Suchergebnisse

After years of deliberation and judicial activism, the South African legislature in September 2010 brought into force the Reform of Customary law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 (the Reform Act). The Act regulates the devolution of property of individuals who live according to customary law and die intestate. The notorious customary law principle of male primogeniture, according to which males inherited to the exclusion of females, has been abolished and replaced with the common law system of intestate succession. It has been nine years since the enactment of the Reform Act. This thesis investigates the implementation of the Act to understand its application by officials and people's experiences thereof. It is a qualitative study that draws upon doctrinal and empirical research to address its objectives. The theoretical concepts of deep legal pluralism and the semi-autonomous social field are employed as the analytical prism through which the administration of customary law estates is investigated. The findings are based on a comprehensive case study conducted in a rural village in the Eastern Cape of South Africa. Individuals, the traditional leader, the headman and state officials were interviewed to understand how estates are reported and the devolution of benefits. The interviews were augmented by an analysis of a sample of case files drawn from the Master's Office responsible for the administration of estates. The findings revealed the resilience of living customary law in the administration of estates, particularly in respect of homes situated in rural areas. In this regard, living customary law has evolved to allow women and daughters greater rights to property but it still displays patriarchal overtones as males are considered the true owners of homes. The Reform Act regulates more effectively the devolution of assets found in the formal sector, such as financial assets. The case study found most estates were valued at less than R250 000, with the result that deceased's surviving spouse and children were the primary beneficiaries of the estate. However, a statutory right of inheritance is no guarantee that beneficiaries enjoy their rights as there is a significant risk of property grabbing. While much has been done to reform the customary law of succession, there is room for improvement in securing the rights of dependents of the deceased, facilitating the reporting of estates and ensuring the implementation of mediated solutions in communities. The thesis thus offers practical recommendations to improve the system of administration. First, the thesis recommends a move towards a functional, fact-based approach to inheritance which extends inheritance rights to individuals supported by the deceased while alive, regardless of whether they constitute a spouse or a descendant as statutorily defined. This addresses the lack of protection for unmarried partners and the broader notions of family found in customary law. Second, it advocates for the greater leveraging of traditional institutions such as chiefs and families in the reporting of estates and resolution of disputes. Third, the dissemination of information through state and non-state institutions is promoted. Fourth, it advocates for the explicit condemnation of corrupt state practices which exploit vulnerable individuals. Finally, the thesis recommends further research into practices such as the existence of family property and administration of estates in urban areas. Understanding the nuanced manner in which administration is experienced is argued to be necessary for successful reform.

In pluralistic legal systems, the regulation of non-state law through statute carries the risks associated with codification; namely the ossification and distortion of law. This article examines the effects of statutory regulation on unwritten systems of law in the South African legal context. It argues that the constitutional recognition of customary law in South Africa has forced the state to legislate in this arena, the most notable enactments being the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The enactments' attempt to align customary law with constitutional values have imported significant portions of the common law to regulate the customary law of marriage and succession. This has resulted in a distortion of customary law to reflect common law values and rules. Furthermore, it is argued that significant lacunae in the enactments have necessitated litigation and resulted in the judiciary playing a significant role in shaping customary law. Finally, despite the incorporation of living customary law into the enactments, the implementation thereof by courts and in practice has – and perhaps inevitably so – ossified and distorted portions of the law. Nonetheless, the article argues that legislation is critical to regulate customary law. It advocates that the shortcomings identified in the article are addressed to ensure a more accurate portrayal of customary law in legislation and the successful implementation thereof.

In pluralistic legal systems, the regulation of non-state law through statute carries the risks associated with codification; namely the ossification and distortion of law. This article examines the effects of statutory regulation on unwritten systems of law in the South African legal context. It argues that the constitutional recognition of customary law in South Africa has forced the state to legislate in this arena, the most notable enactments being the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The enactments' attempt to align customary law with constitutional values have imported significant portions of the common law to regulate the customary law of marriage and succession. This has resulted in a distortion of customary law to reflect common law values and rules. Furthermore, it is argued that significant lacunae in the enactments have necessitated litigation and resulted in the judiciary playing a significant role in shaping customary law. Finally, despite the incorporation of living customary law into the enactments, the implementation thereof by courts and in practice has – and perhaps inevitably so – ossified and distorted portions of the law. Nonetheless, the article argues that legislation is critical to regulate customary law. It advocates that the shortcomings identified in the article are addressed to ensure a more accurate portrayal of customary law in legislation and the successful implementation thereof.

