Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper identifies recurrent patterns in the political activity of American corporations that support trade. These firms have made public coalitions a central element of their pro-trade activities, and their collective efforts vastly outstrip those of trade's corporate opponents. This superiority in organization is paired with dramatically greater volumes of lobbying and campaign contributions. I explain these striking divergences by integrating collective action theory into a firm-centred model of trade politics: the heavy concentration of gains from trade among a small number of firms makes both individual and collective political action easier for pro-trade firms than for producers opposed to trade. This explanation is supported in panel analysis of firms' participation in pro-trade coalitions, which shows that size, multinationality, and heterogeneity in global networks of production and sales drive participation in pro-trade groups. Globally engaged firms have supported trade by matching pro-trade preferences with highly organized political action.

AbstractFrom 1960 to 2000, manufacturing supply chains became global. To what extent has this growth in offshore outsourcing and foreign direct investment affected industrial attitudes toward trade liberalization? Using data on public positions of US firms and trade associations on all free trade agreements since 1990, I show that foreign direct investment (FDI) and input sourcing are theprimarydrivers of support for trade liberalization. Direct import competition and export opportunities play a secondary role in shaping support for free trade agreements. This work therefore adds to the literature on the politics of globalization by providing systematic evidence of a link between global supply chains and industrial preferences, and by developing a new model of the determinants of industrial attitudes toward trade.

This article documents systematic deviations from standard models of trade politics, each of which has the effect of undermining sustained efforts at coherent industrial opposition to trade. Industries have internal disagreements about liberalization, support for trade liberalization extends bilaterally across borders in the same industry, and comparative disadvantage industries feature convincing expressions of public support for liberalization. These surprising outcomes are explained by a model of trade politics that emphasizes three factors: firm heterogeneity in export performance, product differentiation, and reciprocal liberalization. The author uses a new data set of industry attitudes about fifteen US trade agreements to show that product differentiation is strongly correlated with these outcomes, even conditional on plausible alternatives. The author concludes that public position-taking and lobbying on trade politics have been fundamentally altered by the rise of product variety; trade's opponents and indifferents have been overwhelmed by pro-globalization firms breaking out to support trade on their own.

The recent focus on firms in international trade suggests two conjectures about preferences over trade policy – only the most productive firms should support freer trade, and industries can be internally divided over reciprocal liberalization. This paper clarifies the content and scope of these claims. The most productive firms are generally not the greatest beneficiaries from trade liberalization and may oppose further liberalization due to increased competition in export markets from compatriot firms. Exporting industries will feature no support for trade if foreign competition is too strong or barriers too unequal. The key analytic factor generating intra‐industry division is product differentiation, both directly, by increasing export opportunities for less efficient firms, and by inducing home market effects wherein larger countries are more competitive. The implications of these findings for the distributional effects of liberalization and the study of trade politics are discussed.

Abstract
Globalization creates winners and losers, and recent research emphasizes that large corporations are among the biggest beneficiaries of trade while smaller firms may be harmed. How do these redistributive effects impact trade attitudes? Because a growing share of Americans hold highly unfavourable views of big corporations, we argue that the belief that large firms win from trade will provoke hostility towards trade and globalization. To test this theory, we show experimentally that informing people that large corporations benefit from trade makes them markedly more hostile towards trade compared to a treatment emphasizing that firms in exporting industries benefit. Using subgroup and mediation analysis, we find that anti-corporate sentiment drives this effect, particularly concern about corporations' power in society. Our findings illustrate how distributive consequences and attitudes towards the winners and losers from policy change interact to shape public opinion on economic policy.

How do multinational firms trapped in host markets suffering from political violence find security? Terrorism and conflict repel foreign investment and recent research has sought to understand heterogeneity across firms in their response to violence. When multinational firms are unable to move their investments in the face of violence, we argue that their home governments use diplomatic capacity and security and economic resources to secure protection from host governments. Multinational corporations from home markets with significant leverage over host markets are therefore less likely to curtail their operations or investments in the wake of violence. Examining dyadic data on foreign direct investment (FDI), we show that home market diplomatic missions, aid, and alliances substantially abate the negative effects of violence on FDI. Consistent with our argument, this effect is observed after violence begins and is not an artifact of host markets garnering security aid from great powers other than the home market. A strong diplomatic presence matched to both hard and soft power resources positively contributes to the defense of core foreign policy interests.

AbstractWhen do corporations stop ignoring or opposing climate action and start to go green? We focus on the role of corporate boards of directors, which shape firms' positions on internal and external issues of corporate governance and public policy. We argue that board decisions to engage constructively on climate issues are likely to be influenced by the choices and experiences of other firms. Learning, socialization, and competitive dynamics are especially important in highly salient and rapidly evolving policy areas, such as climate change. To test this theory, we construct the network of board memberships for US public corporations and uncover robust evidence that climate innovations diffuse among companies that share board members in common and among companies whose board members interact at separate boards. Understanding the unfolding dynamics of corporate climate action requires examining corporate boards and their social context.

AbstractFirms that offshore final production should oppose trade barriers "protecting" their own industry. This pits them against onshore firms, especially when comparative disadvantage is most pronounced, and so fundamentally alters trade policy coalitions. The US-China trade war's exclusion process, where US firms could request that tariffs not be applied to a product, provides a golden opportunity to test this contention. We show that coverage by a tariff in the trade war and firm characteristics associated with offshoring—size, multinationality, and heavy imports from China—interacted to generate firm requests for exclusion from the trade war's tariffs. This finding is robust to input-sourcing and fears of export retaliation as alternative explanations, and across multiple measures of firm size, tariff coverage, and exclusion requests. We therefore test a key piece of the firm-centered model of trade politics and show its value in interpreting the US-China trade war.

AbstractWho supports trade in the US Congress? We uncover the ideological space of trade voting, focusing on trade agreements and development policy as two fundamental cleavages around globalization. We then cluster members of Congress into coherent voting blocs, and identify the most pro-trade voting blocs in each Chamber. We find that these blocs: cross party lines; are ideologically heterogeneous; and are over-represented on the committees with jurisdiction over trade. We then examine two leading theories of Congressional voting – on constituency characteristics and campaign contributions – and find support for each using our learned voting blocs. Members of pro-trade blocs have defended their constituents' and contributors' interests by speaking out to confront the Trump administration's protectionism. We conclude that unsupervised learning methods provide a valuable tool for exploring the multifaceted and dynamic divisions which characterize current debates over global economic integration.

Under what circumstances does terrorism repel foreign investment? The negative effect of terrorism on foreign investment identified in current scholarship masks heterogeneity across host markets and industries. Foreign investment ought to react less to political violence when host markets match firms' input requirements, when firms lack viable alternative hosts, and when assets are immobile across markets. We model the endogenous codetermination of terror and investment to derive these comparative statics, highlighting empirical challenges in identifying the effects of terror on foreign direct investment. To overcome these obstacles, we use an instrumental variable estimator which exploits differences in the networks along which terror and investment spread. Using industry-level data on the activities of US multinationals, we test our model and conclude that foreign investors that find it hard to leave particular host markets are doubly penalized: their lack of outside options makes them tempting targets for terror. Our findings have implications for other forms of violent and nonviolent political tactics which affect multinationals and for understanding how foreign investment reacts to heightened risk in host markets.