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Government formation is a crucial phase after elections. This article focusses on coalition formation in Belgian local government after the elections in 2006. Coalition theories have mainly been developed at the national level, but they are also applicable to the local level where there is no shortage of coalitions. This level offers the opportunity to not only test rather classic coalition theories such as minimum size theories or the coalitions' incumbency status. In a federal state like Belgium we can compare the local coalitions with coalitions made at higher levels. The results show that the local political parties prefer to form minimal winning and minimum parties coalitions, but not the smallest coalition that is possible. Coalitions are also more likely to form when they represent the incumbent coalition. Finally, political parties prefer congruent coalitions with the federal and regional government. Adapted from the source document.

This paper focuses on the role of size in coalition formation in the Flemish region in Belgium after the local elections of 2006. A quantitative analysis already showed that size matters at the local level. In this paper, portfolio allocation is considered as an important part of coalition formation. This paper illustrates that combining research methods can enhance our knowledge about the role of size in the coalition formation process. The results demonstrate that parties consider a minimal winning and minimum parties coalition as a starting point for the negotiations and other factors influence the final coalition outcome. In portfolio allocation proportionality rules, but parties also prefer competences related to their policy profile. Intra-party and personal characteristics play an important role in selecting the executive mandates.

This article focuses on the role of size in coalition formation in the Flemish region in Belgium after the local elections of 2006. A quantitative analysis already showed that, size matters at the local level. In this article, portfolio allocation is considered as an important part of coalition formation. This article illustrates that, combining research methods can enhance their knowledge about the role of size in the coalition formation process. The results demonstrate that, parties consider a minimal winning and minimum parties coalition as a starting point for the negotiations and other factors influence the final coalition outcome. In portfolio allocation proportionality rules, but parties also prefer competences related to their policy profile. Intra-party and personal characteristics play an important role in selecting the executive mandates. Adapted from the source document.