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This article proposes a theoretical model for understanding foreign policy formation and change, especially regarding alliances and what might be called "balancing" foreign policy behavior. The article combines a realist focus on power with the perceptions of actors based on their experiences and the lessons they draw from them. When uncertainty about threat level is high, the "lessons" that actors or groups draw from the past play an indispensable role in helping them make sense of the world. The model is applied to the case of Denmark's decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, which was arguably the most significant shift in Danish foreign policy of the twentieth century. The model explains why Danish officials decided to joined NATO only after the Scandinavian Defense Union had failed.

Danish activism in a Nordic context has suffered many setbacks since the end of the cold war. A central supplement strategy to the dominant Danish foreign and security policy in NATO during the cold war, Danish Nordic activism has since lost ground within the military sphere, the diplomatic sphere and the economic sphere. However, recent developments indicate that Danish Nordic activism may now experience a cautious revival, brought about by success with pragmatically focused cooperative projects for example in NORDEFCO and by the diffusion of Nordic ideals to a broader group such as Nordic Plus or within the EU. The NATO and EU divide between the Nordic countries, however, as well as differing national priorities in many different policy areas, still constitute considerable obstacles.

Dansk aktivisme i nordisk kontekst har ikke haft nemme kår siden den kolde krigs afslutning. Fra at have udgjort et centralt udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitisk supplement til Danmarks hovedlinje som NATO-medlem under den kolde krig, blev det nordiske, efter den kolde krigs afslutning, i stigende grad nedprioriteret på både det politisk-militære, det politisk-diplomatiske og det økonomiske område. Udviklingen de seneste år tyder imidlertid på en forsigtig ny spiren i nordisk aktivisme. Dette skyldes dels succes inden for pragmatiske samarbejder, fx i NORDEFCO, dels diffunderingen af nordiske idealer til lidt bredere kredse inden for fx Nordic Plus eller inden for EU. Forskellige nationale præferencer på flere politikområder såvel som NATO- og EU-skel udgør dog stadig centrale begrænsninger.

Danish activism in a Nordic context has suffered many setbacks since the end of the cold war. A central supplement strategy to the dominant Danish foreign and security policy in NATO during the cold war, Danish Nordic activism has since lost ground within the military sphere, the diplomatic sphere and the economic sphere. However, recent developments indicate that Danish Nordic activism may now experience a cautious revival, brought about by success with pragmatically focused cooperative projects for example in NORDEFCO and by the diffusion of Nordic ideals to a broader group such as Nordic Plus or within the EU. The NATO and EU divide between the Nordic countries, however, as well as differing national priorities in many different policy areas, still constitute considerable obstacles.

When the Baltic States regained their independence in 1991, Denmark had been one of their very strongest supporters, at a time when many European countries looked at the Baltic aspirations with caution. It was one of the first examples of the new post-Cold War "activist" Danish foreign policy strategy. It was not, however, without difficulties. Thus, the article argues that the Danish Social Democratic centre-left and Conservative-Liberal centre-right disagreed on how to support the Balts in practice and at what price. The difference was rooted in a hawk-dove disagreement over détente and the Soviet Union. Government party colour, the article argues, is therefore likely to have been crucial for the Danish policy. Had the relatively hawkish centre-right government not been in po­wer, it is very doubtful that we would have seen the kind of aggressive diplomatic support for Baltic independence as we saw from Denmark leading up to 1991.

When the Baltic States regained their independence in 1991, Denmark had been one of their very strongest supporters, at a time when many European countries looked at the Baltic aspirations with caution. It was one of the first examples of the new post-Cold War 'activist' Danish foreign policy strategy. It was not, however, without difficulties. Thus, the article argues that the Danish Social Democratic centre-left and Conservative-Liberal centre-right disagreed on how to support the Balts in practice and at what price. The difference was rooted in a hawk-dove disagreement over detente and the Soviet Union. Government party colour, the article argues, is therefore likely to have been crucial for the Danish policy. Had the relatively hawkish centre-right government not been in power, it is very doubtful that we would have seen the kind of aggressive diplomatic support for Baltic independence as we saw from Denmark leading up to 1991. Adapted from the source document.

