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There is extensive literature on accountability, yet systematic research on the state of the art in the field of public administration is lacking. This research is essential to understand the aspects of accountability that have been studied and identify the primary findings and areas that require further investigation. This study seeks to address this gap by conducting a systematic literature review of 277 articles on accountability published in 15 leading public administration journals between 1996 and 2021. This review aims to answer the following questions: What types of accountability have been examined? To what extent has accountability been investigated as a dependent or an explanatory variable? Which methodological approaches dominate, and which cases are more commonly examined? What are the current challenges and future research trends? Points for practitioners Two dimensions to consider when examining accountability are supply-side accountability, which centers on traditional government models, and demand-side accountability, which underscores the role of citizens and multiple forums. The interaction between the supply and demand sides leads to various types of accountability, encompassing vertical, horizontal, hybrid, and social accountability. Core approaches used for measuring accountability include formal, informal, voluntary, and felt accountability.

AbstractThis article examines the decision to include interest group representation (IGR) in the most important decisionmaking bodies of European Union agencies (EAs). The study shows that there is considerable variation among agencies: some agencies have no IGR, others have formal rules that establish a clear distribution of the number of representatives among stakeholders, while other agencies are ambiguous with regard to the number of representatives that each group should have. In addition, interest group representatives have the right to vote in some of the agencies with IGR, while in others they only have an advisory role. This article identifies three broad types of groups normally represented: representatives of capital (e.g. industry), representatives of labor (e.g. trade unions), and citizens' representatives (e.g. non‐governmental organizations, consumer groups). The findings suggest that informative agencies are more likely to have IGR than agencies performing operational/management tasks. The findings also suggest that the involvement of the European Parliament in the design of EAs is more likely to lead to a provision for the representation of stakeholders. Finally, case studies of the European Food Safety Agency and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work demonstrate that interest groups could play an important role by pushing European Union institutions to include stakeholder representatives in EAs.

La présente étude a pour but de présenter un cadre d'analyse et d'évaluation de l'imputabilité pour les politiques publiques. Je commence par proposer deux dimensions pour l'analyse de l'imputabilité des politiques (la dimension informative/justificative, et la dimension évaluative/de sanction), appliquées à la phase de mise en œuvre de la politique et plus particulièrement à trois éléments déterminants qui composent cette phase (les acteurs responsables, les ressources et les résultats stratégiques). Deuxièmement, je propose d'évaluer l'imputabilité d'une politique publique en partant du degré de formalisation et, plus précisément, du respect de quatre caractéristiques de son cadre réglementaire : le caractère spécifique, le contraignant, le public et l'autonome. Troisièmement, je propose une application empirique de cette proposition à l'analyse de la politique de la santé en Espagne, dont le modèle décentralisé, où les gouvernements régionaux sont responsables de sa mise en œuvre, permet d'analyser les différences dans les niveaux d'imputabilité de cette politique à l'échelle des régions. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens La présente étude vise à épingler et à limiter les composantes pouvant être intégrées dans l'analyse de l'imputabilité des politiques publiques en proposant un cadre analytique pouvant servir à mesurer et comparer les niveaux d'imputabilité pour différents types de politiques (santé, éducation, pensions, etc.) dans différents contextes (pays, régions, gouvernements locaux, etc.). Afin de vérifier la validité de la proposition développée ici, nous proposons dans le présent article une application empirique de l'analyse de la politique de la santé en Espagne, dont le modèle décentralisé permet d'analyser les différences dans l'imputabilité entre différents gouvernements régionaux.

The aim of this study is to present a framework for analyzing and assessing accountability for public policies. First, I suggest two dimensions for analyzing accountability for policies (the informative/justifying dimension, and the evaluative/sanctioning dimension), applied to the implementation phase of the policy and, in particular, to three central elements that make up this phase (the actors responsible, the resources, and the policy results). Second, I suggest assessing accountability for a public policy starting from the degree of formalization and, specifically, from compliance with four characteristics of its regulatory framework: specific, binding, public and autonomous character. Third, I develop an empirical application of this proposal to the analysis of health policy in Spain, whose decentralized design, where regional governments are responsible for its implementation, allows us to analyze the differences in the levels of accountability for this policy across regions.Points for practitionersThis study identifies and limits the components that can be incorporated into the analysis of accountability for public policies by providing an analytical framework that can be used to measure and compare levels of accountability for different kinds of policies (e.g. health, education, pensions) in different contexts (e.g. countries, regions, local governments). In order to test the validity of the proposal developed here, this article presents an empirical application to the analysis of health policy in Spain, whose decentralized design allows us to analyze the differences in accountability across regional governments.

The aim of this article is to analyse citizens' attitudes towards governmental accountability in 24 European countries and to examine the influence of contextual and individual factors on perceptions of accountability. Using as a dataset the 2012 European Social Survey, the results show that citizens respond positively when the media provides reliable information on which to judge the government, when individuals perceive that governments perform well, when individuals live in more extensive and generous welfare states and when they live in countries where the rule of law is firmly established. In addition, the findings also provide evidence that compared to politically left-wing citizens, right-wing supporters have, on average, a higher perception of governmental accountability. In particular, the findings show strong positive evaluations of right-wing governments by right-wing voters in comparison with left-wing governments by left-wing voters.

