Suchergebnisse

International audience ; The subsidiarity principle governing the collection of statistical data in the EMU may cause asymmetrical information. The national governments may be tempted to distort their economic and financial data communicated to ECB in order to influence its monetary policy decisions. We base our analysis on a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary Union and we prove that the governments' incentives to modify their private information depend mainly on the nature of the asymmetrical information between the Union's policy-makers, on the degree of monetary activism and on the extent of structural heterogeneity between the Union's members.

International audience ; The subsidiarity principle governing the collection of statistical data in the EMU may cause asymmetrical information. The national governments may be tempted to distort their economic and financial data communicated to ECB in order to influence its monetary policy decisions. We base our analysis on a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary Union and we prove that the governments' incentives to modify their private information depend mainly on the nature of the asymmetrical information between the Union's policy-makers, on the degree of monetary activism and on the extent of structural heterogeneity between the Union's members.

International audience The subsidiarity principle governing the collection of statistical data in the EMU may cause asymmetrical information. The national governments may be tempted to distort their economic and financial data communicated to ECB in order to influence its monetary policy decisions. We base our analysis on a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary Union and we prove that the governments' incentives to modify their private information depend mainly on the nature of the asymmetrical information between the Union's policy-makers, on the degree of monetary activism and on the extent of structural heterogeneity between the Union's members.

International audience ; The subsidiarity principle governing the collection of statistical data in the EMU may cause asymmetrical information. The national governments may be tempted to distort their economic and financial data communicated to ECB in order to influence its monetary policy decisions. We base our analysis on a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary Union and we prove that the governments' incentives to modify their private information depend mainly on the nature of the asymmetrical information between the Union's policy-makers, on the degree of monetary activism and on the extent of structural heterogeneity between the Union's members.

International audience ; The subsidiarity principle governing the collection of statistical data in the EMU may cause asymmetrical information. The national governments may be tempted to distort their economic and financial data communicated to ECB in order to influence its monetary policy decisions. We base our analysis on a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary Union and we prove that the governments' incentives to modify their private information depend mainly on the nature of the asymmetrical information between the Union's policy-makers, on the degree of monetary activism and on the extent of structural heterogeneity between the Union's members.

Given a monetary Union which is heterogeneous at the level of labour market flexibility, this paper investigates the effects in terms of macroeconomic stabilization of the different degrees of fiscal coordination between governments. We use a static Keynesian model within a closed monetary Union and we introduce an intermediate level of coordination between the national governments, which is the variable geometry coordination between economic clubs consisting of structurally close countries. The distinction between the wide Union's welfare and each country member's individual welfare proves that the effectiveness of a variable geometry fiscal coordination mainly depends on the type of the economic shocks affecting the Union members, the nature of the fiscal spillovers, and the extent of the Union's structural heterogeneity. While this type of game is effective in neutralizing the demand shocks, it doesn't manage to improve the national protection of all the country members against the supply shocks. .

International audience ; This paper analyses the impact of monetary and fiscal policies' interaction on the financial stability of the eurozone. Based on the construction of a financial stability index for the entire euro area, we assess the impact in terms of the stability of different configurations of policy-mix using a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary union. Mainly following the nature of fiscal spillovers, we show that fiscal coordination may be useful to improve the quality of the European Monetary Union financial stabilisation. The explicit consideration by the European Central Bank of the aggregate euro area financial stability as one of its macroeconomic objectives makes the non-cooperative game efficient. This configuration allows for a better macroeconomic and financial stabilisation at the aggregate level, which also has a positive effect at an individual level.

International audience ; This paper analyses the impact of monetary and fiscal policies' interaction on the financial stability of the eurozone. Based on the construction of a financial stability index for the entire euro area, we assess the impact in terms of the stability of different configurations of policy-mix using a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary union. Mainly following the nature of fiscal spillovers, we show that fiscal coordination may be useful to improve the quality of the European Monetary Union financial stabilisation. The explicit consideration by the European Central Bank of the aggregate euro area financial stability as one of its macroeconomic objectives makes the non-cooperative game efficient. This configuration allows for a better macroeconomic and financial stabilisation at the aggregate level, which also has a positive effect at an individual level.

International audience ; This paper analyses the impact of monetary and fiscal policies' interaction on the financial stability of the eurozone. Based on the construction of a financial stability index for the entire euro area, we assess the impact in terms of the stability of different configurations of policy-mix using a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary union. Mainly following the nature of fiscal spillovers, we show that fiscal coordination may be useful to improve the quality of the European Monetary Union financial stabilisation. The explicit consideration by the European Central Bank of the aggregate euro area financial stability as one of its macroeconomic objectives makes the non-cooperative game efficient. This configuration allows for a better macroeconomic and financial stabilisation at the aggregate level, which also has a positive effect at an individual level.

International audience ; This paper analyses the impact of monetary and fiscal policies' interaction on the financial stability of the eurozone. Based on the construction of a financial stability index for the entire euro area, we assess the impact in terms of the stability of different configurations of policy-mix using a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary union. Mainly following the nature of fiscal spillovers, we show that fiscal coordination may be useful to improve the quality of the European Monetary Union financial stabilisation. The explicit consideration by the European Central Bank of the aggregate euro area financial stability as one of its macroeconomic objectives makes the non-cooperative game efficient. This configuration allows for a better macroeconomic and financial stabilisation at the aggregate level, which also has a positive effect at an individual level.

International audience ; This paper analyses the impact of monetary and fiscal policies' interaction on the financial stability of the eurozone. Based on the construction of a financial stability index for the entire euro area, we assess the impact in terms of the stability of different configurations of policy-mix using a static Keynesian model in a closed monetary union. Mainly following the nature of fiscal spillovers, we show that fiscal coordination may be useful to improve the quality of the European Monetary Union financial stabilisation. The explicit consideration by the European Central Bank of the aggregate euro area financial stability as one of its macroeconomic objectives makes the non-cooperative game efficient. This configuration allows for a better macroeconomic and financial stabilisation at the aggregate level, which also has a positive effect at an individual level.