Suchergebnisse

Explains important aspects of the Voting Rights Act, & especially section 5 preclearance, by showing that it is a common sense, non-quota set of regulations, which can be easily abided by & understood via software. Yet despite the importance & integrity of the VRA, the heart of the matter is whether the VRA penalizes states that have proven themselves under the act, & are allowing other states under the radar to do as they please to their minority groups, especially in light of the population shift of minorities throughout the 50 states since its inception. Seeks a trenchant analysis of the facts as they've changed through the years, with the possibility of overhaul of the act should it be necessary. While no objective baseline to determine unacceptable levels of racism in electoral practice have been concretely deduced, the author offers a list of 8 possible symptoms of such a situation. With this, it is attempted to determine which states have been the most egregious violators of minority voting rights since 1982, while also considering aspects of sections 2 & 203 of the VRA. Considers other factors, such as racial disparities in voter turnout, the wooing of minorities by both of the major political parties, & the number of minorities elected to state positions. References. J. Fullmer

This Article argues that money contributed to and spent on political campaigns ('political money") possesses many of the traits that explain judicial respect for regulation of property, and that courts reviewing restrictions on political money should consider doctrines associated with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Property Clauses. As evidenced by the different degrees of respect afforded to regulations of property and speech, judicial treatment of a particular liberty interest can be explained by the presence and particular posturing of distinct functional issues such as distrust, scarcity, distribution, and interference with others' interests. Campaign finance jurisprudence, however, has categorized political money as warranting exacting judicial protection under the First Amendment, and this formalism causes courts to overlook the intersection of two different constitutional doctrines in the political money context. Instead, courts should glean lessons from both property and speech doctrines to determine the appropriate judicial approach in reviewing regulations of political money.