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BACKGROUND: Plasmodium falciparum-resistance to sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) has been largely reported among pregnant women. However, the profile of resistance markers to SP dihydrofolate reductase (dhfr) and dihydropteroate synthase (dhps) in the general population are varied and not frequently monitored. Currently, SP is used as partner drug for artemisinin combination therapy (SP-artesunate) in some sub-Saharan African countries or as a prophylactic drug in intermittent preventive treatment of malaria during pregnancy and infants and in seasonal malaria chemoprevention (SMC). Profiling of P. falciparum-resistant genotypes to SP is dynamic and critical in providing data that would be useful for malaria control programmes. This study assessed the profile of dhfr and dhps genes genotypes among individuals with malaria in Lagos, Nigeria. METHODS: Molecular markers of SP resistance were identified by nested PCR and sequenced among malaria positive dried blood spots (DBS) that were collected from individuals attending health facilities from January 2013 to February 2014 and during community surveys from October 2010 to September 2011 across different Local Government Areas of Lagos State, Nigeria. RESULTS: A total of 242 and 167 samples were sequenced for dhfr and dhps, respectively. Sequence analysis of dhfr showed that 95.5% (231/242), 96.3% (233/242) and 96.7% (234/242) of the samples had N51I, C59R and S108N mutant alleles, respectively. The prevalence of dhps mutation at codons A437G, A613S, S436A, A581G, I431V and K540E were 95.8% (160/167), 41.9% (70/167), 41.3% (69/167), 31.1% (52/167), 25.1% (42/167), and 1.2% (2/167) respectively. The prevalence of triple mutations (CIRNI) in dhfr was 93.8% and 44.3% for the single dhps haplotype mutation (SGKAA). Partial SP-resistance due to quadruple dhfr-dhps haplotype mutations (CIRNI-SGKAA) and octuple haplotype mutations (CIRNI-VAGKGS) with rate of 42.6% and 22.0%, respectively has been reported. CONCLUSIONS: There was increased prevalence in dhfr triple ...

Differences in epidemiologic patterns are only partially explained by vaccination practices.

Background: Lagos state is the industrial nerve centre of Nigeria and was the epicentre of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Nigeria as it is now for the current Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak. This paper describes how the lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak in 2014 informed the emergency preparedness of the State ahead of the COVID-19 outbreak and guided response. Discussion: Following the Ebola outbreak in 2014, the Lagos State government provided governance by developing a policy on emergency preparedness and biosecurity and provided oversight and coordination of emergency preparedness strategies. Capacities for emergency response were strengthened by training key staff, developing a robust surveillance system, and setting up a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory and biobank. Resource provision, in terms of finances and trained personnel for emergencies was prioritized by the government. With the onset of COVID-19, Lagos state was able to respond promptly to the outbreak using the centralized Incident Command Structure and the key activities of the Emergency Operations Centre. Contributory to effective response were partnerships with the private sectors, community engagement and political commitment. Conclusion: Using the lessons learned from the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Lagos State had gradually prepared its healthcare system for a pandemic such as COVID-19. The State needs to continue to expand its preparedness to be more resilient and future proof to respond to disease outbreaks. Looking beyond intra-state gains, lessons and identified best practices from the past and present should be shared with other states and countries.

Background Lagos state is the industrial nerve centre of Nigeria and was the epicentre of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Nigeria as it is now for the current Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak. This paper describes how the lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak in 2014 informed the emergency preparedness of the State ahead of the COVID-19 outbreak and guided response. Discussion Following the Ebola outbreak in 2014, the Lagos State government provided governance by developing a policy on emergency preparedness and biosecurity and provided oversight and coordination of emergency preparedness strategies. Capacities for emergency response were strengthened by training key staff, developing a robust surveillance system, and setting up a Biosafety Level 3 laboratory and biobank. Resource provision, in terms of finances and trained personnel for emergencies was prioritized by the government. With the onset of COVID-19, Lagos state was able to respond promptly to the outbreak using the centralized Incident Command Structure and the key activities of the Emergency Operations Centre. Contributory to effective response were partnerships with the private sectors, community engagement and political commitment. Conclusion Using the lessons learned from the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Lagos State had gradually prepared its healthcare system for a pandemic such as COVID-19. The State needs to continue to expand its preparedness to be more resilient and future proof to respond to disease outbreaks. Looking beyond intra-state gains, lessons and identified best practices from the past and present should be shared with other states and countries.

In 2014, Ebola virus (EBOV) was identified as the etiological agent of a large and still expanding outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa and a much more confined EVD outbreak in Middle Africa. Epidemiological and evolutionary analyses confirmed that all cases of both outbreaks are connected to a single introduction each of EBOV into human populations and that both outbreaks are not directly connected. Coding-complete genomic sequence analyses of isolates revealed that the two outbreaks were caused by two novel EBOV variants, and initial clinical observations suggest that neither of them should be considered strains. Here we present consensus decisions on naming for both variants (West Africa: "Makona", Middle Africa: "Lomela") and provide database-compatible full, shortened, and abbreviated names that are in line with recently established filovirus sub-species nomenclatures. ; This work was funded in part through Battelle Memorial Institute's prime contract with the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) under Contract No. HHSN272200700016I. ; http://www.mdpi.com/journal/viruses ; hb2015

In 2014, Ebola virus (EBOV) was identified as the etiological agent of a large and still expanding outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa and a much more confined EVD outbreak in Middle Africa. Epidemiological and evolutionary analyses confirmed that all cases of both outbreaks are connected to a single introduction each of EBOV into human populations and that both outbreaks are not directly connected. Coding-complete genomic sequence analyses of isolates revealed that the two outbreaks were caused by two novel EBOV variants, and initial clinical observations suggest that neither of them should be considered strains. Here we present consensus decisions on naming for both variants (West Africa: "Makona", Middle Africa: "Lomela") and provide database-compatible full, shortened, and abbreviated names that are in line with recently established filovirus sub-species nomenclatures.