Suchergebnisse

This paper evaluates the impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes of natives in France over the period 1962-1999. Combining large (up to 25%) extracts from six censuses and data from Labor Force Surveys, we exploit the variation in the immigrant share across education/experience cells and over time to identify the impact of immigration. In the Borjas (2003) specification, we find that a 10% increase in immigration increases native wages by 3%. However, as the number of immigrants and the number of natives are positively and strongly correlated across cells, the immigrant share may not be a good measure of the immigration shock. When the log of natives and the log of immigrants are used as regressors instead, the impact of immigration on natives' wages is still positive but much smaller, and natives' wages are negatively related to the number of natives. To understand this asymmetry and the positive impact of immigration on wages, we explore the link between immigration and the occupational distribution of natives within education/experience cells. Our results suggest that immigration leads to the reallocation of natives to better-paid occupations within education/experience cells. -- immigration ; occupations

La administración del Nuevo Reino de Granada buscó hacer del Chocó un área eficiente en la producción de minerales preciosos y un centro de intercambio comercial. Los argumentos para lograr tal fin se centraron en el comercio a través del río Atrato. El presente artículo analiza la manera como los ingenieros militares, mediante la cartografía, justificaron la liberación de la navegación comercial del río Atrato en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII. A este efecto se tendrá en cuenta, principalmente, el plano del curso del río Atrato con la relación análoga que hizo el ingeniero militar Juan Donoso en su contexto de producción.

The plot of the book is about how the rule of law functions to protect corporate structures that facilitate the commission of globalized fraud and abuse. The rules of law are used to dilute and hide accountability of high managerial agents, performing as a tool in aid of centralized and concentrated capital interests.

We consider a Gellnerian model to study the transformation of a two-region state into a nation state. Industrialization requires the elites to finance schooling. The implementation of statewide education generates a common national identity, which enables cross-regional production, while regional education does not. We show that statewide education is chosen when cross-regional production opportunities and productivity are high, especially when the same elite holds power at both geographical levels. By contrast, a dominant regional elite might prefer regional schooling, even at the loss of large cross-regional production opportunities if it is statewide dominated. The model is consistent with evidence for five European countries in 1860–1920. ; This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (grant number SEV-2015-0563), CICYT (grant number ECO2012- 37065), and the government of Catalonia ; Peer reviewed

Peer reviewed ; We consider a Gellnerian model to study the transformation of a two-region state into a nation state. Industrialization requires the elites to finance schooling. The implementation of statewide education generates a common national identity, which enables cross-regional production, while regional education does not. We show that statewide education is chosen when cross-regional production opportunities and productivity are high, especially when the same elite holds power at both geographical levels. By contrast, a dominant regional elite might prefer regional schooling, even at the loss of large cross-regional production opportunities if it is statewide dominated. The model is consistent with evidence for five European countries in 1860–1920. This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (grant number SEV-2015-0563), CICYT (grant number ECO2012- 37065), and the government of Catalonia

We consider a Gellnerian model to study the transformation of a two-region state into a nation state. Industrialization requires the elites to finance schooling. The implementation of statewide education generates a common national identity, which enables cross-regional production, while regional education does not. We show that statewide education is chosen when cross-regional production opportunities and productivity are high, especially when the same elite holds power at both geographical levels. By contrast, a dominant regional elite might prefer regional schooling, even at the loss of large cross-regional production opportunities if it is statewide dominated. The model is consistent with evidence for five European countries in 1860–1920.

