Suchergebnisse

The Western reactions to the Russian assault on Ukraine in 2022 were surprisingly united and tangible. This article argues that the intervention in the Russia–Ukraine war was a continuation of other liberal interventions that took place earlier in the current century. This article claims that there is no crisis of liberal interventionism because foreign policy decision-makers in the US agree that (liberal) interventions in foreign countries can serve the national interests of the US as well as the interests of the people in the countries affected. There is no crisis because the transatlantic partners in Europe backed the US in the interventions. Finally, there is no crisis of liberal interventionism because the domestic opposition in the US and Europe is too weak to restrain the liberal interventionist mood among Western governments. Liberal interventionism is still on the agenda.

The presidency of Donald Trump represented an unprecedented low point in transatlantic relations. When Joe Biden took power in early 2021, his administration launched several policy initiatives suggesting that the new administration would continue to allow the seemingly long-term weakening of the transatlantic relationship to continue. A significant part of the literature on recent developments in transatlantic relations points in the same direction, namely that a weakening of the cooperation across the Atlantic has taken place. This article proposes an alternative view, arguing that the relationship has strengthened in recent years despite Donald Trump and his erratic policy. The article applies a theoretical framework combining international as well as domestic variables. Based on an analysis of four cases—NATO, the US pivot to Asia, the sanctions policy towards Russia, and the Afghanistan debacle—it is concluded that the transatlantic relationship is strong.

The current century has witnessed several high-profile Western military interventions in developing countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali/West Africa are well-known examples. All three were initiated unilaterally by the US or France but were soon supplemented with multilateral missions which operated in parallel with the unilateral intervention force, giving them a "messy" appearance. In the three cases, the foreign policy decision-makers in the US and France reacted mainly to domestic stimuli, most evidently in the case of the US, where revenge for 9/11 was a strong motive. Like-minded partners in NATO and troops from developing countries shared the burdens of the US and France and gave legitimacy to the military interventions. The consequences of the interventions were not that they contributed to stability. Rather they supported the incumbent elites, as they were able to avoid launching economic and political reform. The lack of reform undermined the prospects for stability.

The presidency of Donald Trump represented an unprecedented low point in transatlantic relations. When Joe Biden took power in early 2021, his administration launched several policy initiatives suggesting that the new administration would continue to allow the seemingly long‐term weakening of the transatlantic relationship to continue. A significant part of the literature on recent developments in transatlantic relations points in the same direction, namely that a weakening of the cooperation across the Atlantic has taken place. This article proposes an alternative view, arguing that the relationship has strengthened in recent years despite Donald Trump and his erratic policy. The article applies a theoretical framework combining international as well as domestic variables. Based on an analysis of four cases—NATO, the US pivot to Asia, the sanctions policy towards Russia, and the Afghanistan debacle—it is concluded that the transatlantic relationship is strong.

The current century has witnessed several high-profile Western military interventions in developing countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali/West Africa are well-known examples. All three were initiated unilaterally by the US or France but were soon supplemented with multilateral missions which operated in parallel with the unilateral intervention force, giving them a "messy" appearance. In the three cases, the foreign policy decision-makers in the US and France reacted mainly to domestic stimuli, most evidently in the case of the US, where revenge for 9/11 was a strong motive. Like-minded partners in NATO and troops from developing countries shared the burdens of the US and France and gave legitimacy to the military interventions. The consequences of the interventions were not that they contributed to stability. Rather they supported the incumbent elites, as they were able to avoid launching economic and political reform. The lack of reform undermined the prospects for stability.