Suchergebnisse

Standard risk economic analysis suggests that global environmental risk is lower in the case of risk aversion than in the case of risk neutrality or risk seeking. Maybe the reason why the Advisory Council of the German Government on Global Environmental Change (WBGU) explicitly recommends to behave as a risk averter when dealing with problems of global risk management. However risk aversion not always guaranties the limitation of a global pollutant, like CO2. To show this the paper focuses on two different landscapes of risk that are motivated by aspects of ecological vulnerability of the nations as well as the country-specific abilities to cope with environmental change. Each is defined in terms of the means – and of the standard deviation ó of the national welfare distributions in different states of emission behaviour. The nations under consideration are either risk neutral, risk averse or risk seeking and are sovereign in taking measures of global risk reduction. Following the assumption of expected utility maximisation it is revealed that taking and enforcing measures of risk reduction critically depend on the interplay of the subjective risk preferences and the landscape of risk induced by the effects of global risk control. Hence, given the national risk preferences, it is the landscape of risk that determines the co-operative power of national risk attitudes and with it attributes the nations as environmental-friendly or not. ; Risikoökonomische Analysen lassen den Schluss zu, dass die Begrenzung globaler Umweltrisiken im Fall der Risikoscheu auf einem höheren Niveau erfolgt als unter Risikoneutralität oder Risikofreude. Möglicherweise empfiehlt deshalb auch der Wissenschaftliche Beirat der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderung (WBGU 2000) bei der globalen Risikobegrenzung eine risikoscheue Haltung einzunehmen. Die vorliegende Analyse zeigt jedoch, dass eine risikoscheue Haltung keine Garantie für die Verringerung globaler Schadstoffe, etwa von CO2, ist. Betrachtet werden zwei Risikolandschaften, die sich durch unterschiedliche Risiko- Ertragsstrukturen auszeichnen. Die Ursache sind länderspezifische Betroffenheitslagen im Fall einer Risikofreisetzung sowie nationale Unterschiede bei der Risikobewältigung. In den Risikolandschaften agieren zwei Länder, die souverän über den Beitritt zu einem internationalen Umweltschutzabkommen entscheiden. Jedes Land optimiert entsprechend seiner länderindividuellen Risikopräferenz (die risikoscheu, risikoneutral oder risikofreudig ausgeprägt sein kann) die jeweils nationale Wohlfahrtslage. Dabei wird deutlich, dass der Beitritt zu einem internationalen Umweltschutzabkommen und die Umsetzung der damit verbundenen Pflichten wesentlich davon abhängen, ob die "subjektive" Risikobewertung durch die Risikopräferenzen der Staaten mit den "objektiven" (d.h. von Experten geschätzten) Risiko-Ertragsstrukturen harmonieren. Daraus ergibt sich, dass bei gegebener Risikohaltung der Staaten, letztlich der Typ der vorliegenden Risikolandschaft über die kooperationsfördernde Wirkung des Risikoverhaltens bestimmt und in Folge auch festlegt, welchen Staaten das Attribut der Umweltfreundlichkeit und welchen das des Freifahrers zufällt.

Chemicals indisputably contribute greatly to the well‐being of modern societies. Apart from such benefits, however, chemicals often pose serious threats to human health and the environment when improperly handled. Therefore, the European Commission has proposed a regulatory framework for the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) that requires companies using chemicals to gather pertinent information on the properties of these substances. In this article, we argue that the crucial aspect of this information management may be the honesty and accuracy of the transfer of relevant knowledge from the producer of a chemical to its user. This may be particularly true if the application of potentially hazardous chemicals is not part of the user's core competency. Against this background, we maintain that the traditional sales concept provides no incentives for transferring this knowledge. The reason is that increased user knowledge of a chemical's properties may raise the efficiency of its application. That is, excessive and unnecessary usage will be eliminated. This, in turn, would lower the amount of chemicals sold and in competitive markets directly decrease profits of the producer. Through the introduction of chemical leasing business models, we attempt to present a strategy to overcome the incentive structure of classical sales models, which is counterproductive for the transfer of knowledge. By introducing two models (a Model A that differs least and a Model B that differs most from traditional sales concepts), we demonstrate that chemical leasing business models are capable of accomplishing the goal of Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals: to effectively manage the risk of chemicals by reducing the total quantity of chemicals used, either by a transfer of applicable knowledge from the lessor to the lessee (Model A) or by efficient application of the chemical by the lessor him/herself (Model B).

Global public good provision (e.g. environmental quality) confronts us with problems demanding both national and international co-operation. However among sovereign nations reaching agreement on mutual public good provision is difficult. Slowing down global warming is just one example. Due to the diffusion of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere it is attractive for each individual state that other countries commit themselves to climate protection, whereas one's own state using the free-rider-strategy benefits from the protective measures of the others without making any costly national contribution. On the other hand such a strategic behaviour clashes with moral values, especially concerning motives of justice within society. Should free-riding be preferred from the strategic point of view or rather, out of consideration to justice, national commitments to contribute to climate protection? Therefore, an analysis of how appraisals of justice and strategic considerations interact is a challenge to international (environmental) policy. Taking a game-theoretic point of view, we analyse three psychological-empirical conceptions of justice: need, equality and equity, and point out how these principles are able to determine the type of game nations are expected to play.

In this paper, we argue that the incentive structures of the games nations play in international environmental negotiations depend on the choice of environmental policy instruments. Bargaining on the use of some instrument (eg, an effluent charge) may put the players into a dilemma game (like Chicken). Negotiations to apply a different instrument (say, an emission reduction quota) may lead to a cooperation game (like Stag Hunt). The higher the incentive to cooperate in the type of game built up by a specific instrument, the higher is this instrument's "cooperative push." Of course, comparing two instruments, the one with the higher cooperative push might well be the less efficient one. In this paper, we analyze a situation where the higher cooperative push of an instrument overcompensates this instrument's lower efficiency: Aggregate welfare with bilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of Stag Hunt) is higher than with unilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of the Chicken game). The question remains whether sovereign countries decide to play Stag Hunt, ending up in the welfare superior equilibrium. It is shown below that they do not in an uncoordinated optimizing setting. However, we develop a particular frame where the proposed solution meets the criteria of individual rationality, stability, & fairness. It thereby establishes the politically most desired result -- international cooperation. 4 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.