Suchergebnisse

Nature and epistemology of law. Early thinkers: Apastamba (late third century B.C.E.), Patanjali (mid-second century B.C.E.) ; Later aphoristic texts on dharma: Gautama (late second century B.C.E.), Baudhayana (early first century B.C.E.), Vasistha (late first century B.C.E.) ; Perspectives from political science: Kautilya (first-second century C.E.) ; Innovations of Manu (mid-second century C.E.) ; Developments after Manu: Yajnavalkya (fourth-fifth century C.E.), Vishnu (seventh century C.E.), Parasara (seventh century C.E.) ; The school of vedic exegesis: Sabara (fifth century C.E.), Kumarila (seventh century C.E.) ; Early commentators: Bharuci (seventh century C.E.), Visvarupa (early ninth century C.E.), Medhatithi (second half of the ninth century C.E.) ; Medieval commentators and systematizers: Commentators of Manu: Govindaraja (eleventh-twelfth century C.E.), Nandana, Kulluka (fourteenth century C.E.); Commentators of Yajnavalkya: Vijnanesvara (fl. 1100-1125 C.E.), Apararka (first half of the twelfth century C.E.); Legal digests-Nibandhas: Devanna Bhatta (circa 1200 C.E.) -- Courts of law and legal procedure. The beginnings: Apastamba, Gautama, Baudhayana, Visistha ; The early theorists: Kautilya, Manu ; The mature phase: Yajnavalkya, Narada (fifth-sixth century C.E.) ; Early commentators: Bharuci, Medhatithi ; Medieval commentators and systematizers: Vijnanesvara, Devanna Bhatta

King, Governance, and Law in Ancient India presents an English translation of Kautilya's Arthashastra (AS.) along with detailed endnotes. When it was discovered in 1923, the Arthashastra was described as perhaps the most precious work in the whole range of Sanskrit literature, an assessment that still rings true. This new translation of this significant text, the first in close to half a century takes into account a number of important advances in our knowledge of the texts, inscriptions, and archeological and art historical remains from the period in Indian history to which the AS. belongs (2nd-3rd century CE, although parts of it may be much older).

Papers presented at the International Symposium on Aśoka, held at Austin on 4th February 2006

In his celebrated book The Concept of Law, H. L. A. Hart posits three secondary rules in a legal system: recognition, change, and adjudication. In this paper, I look at the second category: the means provided within the Indian legal system by which laws, in this case dharma, can be changed. The category of recognition provides us with means of knowing what the laws are. In modern systems, this is done through the passage of laws in a duly constituted legislature. The ancient Indian system did not have a provision for a legislative body. Instead, law as dharma was to be discovered rather than enacted: it was thought to be found in the Veda (vedamulatva concept) and, secondarily, in the texts known as smrtis. Law is thus eternal and, in theory, immutable; it cannot be changed. But, in spite of the theory, society and culture do change and demand laws that reflect those changes. The hermeneutical tradition of India provided means by which such change, foreclosed de jure, could be enacted de facto. This paper will analyse several of these techniques, including the yuga theory, the dharma of smaller social and geographical units, and, quite interestingly, the opprobrium of the people (lokavidvista).

Much of the significant data for long-distance and maritime trade across South Asia in the ancient period comes from archaeological sources. Nevertheless, textual sources too have some significant things to say about material culture and trade in the ancient world. In a special way, texts give insights into what people thought about trans-regional trade, the globalisation of the ancient world, both the good and the bad that came with it, insights that cannot be culled solely from archaeological data. This article's focus is on the Arthaśāstra, which Kauṭilya wrote around middle of the first century ce, drawing on sources that predate him by a century or more. The Arthaśāstra does not have a separate section on trade, but trade data are scattered over at least four areas: (a) the treasury and its need for luxury goods: pearls, gems, diamonds, coral, sandalwood, aloe, incense, skins and furs, and cloth; (b) military needs: horses and elephants; (c) developing and guarding land and water routes and shipping; and (d) duties and taxes on imported goods. Significant data on trade are also provided in Kauṭilya's discussion of trade routes and their protection, as well as data on duties and taxes on imported goods.

Animals are certainly good to think (bonnes a penser), as famously noted by Claude Levi-Strauss, but from the dawn of literature humans have also given them voices so that they can participate vicariously in an anthropomorphized animal linguistic and social world paralleling the human, giving rise to the literary genre of the animal fable. The earliest use of animals in literature was probably as similes. Such allegories abound in the earliest strata of the Rg-Veda. What is interesting in these comparisons for later animal tales is that a particular characteristic is singled out as defining a particular animal and constituting its very nature (svabhava). The association of a particular species with a set of moral and intellectual qualities, with personality traits, plays a central role in later animal fables. But what about talking animals? When do they make their first appearance in the extant corpus of Indian literature? This article will reflect on the religious and cultural backdrop within which the anthropomorphizing habit of Indian animal tales took place in Indian Sanskrit literature.