We model a two-region country where value is created through bilateral production between masses and elites (bourgeois and landowners). Industrialization requires the elites to finance schools and the masses to attend them. Schooling raises productivity, particularly for matches between masses and bourgeois. At the same time, only country-wide education (unified schoolingî) renders the masses mobile across regions. Alternatively, schools can be implemented in one region alone (regional education) or the regionally dominant group can choose to implement schooling in its own region but refuse to share the costs/proceeds within the wider country-level group (secession). We show that schools are more likely to be set-up when the bourgeoisie dominates, but that this is not necesarily socially e¢ cient. Unified schooling is always chosen if the identity of the dominant elite at the regional and country level is the same and/or the industrialization shock is sufficiently high. If instead the bourgeoisie is dominant in one region and landowners are dominant countrywise, the bourgeoisie of that region may promote the secession of the region, and this can be socially e¢ cient. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence for 19th century France and Spain. ; Hauk acknowledges Önancial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and through CICYT project number ECO2012-37065 and from the government of Catalonia ; Peer reviewed

We model a two-region country where value is created through bilateral production between masses and elites (bourgeois and landowners). Industrialization requires the elites to finance schools and the masses to attend them. Schooling raises productivity, particularly for matches between masses and bourgeois. At the same time, only country-wide education (>unified schooling>) renders the masses mobile across regions. Alternatively, schools can be implemented in one region alone (>regional education>) or the regionally dominant group can choose to implement schooling in its own region but refuse to share the costs/proceeds within the wider country-level group (.secession.). We show that schools are more likely to be set-up when the bourgeoisie dominates, but that this is not necessarily socially efficient. Unified schooling is always chosen if the identity of the dominant elite at the regional and country level is the same and/or the industrialization shock is sufficiently high. If instead the bourgeoisie is dominant in one region and landowners are dominant countrywise, the bourgeoisie of that region may promote the secession of the region, and this can be socially efficient. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence for 19th century France and Spain ; Hauk acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2011-0075) and through CICYT project number ECO2012-37065 and from the government of Catalonia ; Peer Reviewed

We model a two-region country where value is created through bilateral production between masses and elites (bourgeois and landowners). Industrialization requires the elites to finance schools and the masses to attend them. Schooling raises productivity, particularly for matches between masses and bourgeois. At the same time, only country-wide education ("unified schooling") renders the masses mobile across regions. Alternatively, schools can be implemented in one region alone ("regional education") or the regionally dominant group can choose to implement schooling in its own region but refuse to share the costs/proceeds within the wider country-level group ("secession"). We show that schools are more likely to be set-up when the bourgeoisie dominates, but that this is not necessarily socially efficient. Unified schooling is always chosen if the identity of the dominant elite at the regional and country level is the same and/or the industrialization shock is sufficiently high. If instead the bourgeoisie is dominant in one region and landowners are dominant countrywise, the bourgeoisie of that region may promote the secession of the region, and this can be socially efficient. The model is shown to be consistent with evidence for 19th century France and Spain.

The interplay between unemployment compensation and the duration of contracts is analysed in a matching framework. The unemployed after a permanent job are entitled to a long period of unemployment Insurance (UI). The unemployed after a temporary job are not eligible for UI. The former receive offers for permanent and temporary jobs while the latter find only temporary jobs. The variables of the model are estimated using the European Panel. Then some reforms of the unemployment compensation system and of the temporary contracts' legislation are simulated. More generous insurance or assistance benefits slightly raise the unemployment rate and the social welfare. Increasing the legal duration of temporary contracts or their transformation rate in permanent contracts strongly decreases the rate of unemployment and improves the welfare of all the individuals. L'interaction entre l'indemnisation du chômage et la durée des contrats est analysée dans le cadre d'un modèle d'appariement. Les chômeurs après un emploi en CDI ont droit à une longue période d'indemnisation par l'assurance. Les chômeurs après un emploi temporaire sont peu ou pas indemnisés. Or les premiers reçoivent des offres d'emploi en CDI et CDD, alors que les seconds ne trouvent que des CDD. Les variables du modèle sont estimées à partir du Panel européen, puis des réformes de l'indemnisation du chômage et de la législation sur les contrats temporaires sont simulées. Des allocations chômage (d'assurance ou d'assistance) plus généreuses accroissent faiblement le taux de chômage et le bien-être social. Allonger la durée légale des CDD ou accroître leur taux de transformation en CDI réduit fortement le taux de chômage et améliore le bienêtre de tous.