Suchergebnisse

The article examines the role played by the Portuguese oppositionist diaspora in the final years of theEstado Novodictatorship (c. 1968–c.1974). It advances an explanation for the apparent lack of success met by several exile groups when trying to persuade the Western democracies to withdraw (or at least reduce) their support for Lisbon's authoritarian regime during a period in which the public was increasingly aware of human rights abuses. The choice of this particular juncture is justified for several reasons. Firstly, it was a time of renewed expectations regarding a possible liberalisation of the regime in the aftermath of the replacement of the incapacitated Oliveira Salazar by the younger Marcelo Caetano (September 1968), an event that confronted the different sections of the Portuguese opposition with a number of dilemmas, both at home and abroad, and exposed rifts that would take some time to repair. Secondly, this was also an epoch of momentous social and cultural change in Europe, with obvious ramifications for the political orientations and attitudes of those who, for different reasons, had decided to leave Portugal in the 1960s. Finally, the vicissitudes of the East–West détente are seen here as equally important for understanding the opportunities and limitations of the anti-Estado Novoopposition abroad.

UID/HIS/04209/2013 ; The article examines the role played by the Portuguese oppositionist diaspora in the final years of the Estado Novo dictatorship (c. 1968-c.1974). It advances an explanation for the apparent lack of success met by several exile groups when trying to persuade the Western democracies to withdraw (or at least reduce) their support for Lisbon's authoritarian regime during a period in which the public was increasingly aware of human rights abuses. The choice of this particular juncture is justified for several reasons. Firstly, it was a time of renewed expectations regarding a possible liberalisation of the regime in the aftermath of the replacement of the incapacitated Oliveira Salazar by the younger Marcelo Caetano (September 1968), an event that confronted the different sections of the Portuguese opposition with a number of dilemmas, both at home and abroad, and exposed rifts that would take some time to repair. Secondly, this was also an epoch of momentous social and cultural change in Europe, with obvious ramifications for the political orientations and attitudes of those who, for different reasons, had decided to leave Portugal in the 1960s. Finally, the vicissitudes of the East-West détente are seen here as equally important for understanding the opportunities and limitations of the anti-Estado Novo opposition abroad. ; authorsversion ; published

UID/HIS/04209/2013 ; The dissolution of Portugal's African empire took place in the mid-1970s, a decade after the dismantling of similar imperial formations across Europe. Contrary to other European metropoles, Portuguese rulers were unwilling to meet the demands for self-determination in their dependencies, and thus mobilized considerable resources for a long, drawn-out conflict in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique from 1961 to 1974. Several factors can explain Lisbon's refusal to come to terms with the "winds of change" that had swept Africa since the late 1950s, from the belief of its decision-makers that Portugal lacked the means to conduct a successful "exit strategy" (akin to the "neocolonial" approach followed by the British, the French, or the Belgians), to the dictatorial nature of Salazar's "New State," which prevented a free and open debate on the costs of upholding an empire against the anti-colonial consensus that had prevailed in the United Nations since the early 1960s. Taking advantage of its Cold War alliances (as well as secret pacts with Rhodesia and South Africa), Portugal was long able to accommodate the armed insurgencies that erupted in three of its colonies, thereby containing external pressures to decolonize. Through an approach that combined classic "divide and rule" tactics, schemes for population control, and developmental efforts, Portugal's African empire was able to soldier on for longer than many observers expected. But this uncompromising stance came with a price: the armed forces' dissatisfaction with a stalemate that had no end in sight. In April 1974, a military coup d'etat put an end to five decades of authoritarianism in the metropole and cleared the way for transfer of power arrangements in the five lusophone African territories. The outcome, though, would be an extremely disorderly transition, in which the political inexperience of the new elites in Lisbon, the die-hard attitude of groups of white settlers, the divisions among the African nationalists, and the meddling of foreign powers all played critical roles. ; publishersversion ; published

Harold Macmillan was a key figure in the process that culminated with the liquidation of Britain's formal empire in the early 1960s. His speech delivered to the South African Parliament on February 1960 became famous for an expression -- 'the winds of change' -- that encapsulated the high tide of nationalism in the colonial world. In this article, we start by analyzing the circumstances that facilitated the changes in the UK policy towards its own empire, and then proceed to describe the perceptions of the Portuguese leaders concerning those changes and how this impacted on the Anglo-Portuguese relationship. Finally we will describe the ill-fated efforts undertook by Macmillan's administration in xg6r in order to persuade Salazar to adopt a more flexible stance towards the demands for self-determination in Portuguese Africa. Adapted from the source document.

In the first decades of the Cold War, NATO's major powers coexisted in a fairly easy way with the un-democratic nature of the Portuguese regime. After the collapse of Caetano's dictatorship, however, the ascendancy of the Marxist left, & of the Communist Party in particular, created a whole set of dilemmas to the Western powers. This article describes how several NATO's members equated the implications of a possible triumph of the Moscow orientated left in Portugal to the cohesion of the Alliance. The article argues that the cautious & moderate stance assumed by the European partners was vital to persuade the Ford administration in Washington to accept a policy towards the Portuguese based on a combination of pressures & inducements. As the article tries to show, this policy may be seen as one of the key international factors that helped to bring about the consolidation of Portugal's democracy. Adapted from the source document.

Thanks to the recent disclosure of previously classified documents, made possible by the new British Freedom of Information Act, a new light has been cast over the role played by the UK in the events which led to the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia in December 1975. The British diplomatic papers offer us a clearer picture of the international background of what become one the most dramatic episodes of Portugal's decolonisation. The purpose of this article is to describe & comment the conduct followed by the Wilson government vis-a-vis the East Timor crisis of 1975/76, placing it in the context of Britain's historical, strategic, political, & economical involvement in South East Asia. Adapted from the source document.