This report argues that when the Cold War ended, old Cold War lessons were slowly replaced not by one, but rather by at least two kinds of activist foreign policy lesson: a Liberal/Conservative hawkish activist lesson that relatively easily embraced military measures with or without broad international support, and a Social Democratic/Social Liberal dovish activist lesson that was comparatively more multilaterally inclined and had a stronger focus on humanitarian aid. Any seeming consensus during the 1990s or in recent years must not, therefore, be taken for general agreement about activist foreign policy. Instead, these should be seen merely as periods where the differences between lessons of activist foreign policy were masked by the fact that external circumstances, especially periodic American foreign policy restraint and preference for multilateralism, were not creating conditions for disagreement. For this reason the present Danish consensus on activist foreign policy is unlikely to survive any major American aggressive resurgence or big shifts away from multilateralism.

Great power politics in the Arctic are intensifying. The US, Russia and China are all strengthening their presence in the region. With the Arctic strategy of the Kingdom of Denmark presently in the process of being updated, this report analyses the assessments and strategies of Finland, Norway and Iceland and identifies points for consideration by the Kingdom of Denmark. These include emphasizing the value of closely coordinating with the other Nordic countries to establish Arctic-specific military confidence-building measures (CBMs); prioritizing the development of sufficient national capability to decrease reliance on immediate US and NATO involvement; taking a proactive approach to securing influence over the evolving military presence and activities of the US and NATO on the Kingdom of Denmark's territory; further exploring the idea of alternative funding options for Arctic development; and strengthening of Nordic collaboration on intelligence activities, information exchange and diplomatic efforts concerning all three great powers.

This paper seeks to document Danish experiences with integrating International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Laws (IHRL) in capacity building and training of foreign armed forces. It is the first such attempt to present experiences from different international missions and engagements and has thus relied on 'inventing' ways and means of identifying and documenting these. The paper builds on a range of interviews with individuals directly or indirectly involved in training and capacity building activities such as military legal advisors and civilian advisors as well as members of the armed forces. Further, the paper draws on presentations and discussions at a Nordic seminar on IHL and IHRL in capacity building held in Copenhagen on 17 November 2015. The majority of relevant Danish military legal advisors were identified and interviewed for this paper. However, the paper would have benefitted from additional interviews with officers in the armed forces with hands on experience from IHL and IHLR capacity building and training in international missions. Future analysis could therefore focus on further identification of practitioners involved in IHL and IHRL training and capacity building from within the armed forces. While the paper presents an overview of IHL and IHRL capacity building and training activities to date it does not satisfactorily present the impact of these activities. Respondents were all asked about their views on the outcomes of the activities conducted in terms of changed behaviour, procedures and practises. However, due to the ad hoc and often discontinued nature of their work, few offered any views on the impact generated. This paper therefore argues that more should be done to monitor the outcomes and impact of IHL and IHRL capacity building and training including through establishing a baseline i.e. some form of assessment of IHL and IHRL adherence prior to the capacity building and training intervention. At the end of this working paper, key findings have been grouped under 5 thematic categories to provide the reader with 'easy access' to key observations. A list of useful resources on IHL and IHRL, all of which can be accessed online, is also included.

Nordic states' partnership choices in security and defence are more aligned than they were a decade ago. When Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish government officials now identify key security challenges and partners, and reflect on the potential for Nordic cooperation, they have the same reference points and use similar wording. Since 2014, the toolbox for Nordic defence cooperation has also solidified and different formal affiliations with NATO and the EU seem to matter less than before. Furthermore, an array of multi- and minilateral cooperation structures have emerged across and beyond the EU and NATO, expanding the possibilities for Nordic cooperation under a larger Euro-Atlantic umbrella. However, two limitations remain: First, Nordic security and defence cooperation still remains subordinate to and a supplement rather than an alternative to NATO. Second, putting Nordic response mechanisms into practice remains dependent not only on the context and issue at stake, but also on the political appetite of the individual Nordic governments to choose a Nordic solution. ; publishedVersion

The Danish defence opt-out will hamper the protection of Danish interests if, in the future, there is dynamic integration, working towards increased European strategic autonomy. Conversely, the defence opt-out will be less important if the EU's defence cooperation stagnates or is rolled back, for example due to internal disagreement among the member states. These were the main findings in the external DIIS report from 2019 that has now been translated to English. The report was commissioned by the Danish government in November 2018 and focuses on the development in the EU in the field of security and defence policy cooperation and its significance for Denmark. Picking up from the last DIIS report (2008), the new report focuses in particular on the period following the launch of the EU's global strategy in the summer of 2016. The analysis is based on interviews with experts, officials and representatives from the EU, NATO, Denmark and other Member States, as well as case files in the archive of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official documents, and existing research.