Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates the sources of variability in the mobilization of domestic tax revenue in oil-producing countries. It argues that the type of natural resources exploited during colonial rule can affect the contemporary levels of domestic tax revenue in oil countries. We test this conjecture by regressing non-oil tax revenue on a proxy of extractive capacity, which is the distance between the date of the beginning of oil production and the date of a country's political independence. The results show that this proxy of extractive capacity positively affects the non-oil tax revenue of oil-producing countries, and these results are robust to various sensitivity checks. The persistence of the pre-existing extractive institutions as well as their subsequent privileged position explain why the elites have no interest in changing this scenario.

The vision of the role of natural resources in the development process has changed over the last thirty years. The optimistic views of the beginning became more moderate, even pessimistic. This thesis focuses on the role of oil in the political, institutional, and economic performances of African countries, some of which are richly endowed. It revolves around three empirical essays. Chapter 2 focuses on the duration of political regimes in Africa and shows from a duration model that revenues from oil exploitation play an important role. Chapter 3 examines the high indebtedness of oil-producing countries. A collateral effect of oil resources is highlighted, it dominates an instability effect. Chapter 4 includes, in a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, the permanent income hypothesis presented in the literature as the answer to the fiscal management of oil revenues. It concludes that a relevant rule of oil revenues management in African countries should not reduce only the impact of volatility on public finances, but it should also address the development needs of African oilproducing countries. ; La vision du rôle des ressources naturelles dans le processus de développement a changé ces trente dernières années. La vision optimiste du départ est devenue plus nuancée, voire pessimiste. Cette thèse porte sur le rôle du pétrole dans les performances politicoinstitutionnelles et économiques des pays d'Afrique, dont certains sont richement dotés. Elle s'articule autour de trois essais de nature empirique. Le chapitre 2 s'intéresse à la durée des régimes politiques en Afrique et montre à partir d'un modèle de durée que les revenus tirés de l'exploitation pétrolière y jouent un rôle important. Le chapitre 3 examine l'endettement élevé des pays producteurs de pétrole. Un effet bonne garantie (collatéral) du pétrole est mis en évidence, celui-ci domine un effet instabilité. Le chapitre 4 intègre, dans un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique, l'hypothèse de revenu permanent présentée dans la littérature comme la ...

The vision of the role of natural resources in the development process has changed over the last thirty years. The optimistic views of the beginning became more moderate, even pessimistic. This thesis focuses on the role of oil in the political, institutional, and economic performances of African countries, some of which are richly endowed. It revolves around three empirical essays. Chapter 2 focuses on the duration of political regimes in Africa and shows from a duration model that revenues from oil exploitation play an important role. Chapter 3 examines the high indebtedness of oil-producing countries. A collateral effect of oil resources is highlighted, it dominates an instability effect. Chapter 4 includes, in a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, the permanent income hypothesis presented in the literature as the answer to the fiscal management of oil revenues. It concludes that a relevant rule of oil revenues management in African countries should not reduce only the impact of volatility on public finances, but it should also address the development needs of African oilproducing countries. ; La vision du rôle des ressources naturelles dans le processus de développement a changé ces trente dernières années. La vision optimiste du départ est devenue plus nuancée, voire pessimiste. Cette thèse porte sur le rôle du pétrole dans les performances politicoinstitutionnelles et économiques des pays d'Afrique, dont certains sont richement dotés. Elle s'articule autour de trois essais de nature empirique. Le chapitre 2 s'intéresse à la durée des régimes politiques en Afrique et montre à partir d'un modèle de durée que les revenus tirés de l'exploitation pétrolière y jouent un rôle important. Le chapitre 3 examine l'endettement élevé des pays producteurs de pétrole. Un effet bonne garantie (collatéral) du pétrole est mis en évidence, celui-ci domine un effet instabilité. Le chapitre 4 intègre, dans un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique, l'hypothèse de revenu permanent présentée dans la littérature comme la réponse à la gestion budgétaire des revenus pétroliers. Il conclut qu'une bonne règle de gestion des revenus pétroliers dans les pays africains devrait non seulement permettre de réduire l'impact de la volatilité des cours sur les finances publiques, mais aussi elle devrait permettre de répondre aux importants besoins des pays pétroliers africains.

It is often underlined that African oil-producing countries are politically unstable as a result of the role that this resource can play in political incentives. Based on data documenting the duration in office of heads of state of 26 African countries (North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa), this study reveals a surprising twist on the conventional wisdom: The purported instability of African oil-producing countries does not appear to extend to the executive branch of the state. Conversely, using survival analysis, this research suggests a positive link between oil rents and the duration in office of African leaders. Findings also reveal that other mineral rents do not exhibit the same stabilizing effect. The author's interpretation of these results is grounded in an analysis of the practicalities of oil investment and the strategic aspect of oil.

Evidence shows that the allocation of talented people is not neutral for growth. Thus, a country with a large population of law concentrators tends to develop rent-seeking activities that reduce growth. A country with a large population of engineers tends to foster innovation and strengthen growth. But what determines the allocation of talents? This question has not yet been empirically examined. This paper contributes to fill this gap. Based on a sample of 69 developing countries the paper highlights that oil rents determine the allocation of talents but this effect is not linear. It largely depends on the quality of governance. While, oil rents in well governed countries tend to orient talents towards productive activities, oil rents in badly governed countries tend to orient talents towards rent-seeking activities. These results are robust to different specifications, datasets on governance quality and estimation methods.

Evidence shows that the allocation of talented people is not neutral for growth. Thus, a country with a large population of law concentrators tends to develop rent-seeking activities that reduce growth. A country with a large population of engineers tends to foster innovation and strengthen growth. But what determines the allocation of talents? This question has not yet been empirically examined. This paper contributes to fill this gap. Based on a sample of 69 developing countries the paper highlights that oil rents determine the allocation of talents but this effect is not linear. It largely depends on the quality of governance. While, oil rents in well governed countries tend to orient talents towards productive activities, oil rents in badly governed countries tend to orient talents towards rent-seeking activities. These results are robust to different specifications, datasets on governance quality and estimation methods.