Supplemental material files: Data details, Acronyms and full names of European Union Agencies, Weighted models ; Some scholars consider that European Union agencies (EAs) were created as independent bodies in order to enhance the credibility of the European Union decision-making process. Scholars have typically focused on analysing the relationship that these agencies have with politicians. However, relatively little attention has been paid to their relationship with stakeholders. This study examines the professional trajectory of EA board members, identifying their career ties with politicians and stakeholders. Using an original dataset on the career trajectories of 338 top officials in 33 EAs, the findings provide evidence that the type of appointing body matters: on the one hand, the European Parliament is more likely – than the Commission – to appoint individuals having career ties to politicians; on the other hand, multiple veto players are less likely to designate board members linked to political players. Additionally, the findings suggest that agencies performing regulatory tasks seem to be more inclined to have lower levels of de facto independence from politicians. ; Research for this article was financially supported by a research grant of the Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca (2015DEMOC00011).

This article examines the decision to include interest group representation (IGR) in the most important decisionmaking bodies of European Union agencies (EAs). The study shows that there is considerable variation among agencies: some agencies have no IGR, others have formal rules that establish a clear distribution of the number of representatives among stakeholders, while other agencies are ambiguous with regard to the number of representatives that each group should have. In addition, interest group representatives have the right to vote in some of the agencies with IGR, while in others they only have an advisory role. This article identifies three broad types of groups normally represented: representatives of capital (e.g. industry), representatives of labor (e.g. trade unions), and citizens' representatives (e.g. non‐governmental organizations, consumer groups). The findings suggest that informative agencies are more likely to have IGR than agencies performing operational/management tasks. The findings also suggest that the involvement of the European Parliament in the design of EAs is more likely to lead to a provision for the representation of stakeholders. Finally, case studies of the European Food Safety Agency and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work demonstrate that interest groups could play an important role by pushing European Union institutions to include stakeholder representatives in EAs.

La création des agences de l'Union européenne a suscité des discussions normatives et théoriques sur leur imputabilité et leur légitimité démocratique. Cette étude examine dans quelle mesure différentes caractéristiques concernant le modèle institutionnel des agences les incitent à fournir des informations sur leurs performances. Pour ce faire, elle mesure quatre aspects pour lesquels leurs organes directeurs sont censés fournir des informations : les décisions de gouvernance, la performance des politiques, les questions financières et les interactions avec les parties prenantes. En utilisant un nouvel ensemble de données de déclarations informatives incluses dans 199 rapports d'activité annuels de 29 agences au cours de la période 2010-2016, cette étude démontre que l'imputabilité formelle influence positivement la fourniture d'informations sur les questions de gouvernance et de politiques, et que la création d'organes scientifiques au sein des agences améliore la fourniture d'informations sur les aspects liés à la gouvernance, la performance des politiques et leurs interactions avec les parties prenantes. Enfin, cet article constate que les agences qui pratiquent une réglementation plus directe sont soumises à de plus grandes exigences de transparence concernant leurs décisions de gouvernance et leurs interactions avec les parties prenantes. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens L'étude fournit aux praticiens un outil analytique pour évaluer la fourniture d'informations sur les décisions et les actions des conseils d'administration sur les questions de gouvernance, la performance des politiques, les aspects financiers et leurs interactions avec les parties prenantes.

AbstractResearch on transparency in the EU and at the European Parliament, in particular, has extensively examined the adoption and implementation of transparency initiatives as well as the conditions under which interest groups have access to and influence on EU policy‐making. However, the question of whether Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are transparent regarding their interactions with interest group representatives has been overlooked by the literature. This study addresses the question of the conditions under which MEPs are more likely to provide information about their meetings with interest groups. The study engages with institutional theory by emphasizing that formal and informal rules incentivize MEPs' behaviour. Drawing on a dataset on MEPs' reports on their meetings with interest group representatives, the study demonstrates that procedural rules, party's position on the cultural dimension and the national corruption tradition affect legislators' propensity to disclose information about their meetings with interest groups.

The creation of European Union agencies has prompted normative and theoretical discussions about their accountability and democratic legitimacy. This study examines the extent to which different features concerning the institutional design of agencies incentivize information provision on their performance. To do so, it measures four aspects for which their governing bodies are expected to provide information: governance decisions, policy performance, financial issues, and interactions with stakeholders. Using a new data set of informative statements included in 199 annual activity reports of 29 agencies during the period 2010–2016, this study demonstrates that formal accountability positively affects information provision on governance and policy issues, and that the establishment of scientific bodies within agencies improves information provision on governance aspects, policy performance and their interactions with stakeholders. Finally, this article finds that agencies that perform more direct regulation are subject to greater transparency demands about their governance decisions and stakeholder interactions. Points for practitioners The study provides practitioners with an analytical tool for assessing the provision of information about the decisions and actions of management boards on governance issues, policy performance, financial aspects and their interactions with stakeholders.