This article discusses the latest version of the Traditional Courts Bill introduced by Parliament in 2017. It examines several fundamental objections to previous versions of the Bill to explain the progress that has thus far been made. In a much-welcomed improvement, the 2017 Bill provides a mechanism for individuals to opt out of the traditional justice system. Nonetheless, the recognition of the old apartheid homeland boundaries is perpetuated, as only courts convened by a traditional leader, whose power and jurisdiction are based on the old tribal boundaries, are recognised. A notable change is that there are no longer appeals to the magistrates' courts. Parties may appeal a decision to a higher customary court or apply for a review of a decision to the high court. This calls into question the accessibility and affordability of appeals, and essentially locks people into the traditional justice system after the commencement of proceedings. The bar on legal representation continues under the 2017 Bill, which remains objectionable given that traditional courts may still deal with criminal matters. However, the powers of traditional courts in granting sanctions have been significantly circumscribed and regulated. Thus, while the 2017 Bill represents a significant development of previous versions of the Bill, there is still room for improvement.

A headscarf, a simple piece of cloth that covers the head, is a controversial garment that carries various connotations and meanings. While it may be accepted as just another item of clothing when worn by non-Muslim women, it is often the subject of much controversy when worn by Muslim women. In recent years the headscarf has been described as a symbol of Islam's oppression of women and simultaneously of terrorism. As the debate regarding the acceptability of the headscarf in the modern world continues, an increasing number of states have legislated to ban the wearing of the headscarf. This article critically examines the reasons underlying these bans and argues that these prohibitions are not justified. It does this by first analysing the place of the headscarf in Islam, its religious basis and its significance to Muslim women. It argues that the headscarf is more than just a mere religious symbol and that Muslim women wear the headscarf as a matter of religious obligation. The headscarf is considered to be an important religious practice protected by the right to freedom of religion. Thereafter the article examines legislative bans on the headscarf in France, Turkey and Switzerland in order to identify the most popular justifications advanced by states and courts for banning the headscarf. It critically evaluates the justifications for protecting secularism, preventing coercion, promoting equality and curbing religious extremism, and disputes that the reasons put forward by states and accepted by courts justify banning the headscarf. It thereafter explores how South African courts would respond to a headscarf ban and argues that schools and employers should accommodate the headscarf. While Muslim women may not have an absolute right to wear the headscarf, there has thus far been no justifiable reason for banning the headscarf.

A headscarf, a simple piece of cloth that covers the head, is a controversial garment that carries various connotations and meanings. While it may be accepted as just another item of clothing when worn by non-Muslim women, it is often the subject of much controversy when worn by Muslim women. In recent years the headscarf has been described as a symbol of Islam's oppression of women and simultaneously of terrorism. As the debate regarding the acceptability of the headscarf in the modern world continues, an increasing number of states have legislated to ban the wearing of the headscarf. This article critically examines the reasons underlying these bans and argues that these prohibitions are not justified. It does this by first analysing the place of the headscarf in Islam, its religious basis and its significance to Muslim women. It argues that the headscarf is more than just a mere religious symbol and that Muslim women wear the headscarf as a matter of religious obligation. The headscarf is considered to be an important religious practice protected by the right to freedom of religion. Thereafter the article examines legislative bans on the headscarf in France, Turkey and Switzerland in order to identify the most popular justifications advanced by states and courts for banning the headscarf. It critically evaluates the justifications for protecting secularism, preventing coercion, promoting equality and curbing religious extremism, and disputes that the reasons put forward by states and accepted by courts justify banning the headscarf. It thereafter explores how South African courts would respond to a headscarf ban and argues that schools and employers should accommodate the headscarf. While Muslim women may not have an absolute right to wear the headscarf, there has thus far been no justifiable reason for banning the headscarf.

his thesis analyses whether a legislative ban on wearing a headscarf breaches the right to freedom of religion, as such right is universally understood. It describes the ambit of the right to freedom of religion by examining the theoretical justification and importance of the right and thereafter analysing how the right is recognised in international and regional treaties and domestic constitutions. It demonstrates that religious freedom comprises of the right to hold a religion and the right to manifest a religion in the form of worship, observance, practice and teaching. Religious freedom, however, is not absolute and the thesis explains in the light of international and comparative case-law that the right to freedom of religion may be limited by a law that pursues a legitimate state interest and is reasonable. In light of this theoretical framework the thesis examines the practice of Muslim women wearing a headscarf and argues that the practice constitutes a manifestation of Islamic belief protected by the right to freedom of religion. Thereafter this thesis examines French, Turkish and German prohibitions on wearing a headscarf, the effect of these laws on Muslim women and the justifications furnished for such laws. It is argued that the state interest of preserving secularism relied upon to justify a headscarf ban is not legitimate and does not justify a headscarf ban. Furthermore, even where the state has a legitimate interest in preventing the coercion of young girls, promoting the equality rights of women and maintaining safety and order, a headscarf ban does not constitute a reasonable limitation of religious freedom. Ultimately, this thesis argues that a headscarf ban exacerbates the problems it is meant to solve and constitutes an unjustifiable infringement of religious freedom.