Suchergebnisse

A purpose-built Semantic Differential Scale was administered to 372 adolescents. One hundred and eighteen of them came from middle class homes while two hundred and fifty four came from lower socioeconomic homes. There were two hundred and sixty four boys, and one hundred and eight
girls. Their mean age was 16.7 years. The results showed that adolescents from middle class homes had more significantly positive self-concepts than those from lower class homes. The lower class adolescents had more positive self-concepts than their counterparts on only the religious –
non-religious scale (p < .001). The observed differences were discussed. It was suggested that concerted effort should be made in homes and schools to enhance the self-concepts of adolescents, particularly those from low socio-economic status groups.

Changing scenarios in the second decade of the new millennium make revisiting the questions around aid effectiveness quite critical for understanding current human development challenges in Africa, considering that 2022 marks two decades since the Monterrey Consensus and the adoption of its resultant Declaration. Flowing from this original multilateral endeavour at crystallising a paradigm shift among role actors on the need for new approaches to foreign aid and development planning as well as the concerted efforts at standardising development assistance practices over the past two decades, critical questions emerge: (i) Beyond merely pronouncing new pathways of responses for dealing with the critical issues around aid, has the 'new' understanding impacted Africa in any different way? (ii) Could there be more than mere political explanation for the intrigues and divergence surrounding the ever-evolving principles on new aid architecture as propounded by various multilateral actors? (iii) In light of the noticeable contradictions in the approaches of donors and recipient governments to new aid architecture, what implications do these distinctions portend for aid effectiveness in Africa such that will promote human development in real terms? (iv) If development aid is particularly key for the very survival of poor people in Africa, should we not begin to identify more radical designs that will strategically counter-balance the shortfalls of the dominant approach to foreign aid and development planning? This article is an attempt to respond to this plethora of questions, advocating an approach that could transform the landscape of aid architecture and development agenda for Africa.

Abstract

Le présent article évalue le programme, vieux de 40 ans, de construction d'un troisième niveau de gouvernance au Nigeria pour améliorer les aspirations démocratiques et de développement de la plus grande démocratie d'Afrique, l'un des deux seuls pays sous administration fédérale sur le continent. L'évaluation repose sur des sources secondaires et primaires. Nous allons voir que même si la réforme a été soutenue au fil des ans en termes de renforcement des capacités structurelles, financières et humaines et d'une série de changements visant à démocratiser l'institution, le programme n'a abouti que pendant les quatre premières années, lorsque l'armée était au pouvoir. Notre article propose des mesures pour adapter cette institution à la gouvernance civile en renforçant les mécanismes d'imputabilité aux trois niveaux de gouvernance et une approche asymétrique du financement des infrastructures dans les villes et les zones rurales. Cela permettrait aux institutions gouvernementales locales de fonctionner en tant que structures de base pour construire et soutenir la démocratie et le développement à partir de la base, en complément de la stratégie d'exportation du gouvernement actuel. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Le gouvernement nigérian actuel poursuit une stratégie axée sur l'exportation comprenant trois éléments principaux que plusieurs pays en voie d'industrialisation ont repris avec succès. Seuls les deux premiers éléments – stabilité macro-économique et liberté économique pour les agriculteurs et les petits entrepreneurs – sont en place. Ces mesures doivent être complétées par le renforcement des infrastructures rurales, rendu possible par un système politique et administratif solide, étayé par un système d'administration locale de base solide, tel qu'énoncé dans cet article.

This article assesses the 40-year-old program of building a third level of governance in Nigeria to improve the democratic and developmental aspirations of Africa's largest democracy, one of only two federally governed countries on the continent. The assessment relies on secondary and primary sources. The article finds that even though the reform was sustained over the years in terms of structural, financial and human resources capacity infusion and a raft of changes to democratize the institution, the program was only successful in the first four years while the military was in power. The article proposes measures to make this institution adapt to civilian governance through enhancing accountability arrangements at all the three levels of governance and an asymmetric approach to financing infrastructures in the cities and rural areas. These would enable the local government institutions to actually function as grassroots structures for building and sustaining democracy and development from below complementing the export-led strategy of the present government.Points for practitionersThe current Nigerian government is pursuing an export-led strategy comprising three main elements that several industrializing countries have used successfully. Only the first two elements – macro-economic stability, economic freedom for farmers and small-scale entrepreneurs – are in place. These need to be complemented by boosting rural infrastructures which a robust political and administrative system, underpinned by strong grassroots local government system as articulated in this article, makes possible.

While the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002, are not binding on states, they evidence high-level support for the principle of judicial integrity. In addition, superior courts and judiciaries of diverse legal traditions have relied on the Bangalore Principles in codifying their minimum standards of judicial integrity. Extrapolating from some of the core values of the Bangalore Principles, this article accentuates some of the critical challenges implicated in establishing credible, independent and accountable judiciaries. Beyond the task of developing appropriate mechanisms for ensuring judicial integrity, this article assesses the follow-up efforts to the Bangalore Principles, such as the draft Lusaka Measures on the Implementation of the Bangalore Principles on Judicial Conduct, 2010, contending that while these measures seek to quantify the critical elements of the Bangalore Principles, there are still areas of concern. This article addresses a plethora of pertinent questions, advocating that the mechanisms for judicial integrity should not be entirely controlled by the judiciary but be made to accommodate sufficient lay representation, and furthermore, that current codes of judicial conduct be formulated as enforceable rules and procedures in ways that would sustain public confidence in judicial processes.