Search results

ABSTRACT
There exists substantial evidence that technological innovation and, more specifically, innovation creating high-tech exports is a crucial driver for economic growth. However, there is less consensus about the factors that cause high-tech exports to thrive. Most studies emphasize the crucial role played by research and development expenditures, foreign direct investments, trade openness, human capital, and patents. In this article, we instead examine the role of a different determinant, which usually is overlooked in the scholarly debate about governance institutions. We use government effectives (GE) and rule of law (ROL) as measures of governance. We employ a panel-data approach encompassing more than 100 countries between 2007 and 2019. The panel estimates show a causal relationship linking GE and the ROL with high-tech exports.

In this paper we examine the empirical relevance of three prominent endogenous protection models. Is protection for sale, or do altruistic policy makers worry about political support? We find strong evidence that protection is indeed for sale. The important new result is, however, that not only the existence of lobbies matters, but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions. All variables of both the Influence Driven (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and the Tariff Function (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982) models are significant at the one percent level. Novel is our application of a single, unified theoretical framework to take strict interpretations of the three theoretical models to the data. We thus extend the previous tests of the Influence Driven approach by comparing its performance to well specified alternatives. Using J tests to compare the power of the models directly, we find significant misspecification in the Political Support Function approach. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct specification of the Influence Driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the Tariff Function model.

In this paper we examine the empirical relevance of three prominent endogenous protection models. Is protection for sale, or do altruistic policy makers worry about political support? We find strong evidence that protection is indeed "for sale". The important new result is, however, that not only the existence of lobbies matters, but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions. All variables of both the Influence Driven (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and the Tariff Function (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982) models are significant at the one percent level. Novel is our application of a single, unified theoretical framework to take strict interpretations of the three theoretical models to the data. We thus extend the previous tests of the Influence Driven approach by comparing its performance to well specified alternatives. Using J tests to compare the power of the models directly, we find significant misspecification in the Political Support Function approach. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of correct specification of the Influence Driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the Tariff Function model.

Abstract.  Empirical evidence of the impact of borders on international trade flows using the gravity equation approach abounds. This paper examines the empirical relevance of state borders in U.S. interstate trade for various specifications of the gravity equation. We find a large and economically significant subnational border effect for some specifications. However, two model specifications drastically reduce (if not eliminate) the border effect: (i) dynamic panel specifications controlling for past levels of trade and (ii) models conditioning on internal migration.