Suchergebnisse

In face-to-face bargaining, one usuallyfinds a large variety of actions that are not explainable and sometimes not even compatible with the usual rationality assunmptions of the actors. It is widely accepted that bounded rationality approaches are more appropriate for such settings. Most bounds to rationality refer to how the situation and the partners are perceived by the actor Two crucial components of such a perception and judgment are conceptualized as processing aspirations and the socialfield. Ostmann reported on the use of the socialfield concept and on afirst trial to explain bargaining results by aspirations and the socialfield; Another paper explored aspiration processing in a more detailed way. This article deals with questions of how nonstandard measures for the socialfield concept can be used successfully to explain or predict fundamental processes in face-to-face-bargaining.

A growing tradition in analyzing bargaining behavior uses an experimental setup to provide intstrumenits to control the parameters of the underlying conflict. Game theory is used to model the conflict, to analyze the possible actions of the agents and the arguments that might be lused within the bargaining process, and to understand the results of the bargaining. Especially in face-to-face bargaining, we find a large variance in the results within a given class of situations (even when the same game is used). It is a major task of bargaining research to explain this variance. This article describes a trial using the concept of the social field to allow for consideration of social forces that may critically influence the possible development of an agreement.