Suchergebnisse

This is a commissioned review of Copan, P. and Craig, W. (eds.) The Kalām Cosmological Argument Volume Two: Scientific Evidence for the Beginning of the Universe New York: Bloomsbury, US$172.50, ISBN 978-1-50-133587-7

These comments, on the paper by Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican 1 and on the critique of that paper by Janusz Salamon 2 , divide into four sections. In the first two sections, I briefly sketch some of the major themes from the paper by Thornhill-Miller and Millican, and then from the critique by Salamon. In the final two sections, I provide some critical thoughts on Salamon's objections to Thornhill-Miller and Millican, and then on the leading claims made by Thornhill-Miller and Millican. I find much to commend, but also some things to dispute, in both papers. As is so often the way, I shall focus on areas of disagreement.

Pruss (2010) argues that consideration of the motivational centrality of Theistic belief in flourishing and intellectually sophisticated lives of significant length provides reason for thinking that Theistic belief is at least possibly true. But Theistic belief is belief in a necessarily existent God. So, according to Pruss, consideration of the motivational centrality of Theistic belief in flourishing and intellectually sophisticated lives of significant length provides reason for thinking that there is a necessarily existent God. Pruss's gambit is the most interesting original move in the recent literature on modal ontological arguments and, on that account, deserves detailed analysis. In this paper, I aim to provide just such an analysis. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I argue for the conclusion that Pruss's gambit should be declined.

Some people—including the present author—have proposed and defended alternative restricted causal principles that block Robert Koons' 'new' cosmological argument without undermining the intuition that causation is very close to ubiquitous. In 'Epistemological Foundations for the Cosmological Argument', Koons argues that any restricted causal principles that are insufficient for the purposes of his cosmological argument cause epistemological collapse into general scepticism. In this paper I argue, against Koons, that there is no reason to suppose that my favourite restricted causal principle precipitates epistemological collapse into general scepticism. If we impose the same kinds of restrictions on causal epistemological principles and on principles of general causation, then we cannot be vulnerable to the kind of argument that Koons develops.

In this volume, Graham Oppy and N.N. Trakakis present interviews with fourteen leading Australasian philosophers, providing unique insights into the history and development of philosophy in the Antipodes, its current flourishing and its future prospects. The philosophers interviewed are drawn from a variety of backgrounds and perspectives, and in these pages they speak frankly and accessibly about their philosophical careers in Australia, New Zealand and overseas

In this volume, Graham Oppy and N.N. Trakakis present interviews with fourteen leading Australasian philosophers, providing unique insights into the history and development of philosophy in the Antipodes, its current flourishing and its future prospects. The philosophers interviewed are drawn from a variety of backgrounds and perspectives, and in these pages they speak frankly and accessibly about their philosophical careers in Australia, New Zealand and overseas