In: Political science quarterly: the journal of public and international affairs : a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs : PSQ, Band 139, Heft 2, S. 321-322
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 133, Heft 3, S. 601-602
Chapter 1: Presidential Rhetoric and US Foreign Policy -- Chapter 2: Presidential Powers and National Emergencies -- Chapter 3: Presidential Rhetoric and National Emergencies -- Chapter 4: Sanction Rhetoric and Sanction Activities -- Chapter 5: Tough Talk in US Foreign Policy.
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What explains how presidents utilize their emergency powers? In the recent political battle with Congress over the U.S.–Mexico border, President Donald Trump announced his willingness to invoke his emergency powers to construct the controversial wall if Congress continued to oppose his decisions. While his action was met with strong, mostly partisan responses, the declaration of national emergencies to fulfill policy objectives is not unique to the Trump administration. Building on the unilateral presidency literature, we report the results of a pilot project on how the political environment impacts the use of national emergencies in U.S. foreign policy. Results add to our understanding of a current political debate and to a broader comprehension of presidential emergency powers.
AbstractStudies in presidential appointments, particularly principal‐agent models, posit that presidents employ a top‐down strategy to control the bureaucracy, one that promotes loyalty over competence. However, many studies have two critical limitations: (1) treating loyalty and competence as binary constructs and (2) focusing only on presidential nomination and Senate confirmation (PAS) appointments. In this article, the authors construct a continuous measure of loyalty and competence to determine how much loyalty or competence an appointee offers a president and examine other appointment tools—Senior Executive Service (SES), Schedule C, and presidential appointments—that allow presidents to influence different levels of the bureaucracy. Findings show that presidents are more likely to reward competence with their PAS and SES appointments. In addition, few appointees score high on both loyalty and competence, explaining why presidents generally must make a trade‐off between loyalty and competence.
Scholars focusing on landmark congressional legislation have not categorized executive orders as similar to legislation passed by Congress, although they have the same legal standing. It is clear that some executive orders have a greater impact than others and thus observers view them as being of greater importance. Ronald Reagan used executive orders to alter the manner in which agencies established regulations, creating a process of administrative central clearance that delegated considerable power to the Office of Management and Budget over the agency regulatory process. Truman used an executive order to desegregate the military. In this article, we examine those orders that are of a level of importance commensurate with landmark legislation, and, using expert scholarly opinion, we discuss and analyze orders that meet these criteria.