Suchergebnisse

Germany has an ambitious climate target for 2030 that cannot be achieved without reducing the high share of coal in power generation. In the face of this, the country has set up a commission to phase out coal. A UK-style carbon price floor is one of the options being considered. Yet implementing such a policy comes with important risks related to the following two aspects: (1) the price level necessary to reduce emissions to reach the 2030 climate target; and (2) the waterbed effect that arises from such a policy under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) cap. In this paper, we quantify these risks using the numerical electricity market model LIMES-EU, and consider their implications as well as different options for dealing with them. Our results show that under baseline assumptions a carbon price floor of around 33 €/tCO2 would be sufficient to reach the 2030 target. Under unfavourable conditions, an appropriate price floor may be nearly twice as high (57 €/tCO2). The waterbed effect and related risks for the EU ETS could be reduced substantially in the mid-term (2030) through the recently introduced cancellation of allowances through the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), or through a larger coalition of countries. Germany could even fully alleviate the waterbed effect by cancelling 1.1 GtCO2 of certificates. In the long-term (until 2050), emission reductions leading up to 2030 would be almost completely (91%) offset at the EU level. Accordingly, it is essential that the national price initiates a policy sequence that leads to the EU level.

Germany aims to phase out coal to achieve its 2030 climate target, for which a UK-style carbon price floor is considered. But this measure comes with risks related to the uncertainty about what price level is sufficient, and the waterbed effect arising from unilateral policy under the EU-ETS. Quantifying these risks we find that to be on the "safe side" target-wise, the price must be nearly twice as high as the reference scenario price (33 €/tCO2). Further, cancelling 1.1 GtCO2 of certificates and forming coalitions with other countries is essential to reduce the risk that EU climate policy will renationalize.

The stringency of the EU's Emission Trading System (ETS) is bound to be ratcheted-up to deliver on more ambitious goals as put forth in the EU's Green Deal. Tightening the cap needs to consider the interactions with the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), which will be reviewed in 2021. Against that background, we employ the detailed model LIMES-EU to analyse options for the upcoming reforms. First, we examine how revising MSR parameters impacts allowance cancellations through the MSR. We find that under current regulation, the MSR cancels 5.1 Gt of allowances. Varying MSR parameters leads to cancellations in the range of 2.6 and 7.9 Gt, with the intake/outtake thresholds having the highest impact. Intake rates above 12% only have a limited effect but cause oscillatory intake behaviour. Second, we analyse how the 2030 targets can be achieved by adjusting the linear reduction factor (LRF). We find that the LRF increases MSR cancellations substantially (up to 10.0 Gt). This implies that increasing the LRF from currently 2.2% to 2.6% could already be consistent with the 55% EU-wide emission reduction target in 2030. However, we highlight that the number of MSR cancellations is subject to large uncertainty. Overall, the MSR increases the complexity of the market. In face of that, we suggest to develop the MSR into a Price Stability Reserve.

The stringency of the EU's Emission Trading System (ETS) is bound to be ratcheted-up to deliver on more ambitious goals as formulated in the EU's Green Deal. Tightening the cap needs to consider the interactions with the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), which will be reviewed in 2021. We analyse these issues using the model LIMES-EU. First, we examine how revising MSR parameters impacts allowance cancellations. We find that varying key design parameters leads to cancellations in the range of 2.6–7.9 Gt – compared to 5.1 Gt under current regulation. Overall, the bank thresholds, which define when there is intake to/outtake from the MSR, have the highest impact. Intake rates above 12% only have a limited effect, and cause oscillatory intake behaviour. Second, we analyse how more ambitious climate 2030 targets can be achieved by adjusting the linear reduction factor (LRF). We find that the LRF increases MSR cancellations substantially up to 10.0 Gt. This implies that increasing its value from currently 2.2% to only 2.6% could be consistent with an EU-wide target of −55% by 2030. However, MSR cancellations are subject to large uncertainty, which increases the complexity of the market and induces high price uncertainty. ; BMBF, 01LA1810C, Ökonomie des Klimawandels - Verbundprojekt: Die Zukunft fossiler Energieträger im Zuge von Treibhausgasneutralität (FFF) - Teilprojekt 3: Europäische Interaktion ; EC/H2020/730403/EU/Innovation pathways, strategies and policies for the Low-Carbon Transition in Europe/INNOPATHS ; BMBF, 03SFK5A, Verbundvorhaben ARIADNE: Evidenzbasiertes Assessment für die Gestaltung der deutschen Energiewende - Teilvorhaben A

The stringency of the EU's Emission Trading System (ETS) is bound to be ratcheted-up to deliver on more ambitious goals as formulated in the EU's Green Deal. Tightening the cap needs to consider the interactions with the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), which will be reviewed in 2021. We analyse these issues using the model LIMES-EU. First, we examine how revising MSR parameters impacts allowance cancellations. We find that varying key design parameters leads to cancellations in the range of 2.6–7.9 Gt – compared to 5.1 Gt under current regulation. Overall, the bank thresholds, which define when there is intake to/outtake from the MSR, have the highest impact. Intake rates above 12% only have a limited effect, and cause oscillatory intake behaviour. Second, we analyse how more ambitious climate 2030 targets can be achieved by adjusting the linear reduction factor (LRF). We find that the LRF increases MSR cancellations substantially up to 10.0 Gt. This implies that increasing its value from currently 2.2% to only 2.6% could be consistent with an EU-wide target of −55% by 2030. However, MSR cancellations are subject to large uncertainty, which increases the complexity of the market and induces high price uncertainty.