Suchergebnisse

Bo Smith-udvalget gennemførte en undersøgelse af (skandale)sager, der på statsligt niveau havde været genstand for en formel undersøgelse siden 1980. Der var ingen tilsvarende undersøgelse af kommunerne. Denne artikel forsøger at afhjælpe denne mangel. Skandalesager er ikke dagligdag. Alligevel kan disse fortælle os noget om de udfordringer og problemer, som er i den kommunale opgaveløsning og i samspillet mellem politikere og embedsmænd. Der er tale om ni sager fra 2002-2015. Fire sager omhandler forvaltningsmæssige fejl, mens de restende fem i et eller andet omfang berører samspillet mellem den politiske ledelse og embedsmændene. Sagerne diskuteres med relation til Bo Smith-udvalgets anbefalinger.

The interaction between politicians and officials has been widely discussed, not least because of a number of scandals, which have been seen as proof of a politicization of the role and behavior of officials. This discussion has only been concerned with central government. But local authorities are responsible for much of the welfare state and they have therefore been almost as bureaucratized as the ministries. In fact they have had their share of scandals. Councils do, however, lead a more quiet life – partly because the press shows less interest; partly because of institutional factors. Local authorities are governed by committees and there is a strong culture of consensus. The mayor is elected for four years and cannot be forced from office. Formally the mayor is just a chairman with limited executive responsibilities. In fact, he/she is often the central decision-maker. Officers see themselves primarily as advisers to politicians, less as classic administrators. Although without formal legal status they are in fact perceived as very strong. Backbench councilors, on the other hand, complain of having lost influence.

The interaction between politicians and officials has been widely discussed, not least because of a number of scandals, which have been seen as proof of a politicization of the role and behavior of officials. This discussion has only been concerned with central government. But local authorities are responsible for much of the welfare state and they have therefore been almost as bureaucratized as the ministries. In fact they have had their share of scandals. Councils do, however, lead a more quiet life – partly because the press shows less interest; partly because of institutional factors. Local authorities are governed by committees and there is a strong culture of consensus. The mayor is elected for four years and cannot be forced from office. Formally the mayor is just a chairman with limited executive responsibilities. In fact, he/she is often the central decision-maker. Officers see themselves primarily as advisers to politicians, less as classic administrators. Although without formal legal status they are in fact perceived as very strong. Backbench councilors, on the other hand, complain of having lost influence.

AbstractRecent research has illustrated that demographic diversity influences the outcomes of public sector organizations. Most studies have focused on workforce diversity; by comparison, little is known about how managerial diversity affects organizational outcomes. This article focuses on gender diversity in the top management teams of public organizations and its relationship to financial performance. Theory suggests that management diversity can be a positive asset for organizations, allowing for the use of more diverse knowledge and human skill sets. Results of this study, however, suggest that organizations may only be able to leverage these advantages if they have a supporting management structure. In a longitudinal study of top management teams in Danish municipalities, the authors find that gender diversity in top management teams is associated with higher financial performance, but only in municipalities with a management structure that supports cross‐functional team work. These results are interpreted in light of existing theory, and implications are suggested.

1: Performance management strikes Danish universities -- 2: Design of the study -- 3: Trickling down to the individual -- 4: Incentive systems surrounding the modern scholars -- 5: Gaming the system -- 6: Strategic decisions about research and publications -- 7: For love or money? -- 8: From a 'taste for science' to 'a taste for publications'? -- 9: Under pressure? -- 10: Effort substitution? -- 11: How great expectations on Bredgade were dashed at Frue Plads -- 12: Changing publications profiles? -- 13: The international impact of Danish Research -- 14: Havoc or Heaven? -- 15: Lessons from the study

AbstractPrior research has shown that public participation initiatives may have positive effects on how participating citizens view government. However, little is known about whether and how priming citizens to think about such initiatives influences the view of government among the larger public. Using a survey experiment, we find that the effect of priming citizens to think of a public participation initiative that includes a small group of citizens on their view of government is conditional on how proximate the service, which the initiative resolves around, is to citizens. Notably, across outcome measures we a find a negative priming effect among those for which the service is not proximate. These results are highly important, as they suggest that among the larger public, public participation initiatives—that involve few citizens—may have mixed results on the view of government, thus questioning the legitimacy of decisions reached by such initiatives.

