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With increasing costs inflicted by natural hazard perils, and amidst state budget cuts, concerns are mounting about the capacity of governments to design sustainable, equitable and affordable risk management schemes. The participation of the private sector along with the public one through public–private partnerships (PPPs) has gained importance as a means of providing catastrophic natural hazard insurance to address these seemingly conflicting objectives. In 2013 the European Commission launched a wide-ranging consultation about what EU action could be appropriate to improve the performance of insurance markets. Simultaneously, the EU legislator instigated major reforms in the legislation and regulations that pertain to how PPPs are designed or operate. This paper has a dual objective: first, we review and summarize the manifold legal background that influences the provision of insurance against natural catastrophes. Second, we examine how PPPs designed for sharing and transferring risk operate within the European regulatory constraints, illustrated using the example of the UK Flood Reinsurance Scheme (Flood RE) between the state and the Association of British Insurers.

Abstract. With increasing costs inflicted by natural hazard perils, and amidst state budget cuts, concerns are mounting about the capacity of governments to design sustainable, equitable and affordable risk management schemes. The participation of the private sector along with the public one through public–private partnerships (PPPs) has gained importance as a means of providing catastrophic natural hazard insurance to address these seemingly conflicting objectives. In 2013 the European Commission launched a wide-ranging consultation about what EU action could be appropriate to improve the performance of insurance markets. Simultaneously, the EU legislator instigated major reforms in the legislation and regulations that pertain to how PPPs are designed or operate. This paper has a dual objective: first, we review and summarize the manifold legal background that influences the provision of insurance against natural catastrophes. Second, we examine how PPPs designed for sharing and transferring risk operate within the European regulatory constraints, illustrated using the example of the UK Flood Reinsurance Scheme (Flood RE) between the state and the Association of British Insurers.

With increasing costs inflicted by natural hazard perils, and amidst state budget cuts, concerns are mounting about the capacity of governments to design sustainable, equitable and affordable risk management schemes. The participation of the private sector along with the public one through public–private partnerships (PPPs) has gained importance as a means of providing catastrophic natural hazard insurance to address these seemingly conflicting objectives. In 2013 the European Commission launched a wide-ranging consultation about what EU action could be appropriate to improve the performance of insurance markets. Simultaneously, the EU legislator instigated major reforms in the legislation and regulations that pertain to how PPPs are designed or operate. This paper has a dual objective: first, we review and summarize the manifold legal background that influences the provision of insurance against natural catastrophes. Second, we examine how PPPs designed for sharing and transferring risk operate within the European regulatory constraints, illustrated using the example of the UK Flood Reinsurance Scheme (Flood RE) between the state and the Association of British Insurers.

This paper presents a conceptual framework for both assessing the role of economic instruments, and reshaping them in order to enhance their contribution to the goals of managing water scarcity. Water management problems stem from the mismatch between a multitude of individual decisions, on the one hand, and the current and projected status of water resources on the other. Economics can provide valuable incentives that drive individual decisions, and can design efficient instruments to address water governance problems in a context of conflicting interests and relevant transaction costs. Yet, instruments such as water pricing or trading are mostly based on general principles of welfare economics that are not readily applicable to assets as complex as water. A flaw in welfare economic approaches lies in the presumption that economic instruments may be good or bad on their own (e.g., finding the "right" price). This vision changes radically when we focus on the problem, instead of the instrument. In this paper, we examine how economic instruments to achieve welfare-enhancing water resource outcomes can realize their full potential in basin-scale management contexts. We follow a political economy perspective that views conflicts between public and private interest as the main instrumental challenge of water management. Our analysis allows us to better understand the critical importance of economic instruments for reconciling individual actions towards collective ambitions of water efficiency, equity and sustainability with lessons for later-adopting jurisdictions. Rather than providing panaceas, the successful design and implementation of economic instruments as key river basin management arrangements involves high transaction costs, wide institutional changes and collective action at different levels.