Suchergebnisse

Abstract Many efforts to solve environmental problems arising at the international or transnational level meet with limited success or even end in outright failure. But some efforts of this sort succeed. We construct an analytical model of such efforts leading to the conclusion that an ability to steer a course that avoids the twin perils of institutional reductionism and institutional overload is necessary to achieve success in this realm. We examine a range of risk factors or conditions likely to push processes of regime formation and implementation into one or the other of these pitfalls. We then analyze response strategies or procedures that negotiators and administrators can adopt to steer a course between the two perils, taking into account distinctive features of specific problems. We turn to marine issues to illustrate our reasoning. But the argument is applicable to the entire range of efforts to create and implement international environmental regimes.

This article highlights recent successes and failures in efforts to manage Arctic marine living resources to improve our understanding of institutional resilience—that is, the ability of cooperative institutions to maintain their performance despite severe disruptions to their operating environments. Rising ocean temperatures and other impacts of climate change may alter the spatial distribution of fish stocks, including their relative attachment to exclusive economic zones and their availability on the high seas. As evident in the examined Arctic cases, which involve the world's largest stocks of cod, herring and mackerel, such changes may complicate core resource management tasks, including the regulatory task of reaching an agreement among user states on quotas and other restraints that align with scientific advice. The cross-case variance in regulatory resilience to climate-related and other changes in cooperative circumstances sheds light on general propositions regarding the drivers and inhibitors of institutional resilience, including institutional characteristics and the severity of the political challenges posed by changing circumstances.

Distinctive institutional features can make a regime particularly suited for conducting one or more generic tasks of governance: building knowledge, strengthening norms, enhancing problem-solving capacity, or enforcing rule compliance. Each of those governance tasks constitutes a potential "niche" that a regime can specialize in within a larger institutional complex. Applying this niche-oriented approach to the case of Arctic marine transport helps to explain the emerging division of labor between regional and global institutions in an issue area marked by rapid change. Drawing on earlier regime-effectiveness research, the article examines the potential of regional institutions, especially the Arctic Council, to contribute to strengthening the international governance system for shipping, based on the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO). Although the Arctic Council is not well positioned to regulate regional shipping activities, it may facilitate regulatory advances in the IMO, in part by knowledge-building and in part by helping Arctic states to find common ground on matters of controversy. The Council is also well equipped to enhance regional maritime infrastructure, like capacities for responding to oil spills, and search and rescue operations. Should binding region-specific international rules on Arctic shipping be adopted, Arctic institutions could play a role in coordinating port-state enforcement measures-but existing institutions with broader participation are better suited and will probably remain dominant. The larger question of achieving cross-institutional interplay that can promote effectiveness is relevant in any region or issue area, because efforts to solve specific problems usually involve more than one institution. Adapted from the source document.