Suchergebnisse

Guilds ruled many crafts and trades from the Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution, and have always attracted debate and controversy. They were sometimes viewed as efficient institutions that guaranteed quality and skills. But they also excluded competitors, manipulated markets, and blocked innovations. Did the benefits of guilds outweigh their costs? Analyzing thousands of guilds that dominated European economies from 1000 to 1880, The European Guilds uses vivid examples and clear economic reasoning to answer that question. Sheilagh Ogilvie's book features the voices of honorable guild masters, underpaid journeymen, exploited apprentices, shady officials, and outraged customers, and follows the stories of the "vile encroachers" - women, migrants, Jews, gypsies, bastards, and many others - desperate to work but hunted down by the guilds as illicit competitors. She investigates the benefits of guilds but also shines a light on their dark side. Guilds sometimes provided important services, but they also manipulated markets to profit their members. They regulated quality but prevented poor consumers from buying goods cheaply. They fostered work skills but denied apprenticeships to outsiders. They transmitted useful techniques but blocked innovations that posed a threat. Guilds existed widely not because they corrected market failures or served the common good but because they benefited two powerful groups--guild members and political elites

"What was the role of merchant guilds in the medieval and early modern economy? Does their wide prevalence and long survival mean they were efficient institutions that benefited the whole economy? Or did they simply offer an effective way for the rich and powerful to increase their wealth, at the expense of outsiders, customers and society as a whole? These privileged associations of businessmen were key institutions in the European economy from 1000 to 1800. Historians debate merchant guilds' role in the Commercial Revolution, economists use them to support theories about institutions and development, and policy-makers view them as prime examples of social capital, with important lessons for modern economies. Sheilagh Ogilvie's magisterial new history of commercial institutions shows how the answers to such questions can help us understand which types of institution made trade grow, why institutions exist, and how corporate privileges affect economic efficiency and human well-being"--

Institutions - the structures of rules and norms governing economic transactions are widely assigned a central role in economic development. Yet economic history is still dominated by the belief that institutions arise and survive because they are economically efficient. This paper shows that alternative explanations of institutions - particularly those incorporating distributional effects - are consistent with economic theory and supported by empirical findings. Distributional conflicts provide a better explanation than efficiency for the core economic institutions of pre-industrial Europe - serfdom, the community, the craft guild, and the merchant guild. The paper concludes by proposing four desiderata for any future economic theory of institutions.

State Corporatism and Proto-Industry focuses on an industrial countryside in south-west Germany, where a dense worsted industry dominated the rural economy from 1580 to 1800. This is an example of 'proto-industry', the dense, export-oriented rural manufacturing which arose throughout Europe before factory industrialization. But although the Württemberg worsted industry possessed all the features of a classic proto-industry, closer scrutiny throws doubt on basic assumptions about European proto-industrialization. In this book, Sheilagh Ogilvie shows that proto-industries did not break down traditional society. Instead, corporate institutions such as guilds, merchant companies, village communities and manorial systems retained enormous power. This was a result of 'state corporatism': the expanding early modern state granted privileges to favoured groups in return for fiscal and regulatory co-operation. As Ogilvie shows, these corporate privileges profoundly constrained both individual decisions and economic development

Le retard avec lequel le processus d'industrialisation s'est enclenché en Allemagne au XIXe siècle est souvent mis sur le compte de facteurs «exogènes». Or, on découvre que, si ce fut effectivement le cas pour la diffusion de l'industrie «manufacturière» (le système «usinier» ), en remontant dans le temps jusqu'à la fin du Moyen-âge, l'espace allemand n'accusait aucun retard vis-à-vis du reste de l'Europe occidentale quant à la production de biens industriels. La question revient donc au problème des transitions manquées entre XVIe et XIXe siècle. Le type d'obstacles que la société allemande a opposé à l'émergence d'organisations plus propres à satisfaire la demande de biens manufacturés (comme le textile) peut se résumer en une formule : l'institutionnalisation d'un corporatisme qui a bloqué l'évolution du système de production industrielle. Les contraintes politiques de la période ont en effet joué dans le sens de l'inertie institutionnelle où des groupes d'intérêts (princes, municipalités, corporations) trouvaient leur compte mais où l'ensemble de la population a pâti des barrières mises à l'innovation entrepreneuriale perceptible dans d'autres régions d'Europe.

Cet article passe en revue l'état actuel du débat concernant les théories de ' protoindustrialisation'. Celles-ci essayent d'expliquer l'évolution économique durant les premières années de l'Europe moderne. La recherche récente a révélé que les conséquences économiques, sociales et démographiques de la proto-industrialisation different énormément suivant les sociétes. Les principaux facteurs techniques et sociaux qui sont à l'origine de cette diversité sont ici examinés et une analyse de ces facteurs en termes d'influence sur les coûts est proposée.L'auteur affirme que les facteurs les plus importants sont les institutions qui régissent la société: le système des tenures, les communautés, les corporations, les compagnies de commerce et également l'Etat. Ces résultats peuvent éclaircir nos analyses du développement des économies modernes en faisant la lumière sur les jeux d'influence des diverses institutions sur le changement economique et démographique.

Do factor endowments explain serfdom? Domar (1970) conjectured that high land-labor ratios caused serfdom by increasing incentives to coerce labor. But historical evidence is mixed and quantitative analyses are lacking. Using the Acemoglu-Wolitzky (2011) framework and controlling for political economy variables by studying a specific serf society, we analyze 11,349 Bohemian serf villages in 1757. The net effect of higher land-labor ratios was indeed to increase coercion. The effect greatly increased when animal labor was included, and diminished as land-labor ratios rose. Controlling for other variables, factor endowments significantly influenced serfdom. Institutions, we conclude, are shaped partly by economic fundamentals.

On considère souvent que les paysans ignorent les concepts de coût et de profit, et détestent les marchés, l'argent et le gain. La lenteur de la croissance économique est alors attribuée à la «culture paysanne ». Lorsque les paysans se comportent différemment, l'on suppose qu'ils vivent dans des enclaves d'agriculture avancée ou individualiste. Cet article étudie une économie paysanne qui ne prétend pas être avancée : la Bohême sous le servage. Les archives des justices seigneuriales montrent que les paysans de Bohême employaient les concepts économiques habituels, se servaient de l'argent et recherchaient le gain. Ces constats indiquent que les frontières de la culture économique moderne doivent être placées plus à l'Est qu'on ne le pense en général ; ils remettent en question l'utilité de la notion de «culture paysanne» pour expliquer la stagnation économique.