Suchergebnisse

La rivoluzione digitale ha inciso profondamente sui diritti fondamentali. Essa ha aperto nuove prospettive per l'esercizio di diritti fondamentali già riconosciuti. Ha fatto emergere nuovi diritti fondamentali e nuovi limiti e nuove minacce ad essi. La cultura giuridica italiana ha concettualizzato queste sfide attorno ad una serie di temi: la libertà informatica, il diritto fondamentale di accesso ad Internet, il diritto all'oblio, il diritto a non essere oggetto di una decisione amministrativa totalmente automatizzata, i nuovi problemi della libertà di espressione. La Camera dei deputati ha elaborato una "dichiarazione dei diritti su Internet", senza efficacia normativa. E l'uso di Internet ha modificato profondamente il sistema politico. Questo saggio tenta un primo bilancio generale di questi problemi, che in generale sono ancora tutti aperti.

A brief analysis on the constitutional reform rejected in referendum in Italy (in 2016) is contained in this text. The most important reform was the bicameral system, which sought to clarify the role of the Senate and turn it into a Chamber of territorial representation. This would have served also to modify the model of relationship between State and regions. Also is trying to reduce costs of the functioning of representative institutions. While constitutional reform failed, in the article are defended some assets of the reform, which not have been approved have caused that, at this point, continue having dysfunctions in the Italian constitutional political system. ; Se contiene en este texto un breve análisis sobre la reforma constitucional rechazada en referéndum en Italia, en el año 2016. La reforma más importante fue la del sistema bicameral, que pretendía aclarar el papel del Senado y convertirlo en una Cámara de representación territorial. Esto habría servido tambien para modificar el modelo de relación entre Estado y regiones. También se intentaban reducir costes del funcionamiento de las instituciones representativas. A pesar de que la reforma constitucional fracasó, en el artículo se defienden algunos elementos valiosos de la reforma, que al no haberse aprobado han provocado que, en este momento, siga habiendo disfunciones en el sistema político constitucional italiano.

The adaptation of Mexican constitutional rules to the context of a stable multiparty democracy has been discussed since the beginning of the transition that begun in the 1970s and was implemented between 1988 and 2000. The result of this debate is now the constitutional reform of August 9th, 2012, that was originated by a project of political reform submitted in 2009 to the Mexican Congress by the President Felipe Calderón, concerns 14 constitutional provisions and has three main objects (besides some other questions of minor importance). In the federal legal process the reform recognizes to the President the power to submit to the Congress two bills of «preferential initiative», that have the prerogative of being discussed with priority during the session, thus recognizing to the President the right to foster the implementation of its legislative agenda. The substitution of the President in the cases of temporary or absolute failure is regulated recognizing the power to substitute provisionally the President to the Home Affairs Secretary (Secretario de Gobernación). For the first time some procedures for participatory democracy are introduced in the Mexican Constitutional system: the popular initiative of federal legislative acts and the popular consultation. The article analyzes the possible impact of these reforms, specially of the popular consultation, highlighting some ambiguities of its regulation, that differentiates it from the referendums but at the same time recognize to it the effect of binding the governing authorities. The reforms of 2012 includes some modernizations of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, but leave unchanged the contradictions of the Mexican system of government, that since 1997 is characterized by a «divided government» where an American-style separation of powers works with some difficulties with a European-style party system and with a Latin American presidentialist political culture. ; La adaptación de las reglas institucionales mexicanas a las exigencias de una democracia multipartidaria consolidada es objeto de discusión desde el principio de la transición iniciada en los años setenta y desarrollada entre 1988 y 2000. El punto de llegada de este debate es por el momento la reforma constitucional del 9 de agosto de 2012, que es el resultado de un proyecto de reforma política presentado en 2009 al Congreso mexicano por el entonces Presidente Felipe Calderón, afecta a 14 disposiciones constitucionales y tiene por objeto —además de otros asuntos de menor relevancia— tres importantes materias. En el procedimiento legislativo federal se reconoce al Presidente la facultad de presentar en cada sesión del Congreso tres proyectos de ley de «iniciativa preferente», reconociendo así al jefe de estado el poder de impulsar la realización de su agenda legislativa. Se disciplina la sustitución del Presidente de la República en los casos de falta absoluta o temporal, valorizando el papel del Secretario de Gobernación. Se introducen por primera vez en la Constitución mexicana unos procedimientos de democracia participativa: la iniciativa popular de las leyes y la consulta popular. El ensayo analiza la disciplina jurídica y los posibles impactos de estas reformas, en particular de la consulta popular, evidenciando unos perfiles contradictorios de su regulación constitucional, que la diferencian de los referéndum y que al mismo tiempo le atribuyen efectos vinculantes para las autoridades de gobierno. Las reformas de 2012 modernizan a la Constitución mexicana, pero dejan esencialmente inalteradas las contradicciones de la forma de gobierno presidencial prevista por la Constitución de 1917, que desde 1997 es caracterizada por una situación de «gobierno dividido» en el cual una separación de poderes de estilo norteamericano convive con un sistema de partidos disciplinados de tipo europeo y con una cultura presidencialista de estilo latino-americano.The adaptation of Mexican constitutional rules to the context of a stable multiparty democracy has been discussed since the beginning of the transition that begun in the 1970s and was implemented between 1988 and 2000. The result of this debate is now the constitutional reform of August 9th, 2012, that was originated by a project of political reform submitted in 2009 to the Mexican Congress by the President Felipe Calderón, concerns 14 constitutional provisions and has three main objects (besides some other questions of minor importance). In the federal legal process the reform recognizes to the President the power to submit to the Congress two bills of «preferential initiative», that have the prerogative of being discussed with priority during the session, thus recognizing to the President the right to foster the implementation of its legislative agenda. The substitution of the President in the cases of temporary or absolute failure is regulated recognizing the power to substitute provisionally the President to the Home Affairs Secretary (Secretario de Gobernación). For the first time some procedures for participatory democracy are introduced in the Mexican Constitutional system: the popular initiative of federal legislative acts and the popular consultation. The article analyzes the possible impact of these reforms, specially of the popular consultation, highlighting some ambiguities of its regulation, that differentiates it from the referendums but at the same time recognize to it the effect of binding the governing authorities. The reforms of 2012 includes some modernizations of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, but leave unchanged the contradictions of the Mexican system of government, that since 1997 is characterized by a «divided government» where an American-style separation of powers works with some difficulties with a European-style party system and with a Latin American presidentialist political culture.