -- 3.2.3 Significance of a Stock Exchange Listing and International Law -- 3.2.4 Significance of Central Social Institutions -- 3.2.5 Factors Influencing the Implementation of a CMS -- 3.3 Conclusion and Outlook -- References.