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"What monetary policy framework, if adopted by the Federal Reserve, would have avoided the Great Inflation of the 1960s and 1970s? We use counterfactual simulations of an estimated model of the U.S. economy to evaluate alternative monetary policy strategies. We show that policies constructed using modern optimal control techniques aimed at stabilizing inflation, economic activity, and interest rates would have succeeded in achieving a high degree of economic stability as well as price stability only if the Federal Reserve had possessed excellent information regarding the structure of the economy or if it had acted as if it placed relatively low weight on stabilizing the real economy. Neither condition held true. We document that policymakers at the time both had an overly optimistic view of the natural rate of unemployment and put a high priority on achieving full employment. We show that in the presence of realistic informational imperfections and with an emphasis on stabilizing economic activity, an optimal control approach would have failed to keep inflation expectations well anchored, resulting in high and highly volatile inflation during the 1970s. Finally, we show that a strategy of following a robust first-difference policy rule would have been highly effective at stabilizing inflation and unemployment in the presence of informational imperfections. This robust monetary policy rule yields simulated outcomes that are close to those seen during the period of the Great Moderation starting in the mid-1980s"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

A number of recent studies have suggested that activist stabilization policy rules responding to inflation and the output gap can attain simultaneously a low and stable rate of inflation as well as a high degree of economic stability. The foremost example of such a strategy is the policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993). In this paper, I demonstrate that the policy settings that would have been suggested by this rule during the 1970s, based on real-time data published by the U.S. Commerce Department, do not greatly differ from actual policy during this period. To the extent macroeconomic outcomes during this period are considered unfavorable, this raises questions regarding the usefulness of this strategy for monetary policy. To the extent the Taylor rule is believed to provide a reasonable guide to monetary policy, this finding raises questions regarding earlier critiques of monetary policy during the 1970s.

Comparing and contrasting the Fed's and ECB's policy responses to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the importance of the fiscal dimension of monetary policy and the pitfalls that can arise when the synergy of fiscal and monetary policy is neglected by an independent central bank. For the ECB, two critical changes in its policy response led to notably better outcomes in the aftermath of the pandemic. In contrast to the hesitation it exhibited in 2008, the ECB expanded its balance sheet more appropriately in 2020 with decisive purchases of long-term government debt. Furthermore, the ECB suspended elements of its policy framework that had impaired the functioning of government debt markets, such as the reliance on credit rating agencies for determining the eligibility of government debt for monetary operations. By protecting government bond markets from the self-fulfilling adverse equilibria that the ECB had tolerated in the aftermath of the GFC, the ECB supported a low cost of refinancing government debt in the euro area overall, instead of only in selected Member States. This facilitated more expansionary fiscal policy that supported a more robust recovery, and protected against the further fragmentation of the euro area.

SUMMARY
This paper explores the reasons for the suboptimal fiscal–monetary policy mix in the euro area in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and ways in which the status quo can be improved. A comparison of fiscal and monetary policy and of economic outcomes in the euro area, the United States and Japan suggests that both fiscal and monetary policies in the euro area have been overly tight. Fiscal policy has been hampered by the institutional framework which constrains individual states and lacks instruments to secure an appropriate aggregate stance. Monetary policy has been hampered by the distributional effects of balance sheet policies which needed to be adopted at the zero lower bound and by discretionary decisions taken before the crisis such as the reliance on credit rating agencies for determining collateral eligibility for monetary operations. The compromising of the 'safe asset' status of euro area sovereign debt during the crisis complicated fiscal and monetary policies. Changes in the discretionary decisions governing the implementation of monetary policy in the euro area can potentially reduce the distributional effects of policy and improve the fiscal–policy mix and longer-term prospects for the euro area.