"Im gegenwärtig vorherrschenden Klimadiskurs gilt 'klimawandelbedingte Migration' als Anpassungsstrategie und der Untergang von nur knapp über dem Meeresspiegel liegenden Inselstaaten als unvermeidlich. Mit diesem Zukunftsszenario wollen sich die Menschen von Tuvalu, Kiribati und Co. Nicht abfinden." (Autorenreferat)
The concept of resilience was born and grew up in the environmental sciences during the 1970s. After migrating into many other disciplines, resilience is now 'coming home' to the politics of the environment in the name of security. The field of climate change induced migration is investigated as a paradigmatic case of environmental security. On a theoretical level, resilience is studied as a governmentality; that is, as advanced liberal government which governs through contingency. On an empirical level, a brief genealogy of environmental migration is presented with a focus on the latest discursive shift towards resilience. It is demonstrated that climate change induced migration was once represented as a pathology to be prevented and, more recently, as an issue of refugee rights. However, the shift towards resilience has reframed the debate. Climate change-induced migration is now presented as a rational strategy of adaptation to unavoidable levels of climate change and the relocation of millions of people is rendered acceptable and rational. The most drastic policy implication of this shift is that the space of the political is eliminated. Climate change is presented as a matter of fact rather than as a social problem that could still be tackled by significant emission reductions and lifestyle changes by residents in the major developed economies.
Die Verfasser stellen drei verschiedene Theorien vor, mit denen die Verortung des Klimawandels als Sicherheitsbedrohung und die daraus entstehenden Folgen analysiert werden können. Anhand dieser Theorien setzen sie sich mit der Frage auseinander, was die Konstruktion des Klimawandels als Sicherheitspolitik bedeutet und welche politischen Wirkungen sie bereits hatte. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass weder drastischer Klimaschutz noch ein politischer Ausnahmezustand als Folge der Versicherheitlichung des Klimawandels zu beobachten sind. Stattdessen stellen die Verfasser eine "Klimatisierung" von vier Politikfeldern fest, die sicherheitsrelevant sind, nämlich der Entwicklungspolitik, der Verteidigungspolitik, der Migrationspolitik und des Katastrophenschutzes. (ICE2)
Over the last decade, climate change has increasingly been discussed as a security threat. In this essay, we ask from the perspective of the Copenhagen School, if climate change has been successfully »securitized«. We show that there were many speech acts in the realm of international politics which problematized climate change as a security issue but that hardly anyone adopted extraordinary measures to address it. However, this failed securitization does not mean that climate security discourse did not have any policy implications. We use the case of climate change in order to illustrate some well-known weaknesses of the original Copenhagen School's theory of securitization and demonstrate the added value of theory extensions for our case. From an extended theoretical perspective, we show that climate security discourse presents dangerous levels of climate change as an unchangeable matter of fact. It thereby renders invisible the scope for fighting climate change. Instead, resilience to climate change impacts comes to the foreground. We argue that this is a problematic form of de-politicization as well. Keywords: climate change, securitization, Copenhagen School, environmental security, United Nations. (Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen / SWP)
Constraining global climate change to 1.5°C is commonly understood to require urgent and deep societal transformations. Yet such transformations are not always viewed as politically feasible; finding ways to enhance the political feasibility of ambitious decarbonization trajectories is needed. This paper reviews the role of social justice as an organizing principle for politically feasible 1.5°C transformations. A social justice lens usefully focuses attention on first, protecting vulnerable people from climate change impacts, second, protecting people from disruptions of transformation, and finally, enhancing the process of envisioning and implementing an equitable post-carbon society. However, justice-focused arguments could also have unintended consequences, such as being deployed against climate action. Hence proactively engaging with social justice is critical in navigating 1.5°C societal transformations.
Constraining global climate change to 1.5°C is commonly understood to require urgent and deep societal transformations. Yet such transformations are not always viewed as politically feasible; finding ways to enhance the political feasibility of ambitious decarbonization trajectories is needed. This paper reviews the role of social justice as an organizing principle for politically feasible 1.5°C transformations. A social justice lens usefully focuses attention on first, protecting vulnerable people from climate change impacts, second, protecting people from disruptions of transformation, and finally, enhancing the process of envisioning and implementing an equitable post-carbon society. However, justice-focused arguments could also have unintended consequences, such as being deployed against climate action. Hence proactively engaging with social justice is critical in navigating 1.5°C societal transformations.