Suchergebnisse

The liberal state, it has been argued, must be neutral between different conceptions of the good. Honoring individual autonomy & embodying ideals such as fairness & impartiality, the doctrine of state neutrality is intuitively appealing. Working as a restraint for state actions it is however problematic. In this paper, a possible solution to this predicament is outlined. Drawing on the distinction between liberty & what gives worth to liberty, it is argued that we must never accept non-neutral restrictions of liberty itself, but may pursue non-neutral policies affecting the distribution of what gives worth to liberty & may impose taxes funding non-neutral state actions, although such taxation inevitable limits the worth of our liberty. It is suggested that we, by adopting such a policy of limited state perfectionism, can recognize the right to individual autonomy without having to restrain the state from doing the good it can. References. Adapted from the source document.