Suchergebnisse

The eruption of the novel virus brought to the global scene the prediction that Africa would be worse hit by the pandemic. This prediction was partly built on the widely recognized fact that Africa is the continent with the weakest public health care system and the lowest budgetary allocations to health. However, contrary to this prediction, the COVID-19 death rate in Africa has been low compared to in other continents. Debates on Africa's low COVID-19 death rate have generated mixed reactions, the majority of which have centred on beliefs and superstition about hot weather and Africa's youth-dominated society. Little or none of these reactions have attributed the low COVID-19 death rate to swift and prudent budgetary adjustment, which partly aided a swift response from some African governments. Indeed, not many studies have examined the swiftness in the response of some African governments and prudent budgetary adjustment in tackling the spread of COVID-19. This paper, through secondary data, advances knowledge on how budget revision aided government response to the COVID-19 pandemic in South Africa and Nigeria. It found that both countries adjusted their budgetary allocations in response to COVID-19. It further indicates that South Africa, through budgetary revision, allocated more funds to government agencies in charge of COVID-19 and various relief packages than Nigeria. Moreover, it indicates that the swift budgetary adjustment by both countries partly aided a quick government response that progressively flattened the curve and, in the long run, partly contributed to fiscal impulse and deferrals.

The discovery of oil in Nigeria since 1956 has inflicted a heavy burden on the local people of the Niger River Delta who have had to contend with the consequences of oil production. The grievances of these local people have persisted for more than three decades without concrete efforts on the part of the government or oil multinationals to address them. The global triumph of capitalism and the fall of communism gave the local people an opportunity to organize social movements with similar interests to international civil society to challenge the policies of successive governments and the activities of oil multinationals in the Niger Delta. This paper addresses the factors that led to a sudden upsurge in the number of social movements in the Niger Delta and how foreign NGOs have played an important role in addressing the plight of the local people of the region.

The discovery of oil in Nigeria since 1956 has inflicted a heavy burden on the local people of the Niger River Delta who have had to contend with the consequences of oil production. The grievances of these local people have persisted for more than three decades without concrete efforts on the part of the government or oil multinationals to address them. The global triumph of capitalism and the fall of communism gave the local people an opportunity to organize social movements with similar interests to international civil society to challenge the policies of successive governments and the activities of oil multinationals in the Niger Delta. This paper addresses the factors that led to a sudden upsurge in the number of social movements in the Niger Delta and how foreign NGOs have played an important role in addressing the plight of the local people of the region.

Nigeria and The Gambia have been involved in asymmetrical relations since 1965 given the disparity in the material capabilities between them. This asymmetry came to the fore in the role played by Nigeria in resolving the 2016 political impasse in The Gambia when former President Yahya Jammeh refused to accept the results of the elections and quit power, having lost to the opposition. Adopting Krystof Kozák's four behavioural tendencies of asymmetrically stronger states in the theory of asymmetry in international relations, this article notes that Nigeria changed its behaviour towards The Gambia from asymmetric benevolence (B2) to military threat (B4) to oust Jammeh from power. It, however, adds that beyond deploying its asymmetric advantage in resolving the Gambian impasse, Nigeria cannot be of serious assistance to The Gambia in building democratic structures and institutions due to its democratic challenges on B2 terms. The article concludes that Nigeria's action in the Gambian crisis was an end in itself, that is, it was aimed at forestalling threats to regional stability. Nigeria lacks moral and technical wherewithal to deploy its B2 behaviour towards the development of democratic institutions in The Gambia.