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In the last decades, international trade in agri-food products has been mainly affected by two important phenomena. On the one hand there has been a rapid expansion of consumer preferences towards a range of quality characteristics in food products. On the other, we have witnessed significant changes in trade policy patterns in favor of non-tariff measures Food quality and safety issues have become important topics in the agri-food markets, in particular for richer countries. This trend has been driven by a variety of factors exacerbated by several food scares that have triggered growing consumer concern about the attributes of food, the way they are produced, and increasing awareness of the relationship between diet and health. As a consequence, vertical and horizontal quality differentiation of food products has become a necessary condition to satisfy consumer demand (Grunert, 2005). This demand trend and the progressive worldwide elimination or reduction of traditional trade policies, such as tariffs, triggered the diffusion of non-tariff measures, like regulatory standards addressing safety, quality and environmental concerns (WTO, 2012). Such evolution of trade policies stimulates a growing attention in studying the trade and welfare effect of these standards (e.g. Beghin et al. 2015). However, understanding the economic effects of these policy measures is, for several reasons, difficult. This organized session includes three presentations dealing with complementary issues regarding the economics of trade and food quality. Each presentation will be followed by a short discussion. After the three presentations, Bruno Larue, a North American researcher in international trade, will introduce the discussion based on the results presented and their implications for international trade policies. Rich exchanges should then arise with the audience of agricultural economists attending the session. The three presentations will address the following issues. First, the focus will be on the emerging analytical models incorporating information asymmetry and the role of standards in firm heterogeneity trade models. Second, the impact of the policy of geographical indication labeling proposed by the European Union will be discussed. Its role on firms' export competitiveness and behavior for an important French food product (i.e. cheese) will be analyzed. Finally, how the diffusion of most restrictive food standards affects developing country firms' export decisions and products quality will be addressed.[br/] [br/] Trade margins and product quality: adjustments to NTM under information asymmetry. Carl Gaigné, Anne-Célia Disdier, Cristina Herghelegiu[br/] On the competitiveness effects of quality labels: Evidence from the French cheese industry. Sabine Duvaleix-Treguer, Charlotte Emlinger, Carl Gaigné, Karine Latouche[br/] Standards, Trade Margins and Product Quality: Firm-level Evidence from Peru. Daniele Curzi, Monica Schuster , Miet Maertens, Alessandro Olper

An increasing set of evidence has been reported on how countries set standards on genetically modified food and their subsequent economic effects. Studies typically contain some empirical evidence and some theoretical explanations of the data. However, to date, limited effort has been posed on systematically reviewing the existing evidence and its implications for policy. This article contributes to the literature by bringing together a summary of the most recent published evidence on patterns of GMO regulation and their determinants, as well as their economics implications for trade and firms' global strategy.

AbstractThis paper analyses the factors inducing retailers to adopt genetically modified (GM)-freeprivate standards, using information on 44 retailers operating in 54 countries. Retailers are distinguished between those not using GM ingredients and those using ingredients which are potentially GM in their private label products. Results from a binary response model show that many of the drivers highlighted in the empirical literature, such as historical factors, communication infrastructure and sectorial conditions, affect the likelihood of adopting GM-freeprivate standards. Moreover, we test additional hypotheses from the political economy of standards formation and of mass media. Key results show that a higher share of government-oriented public media reduces the probability of adopting GM-freeprivate standards, while different genetically modified organism public standards between home and operating countries increase this probability.

This paper provides evidence on private standards on genetically modified (GM) organisms for 44 retailers operating in 54 countries, distinguishing between retailers not using GM ingredients, and retailers using ingredients which are potentially GM in private label products. Using this information, we empirically investigate the drivers that induce retailers to adopting a GM-free private standard. The results show that many of the drivers highlighted in the literature, such as historical factors, communication infrastructure and sectoral conditions affect the likelihood of adopting a private standard. Moreover, we tested additional hypotheses from the political economy of standard formation and of mass media. Key results show that a higher share of public media reduces the probability of adopting GM-free private standards, while a higher heterogeneity in the GMO public standards increase this probability.

