Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether private insurance is a normal good by examining the effects of public insurance. Also, this study investigates how the amount of public insurance premium affects to the private insurance demand. The main results of this study are as follows. First, the private insurance has a tendency to be a normal good whether the public insurance benefit is fixed to household income. Second, the degree of loading of public insurance and average probability of accident taking place, which are the components of public insurance premium, relates to the private insurance demand, but whether this relation is positive or negative is indeterminate unless private insurance is actuarially fair.

This article analyzes the life and nonlife insurance markets with horizontal differentiation and brand loyalties using a spatial competition model. We construct a three-stage game that includes sales promotion in the first stage, insurance product characteristics in the second stage, and premiums in the third stage. The analysis derives the following results. First, an insurance firm with greater brand loyalty realizes a higher degree of differentiation and sets a relatively higher premium. Second, introducing regulation in insurance product characteristics leads to a lower degree of differentiation and a lower level of sales promotion. Such regulation may then be desirable in terms of social surplus.

This study examines the relationship between incentive contracts for managers and the allocation of efforts by the managers as well as the stock market's role in monitoring allocation of the efforts. It also evaluates solvency regulation in Japan and its effects on the compensation of a manager and allocation of the manager's efforts and on the shareholders' profits in a market with asymmetric information. Particularly, we employ a principal-agency model to demonstrate how uncertainty in the insurance market affects the way managers allocate their efforts so that their companies can achieve a higher solvency ratio in order to meet not only regulatory requirements but also stock market expectation. We find presence of a solvency margin ratio that, subject to certain conditions, increases the level of "good" effort, decreases the level of "bad" effort by the manager and increases the expected stock price.

Abstract
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the new Japanese Bonus–Malus System (BMS 2012) in automobile insurance, which is an unusual system wherein both no-claim and claimed subclasses exist. To evaluate BMS 2012, we conduct a simulation analysis and compare BMS 2012 with the former Japanese BMS (BMS 2009) in terms of the present value of the total insurance premium that is closely related to the frequency of insurance claims. Based on the comparison, our main conclusion is that BMS 2012 offers more effects to lower the frequency of insurance claims than BMS 2009 does when the policyholders' classes in BMS are high classes that evaluate as safety drivers, time discount and/or renewal rates are relatively low, and the policyholders' risk averseness is large.

Abstract
Some people have optimistic expectations regarding their accident probability, and thus, refrain from purchasing adequate insurance. This study investigates how insurance firms use advertisements to lower the ratio of optimistic individuals in the market. The main results are as follows: first, the optimal level of advertisements is maximized when the insurance premium is moderate. Second, the maximum level of advertisement varies according to the degree of optimism, which is measured by the difference between accurate and optimistic accident probabilities. Third, the advertisement decision is affected by the free-rider problem, and the equilibrium number of insurance firms with advertisement is always larger than that of firms without advertisement in a competitive insurance market.