The interaction between political executives and civil servants rests on a delicate balance between political responsiveness and the duty of civil servants and ministers to respect legal and other normative constraints on executive authority. In Danish central government, this balance is stressed by norms that define the correct behavior when the civil service provides ministers with political advice and assistance. Organizational factors strongly influence civil servants' behavior when they have to balance responsiveness against constraints on their role as political advisers. Moreover, civil servants working closely with ministers pay more attention to legal constraints than their peers among agency officials and specialists. Agency officials and specialists are much more prone to prioritize professional standards. We argue that this pattern can be generalized West European systems. ; The interaction between political executives and civil servants rests on a delicate balance between political responsiveness and the duty of civil servants and ministers to respect legal and other normative constraints on executive authority. In Danish central government, this balance is stressed by norms that define the correct behavior when the civil service provides ministers with political advice and assistance. Organizational factors strongly influence civil servants' behavior when they have to balance responsiveness against constraints on their role as political advisers. Moreover, civil servants working closely with ministers pay more attention to legal constraints than their peers among agency officials and specialists. Agency officials and specialists are much more prone to prioritize professional standards. We argue that this pattern can be generalized West European systems.

The interaction between political executives and civil servants rests on a delicate balance between political responsiveness and the duty of civil servants and ministers to respect legal and other normative constraints on executive authority. In Danish central government, this balance is stressed by norms that define the correct behavior when the civil service provides ministers with political advice and assistance. Organizational factors strongly influence civil servants' behavior when they have to balance responsiveness against constraints on their role as political advisers. Moreover, civil servants working closely with ministers pay more attention to legal constraints than their peers among agency officials and specialists. Agency officials and specialists are much more prone to prioritize professional standards. We argue that this pattern can be generalized West European systems.

En måde at organisere samskabelse på i kommunerne er udvalg nedsat efter styrelseslovens § 17, stk. 4. Disse 17-4-udvalg kan ikke tage beslutninger, kan nedsættes ad hoc, kan have medlemmer, der ikke er valgt til kommunalbestyrelsen, og søger ofte at arbejde på tværs af traditionelle sektorområder. For at et 17-4-udvalg kan have potentiale som forum for samskabelse, må det kræves, at udvalget har politikudvikling som fokus, og at der udover kommunalpolitikere også er eksterne ikkeoffentlige aktører som medlemmer. En rundspørge til alle landets kommuner viser, at otte ud af ti kommuner har et eller flere 17-4-udvalg. Selvom der oftest sidder en kommunalpolitiker for bordenden som formand, så har de fleste udvalg eksterne medlemmer. Og en stor del af dem arbejder med politikudvikling. Samlet har to ud af tre 17-4-udvalg potentiale som samskabelsesforum. Fra kommunernes synsvinkel bidrager især disse 17-4-udvalg med at gøre det politiske arbejde mere lydhørt overfor borgerne og tilføre et bedre vidensgrundlag for politiske beslutninger.

This article of top civil servants in Danish central and local government sheds new light on politicization. A survival analysis shows that since 1970, the risk that a top civil servant will be replaced has increased. There is no evidence of politicization in central government while city managers' risk of replacement increases both when a new mayor, representing another party and holding an absolute majority, and when the shift of mayor takes place within the same party. We interpret these results as evidence of the adaptability of the merit civil service and political executives' stronger insistence on their authority to make discretionary replacements. Adapted from the source document.

This article of top civil servants inDanish central and local government sheds new light on politicization. A survival analysis shows that since 1970, the risk that a top civil servant will be replaced has increased. There is no evidence of politicization in central government while city managers' risk of replacement increases both when a new mayor, representing another party and holding an absolute majority, and when the shift of mayor takes place within the same party. We interpret these results as evidence of the adaptability of the merit civil service and political executives' stronger insistence on their authority to make discretionary replacements.