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Do Revenue Management Platforms Like RealPage Facilitate Illegal Algorithmic Collusion?
In: ProMarket (Apr. 18, 2024), https://orb.so/rmplatforms
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The Friction Paradox: Intermediaries, Competition, and Efficiency
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 234-249
ISSN: 1930-7969
Commentators sometimes say that the elimination of impediments to trade—namely, market friction—tends to expand trade and foster competition. This casual assumption is known to be erroneous. Antitrust law recognizes that restraints of trade—which are forms of market friction—are often pro-competitive and frequently have both pro- and anticompetitive effects. Accordingly, antitrust law prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade, but not all restraints of trade. Trust-busting advocates promote a different approach to market friction. They argue that the antitrust laws intend to maintain fragmented industries and favor small businesses. This approach, which has been embraced by the antitrust agencies in recent years, implies that high-friction markets are more competitive than low-friction markets. It is an expression of a phenomenon that can be called the " friction paradox": the elimination of market friction is desirable until this goal is accomplished. Notable examples of the friction paradox include hostility toward new generations of market intermediaries, such as supermarkets, chain stores, department stores, big-box stores, digital platforms, and digital ecosystems. This article observes that antipathy for large intermediaries results in a willingness to sacrifice the core benefits of competition—low prices, convenience, efficiency, and innovation. It, therefore, argues that antitrust expressions of the friction paradox place competition policy at war with itself.
Do Antitrust Disruptors Make Good Reformers?
In: Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 22-20
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The Friction Paradox: Intermediaries, Competition, and Efficiency
In: Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 23-05
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Mandated Neutrality, Platforms, and Ecosystems
In: Pinar Akman et al., Research Handbook on Abuse of Dominance and Monopolization (Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2022)
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The Paramount Decrees: Lessons for the Future
In: 19 Antitrust Source, no. 5, 2020, at 1.
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D&O Liability for Antitrust Violations
In: 59 Santa Clara Law Review 527 (2020)
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Interstate Circuit and Conspiracy Theories
In: 2019 University of Illinois Law Review 1447 (2019)
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The Consumer Welfare Controversy
In: CPI Antitrust Chronical, Nov. 2019, at 22
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The Present New Antitrust Era
In: Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 18-37
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Working paper
Antitrust Populism
In: 14 New York University Journal of Law & Business 1 (2017)
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A State of Inaction: Regulatory Preferences, Rent, and Income Inequality
In: 16 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 45 (2015)
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Was the Crisis in Antitrust a Trojan Horse?
In: 79 Antitrust Law Journal 881 (2014)
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