Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The EU and its Member States both contribute to the informalization of international relations' tools by concluding bilateral soft law instruments which prepare, implement, and especially replace international agreements. This contribution analyses the EU practice of applying international soft law and focuses on the institutional challenges deriving from external relations' soft law instruments. It has the three-fold aim of explaining why the informalization or 'softification' of EU bilateral instruments has proliferated, categorizing them according to their function and purpose in international law and EU external relations law and finally assessing the legal implications in EU law resulting from their application. The paper will argue that while, in practice, differences between international treaty law and bilateral soft law disappear, more legal challenges arise in the EU system through bilateral soft law measures than international agreements. This is caused by the rules on EU external representation, dispersed among supranational and intergovernmental EU actors and characterized by their general wording. International soft law tools operate in a politically contested area with several actors and a variety of informal instruments. The flexibility and hybrid character of soft law form an advantage for the institutions at the expense of the rule of law, legal certainty, and legal review.

The European Parliament's role in EU external relations and treaty-making has increased over the years through constitutional practice and Treaty amendments. Finally, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament's constitutional rights in treaty-making establish – in the words of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) – 'symmetry between legislation-making and treaty-making in compliance with institutional balance provided for by the Treaties'. In a comparative overview, the European Parliament has ascertained more extensive powers over treaty-making compared to the majority of national parliaments which are only involved in politically important international treaties. This contribution addresses the consequences of this symmetry or parallelism and asks whether it leads to structural symmetry or even procedural symmetry which synchronizes the acts of legislating and treaty-making with each other. This contribution analyses the role of the European Parliament in the different phases of international treaty-making against the backdrop of this constitutional practice. This constitutional practice is shaped by intergovernmental agreements, bilateral arrangements and European Parliament resolutions and is influenced by the mounting case law of the CJEU. It also assesses the European Parliament's role in concluding international administrative agreements concluded by the Commission and Europol and how far the constitutional practice is in line with EU primary law.

This contribution will be devoted to the parallel legal orders which are established in the EU legal space. These legal orders align third countries through international agreements with the EU legal order. The Turkish association is one of them but also the European Economic Area (EEA), the Swiss bilaterals on persons, the Energy Community Treaty, the European Common Aviation Area Agreement and the Ukrainian Association can be counted as being among these special agreements. These agreements are not only characterized with the special aim of approximation to parts of the EU acquis but are also equipped with directly effective norms and homogeneity clauses. These homogeneity clauses are intended by the contracting parties to enable an identical interpretation of these international agreements norms with EU treaty norms. Relevant rulings on EU law will be also taken into account in the interpretation of identically or similarly phrased provisions. By comparing the different homogeneity clauses found in these agreements and putting them into the context of the relevant case law, it shall be concluded whether the judges follow the aims of these provisions.

This article is devoted to new institutional actors in EU external relations. The number of EU regulatory agencies has increased over the years. By fulfilling important administrative tasks in the European Union, these agencies actively participate in international relations with third–country agencies or international organizations in such fields as aviation, food safety or border control. However, their actions have not only to be analysed against the backdrop of the internal implications for the Union's institutional balance and the principles of democracy and transparency but also for their consequences on EU external relations law. This contribution aims to categorize these actions of EU regulatory agencies and highlight that their international relations move in a legal minefield between European and international law.