Mass media play a crucial role in information distribution and in the political market and public policy making. Theory predicts that information provided by the mass media reflects the media's incentives to provide news to different groups in society and affects these groups' influence in policy making. We use data on agricultural policy from 69 countries spanning a wide range of development stages and media markets to test these predictions. Our empirical results are consistent with theoretical hypotheses that public support for agriculture is affected by the mass media. In particular; an increase in media (television) diffusion is associated with policies that benefit the majority to a greater extent and is correlated with a reduction in agriculture taxation in poor countries and a reduction in the subsidization of agriculture in rich countries; ceteris paribus. The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that increased competition in commercial media reduces transfers to special interest groups and contributes to more efficient public policies.

The paper develops a composite index of GMO standards restrictiveness for 60 countries, assigning objective scores to six different regulatory dimensions. Using this index and its components, we empirically investigate the political and economic determinants of GMO regulations for 55 countries, controlling for spatial autocorrelation. Results show that many of the determinants highlighted in the theoretical literature, such as the structure of the agricultural sector and the institutional environment are important determinants of the restrictiveness of the GMO regulation. As a key result there emerges a prominent role of the market for information, showing that the structure of domestic mass media (public vs. private) is an important driver of GMO standards.

The paper develops a composite index of GMO standards restrictiveness for 60 countries, assigning objective scores to six different regulatory dimensions. Using this index and its components, we empirically investigate the political and economic detfirminants of GMO regulations. Results show that many of the detfirminants highlighted in the theoretical literature, such as the country trade position, the potential gains from GMO adoption, and the consumer risk aversion, are important detfirminants of the restrictiveness in GMO regulations. As a key result there emerges a prominent role for the market of infirmation, showing that the structure of domestic mass media (public vs. private) is an important driver of GMO standards.

We investigate the effect of electoral rules and firms of government on public policy outcomes using a new dataset on agriculture and food policies from 74 countries over the 1960-2005 period. Using both cross-sectional and panel data analyses we find robust evidence that the specific nature of democratic institutions has important consequences for public policy. Proportional democracies and presidential democracies - compared to majoritarian and parliamentary democracies - give more public support to agriculture and less to food consumers. The magnitude of these constitutional effects are stronger for import-competitive sectors and staple food crops. The effects seem independent from the ideology orientation of governments.

This paper investigates whether political competition plays an important role in determining the level of agricultural protection. In order to do so, we exploit variation in political and economic data from 74 developing and developed countries for the post-war period. Our results robustly show that the level of agricultural distortions is the higher, the higher is the level of political competition. We show that political competition may importantly complement other institutional aspects in determining policy choices. We investigate the heterogeneous effects of political competition across different electoral rules (majoritarian vs. proportional), forms of government (coalition vs. single-party) and level of incomes.

This paper deals with the effect of constitutional rules on agricultural policy outcomes in a panel of observations for more than 70 developing and developed countries in the 1955-2005 period. Testable hypotheses are drawn from recent developments in the comparative politics literature that see political institutions as key elements in shaping public policies. Using differences-in-differences regressions we find a positive effect of a transition into democracy on agricultural protection. However, this average effect masks substantial heterogeneities across different forms of democracy. Indeed, what matters are transitions to proportional democracies, as well as to permanent democracies. Moreover, while the author does not detect significant differences across alternative forms of government (presidential versus parliamentary systems), there is some evidence that the effect of proportional election is exacerbated under parliamentary regimes, and diminished under presidential ones.

Using a bilateral trade equation derived from a monopolistic competition model, we investigated market access reciprocity in food trade among the US, Canada, the EU and Japan. We explore country and industry-specific market access asymmetry through the border effect approach, re-challenging the underlying main explanations. Our findings reveal marked asymmetry in reciprocal trade openness; indeed, access to the food markets of the US and Japan appears significantly easier than reciprocal access to both Canada and, especially, the EU. Policy trade barriers, firstly in the firms of NTBs, the degree of product differentiation and `home bias?in preferences, are all important factors in explaining border effects. Moreover, several stylized facts suggest that border effect interpretation should also be based on political economy arguments.