Suchergebnisse

This work is a continuation of the series of articles dedicated to the genesis of lobbying in Russia. The article examines the specifics of the formation of the institution of lobbying from the moment of the collapse of the USSR to the present day. It is shown that the development of lobbying depended both on the transformations of the political system as well as on the changing norms of interaction between interest groups and the government. The development of lobbying over the past 30 years has passed through three stages: a chaotic period of structural transformations in 1991–1993, the stage of development of the democratic system and oligarchic economy in 1993–2003, the genesis of the vertical of power from 2003 to the present. Specifics of the institution of lobbying in Russia is determined by several key components. First, it is shaped by the interest groups system, which circles around large corporations and business associations. Second, lobbying is determined by the structure of power and decision making, with the President of the Russian Federation, the Administration of the President and the Government being major institutional stakeholders for lobbyists. Third, the development of lobbying depends on modes of interaction between interests groups and public officials which basically remains mostly in the shadows. A fundamental problem in the development of lobbying in Russia is that both the executive bodies and the parliament are closed, non-public power structures, access to which for external groups is generally not systematized. This leads to the elitist, oligarchic tendencies of lobbying means that only few privileged groups enjoy access to the decision-making system. ; Данная работа является продолжением цикла статей автора о генезисе института лоббизма в России. В работе рассматривается специфика формирования института лоббизма от момента распада СССР до наших дней. Показано, что развитие института лоббизма зависело как от трансформаций политической системы, так и от меняющихся норм ...

The United States of America is living through today one of the most acute socio-political crises in its history. The United States is in a state of deep social, political and economic fracture, which affects political and economic efficiency, leads to significant social dysfunctions and delegitimization of the political system. The author argues that current crisis differs from other crises that the United States had faced in its history. There is a layering of several crises that accumulated over time and eventually merged into a single stream. Describing current crisis in the USA, the author proposes to use the concept of a polycrisis - a relatively rare phenomenon in the socio-political development of any country, implying a simultaneous violation of stability, a breakdown in several key areas for the state and the society. In the American case, the polycrisis consists of four main elements that affect the political and socio-economic spheres of the society: ideological polarization of the American society, multiple splits within the Democratic and Republican political parties, declining incomes of the middle class, and the constant increase in socio-economic inequality. The author comes to the conclusion that the current polycrisis will inevitably transform both the political system and the society. The only question is what direction this transformation takes. In a favorable scenario, new egalitarian forces will prevail, smoothing out the sharp edges of increased inequality, as well as restoring the centrist orientation of American politics. In a negative scenario, the United States will slide into ever greater chaos, which is fraught with social explosions and the undermining of American democracy.

This work is a continuation of the series of articles dedicated to the genesis of lobbying in Russia. The article examines the specifics of the formation of the institution of lobbying from the moment of the collapse of the USSR to the present day. It is shown that the development of lobbying depended both on the transformations of the political system as well as on the changing norms of interaction between interest groups and the government. The development of lobbying over the past 30 years has passed through three stages: a chaotic period of structural transformations in 1991–1993, the stage of development of the democratic system and oligarchic economy in 1993–2003, the genesis of the vertical of power from 2003 to the present. Specifics of the institution of lobbying in Russia is determined by several key components. First, it is shaped by the interest groups system, which circles around large corporations and business associations. Second, lobbying is determined by the structure of power and decision making, with the President of the Russian Federation, the Administration of the President and the Government being major institutional stakeholders for lobbyists. Third, the development of lobbying depends on modes of interaction between interests groups and public officials which basically remains mostly in the shadows. A fundamental problem in the development of lobbying in Russia is that both the executive bodies and the parliament are closed, non-public power structures, access to which for external groups is generally not systematized. This leads to the elitist, oligarchic tendencies of lobbying means that only few privileged groups enjoy access to the decision-making system.

The article is dedicated to the political, sociological and historical analysis of lobbying development in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This article opens a series of two articles on the genesis of the institution of lobbying in Russia. Numerous discussions on lobbying in Russia over the past three decades boil down to arguments that the country is not ready to institutionalize interaction between interest groups and the government. There is a widespread opinion that this institution is not rooted in Russian political culture and political traditions. However, analysis of interest groups and their interactions with the government in different periods of Russian history allows us to conclude that this is not a new phenomenon. Analysis of how of lobbying was formed, first under the monarchy, then in Soviet times contributes to a better understanding of the way mechanisms of interest representation evolved over time. It also helps to understand how these mechanisms gave birth to informal lobbying practices that were evolving in the 1990s and why lobbying activities continue to take place in the shadows and under unclear rules of the game.

The article is dedicated to development and current state of the interest groups system in France. The author shows that the development of the French interest groups system occurred under the influence of historical, cultural, social and institutional factors. For comparative researchers who analyze interest groups in different countries France represents a special case since it cannot be classified as either corporatist or pluralistic. Although initially the French model was closer to corporatism, the trade unions — an essential element of classical corporatist systems — always played much smaller role. In addition, in France there is a tradition of close interaction between elites, which directly affects the interest groups system. The most influential groups are those that enjoy privileged access to government officials which allows us to talk about sectoral corporatism. At the same time, pluralistic tendencies can be traced in the development of the French interest groups system. However, in France, the pluralization of the interest groups system is associated not with the development of market relations but with the fragmented structure of state power, in which the decision-making process is concentrated in pluralistic and at the same time elitist communities. The author concludes that the peculiarities of the development of the political system and political culture in France led to the existence of such a system of interest groups that combines both corporate and pluralistic features, but the logic of their interaction with the government is based on the principle of inter-elite interaction.

This article is devoted to the study of the formation and current state of corporatism in Western European countries. Author shows how the evolution of corporatism took place since the XIX century and how corporatism was transforming during the XX century. Particular attention is paid to the last stage of the development of corporatism, which is associated with the evolution of neoliberalism and political pluralism. Corporatism is seen as a form of interaction between organized groups of society and the state, and as a political-ideological category rooted in medieval social philosophy. Corporatism flourished in the post-war decades, when most of the countries of Western Europe took the path of creating vertically integrated associative groups representing the interests of the main socio-economic groups, primarily business and employees. At the same time, corporatism has always been built on a clear value foundation, which implies the pursuit of public interests and the equal distribution of resources among all parties of corporate agreements. The article shows how the onset of neoliberalism led to a reduction in the role of corporatism. Since the 1990s, in those countries that traditionally lined up to the process of agreeing on and adopting key political decisions on a corporate basis, there has been an obvious pluralisation of the systems of interest groups, which is increasingly replacing the tradition and practice of corporatism. At the same time, corporatism does not disappear; in many countries it remains an important element of collective bargaining, but its nature and content are changing. We can conclude that the classic concepts of corporatism are not able to fully explain its current state, it is necessary to use new approaches that could reveal the essence of the transformations taking place.

The development of lobbying in the modern world is directly related to the dynamics of democratic regimes. The interaction between interest groups and the state is inherent in the nature of constitutional democracies. However, as shown in this article, lobbying in a democracy can be viewed from two opposite perspectives — as a continuation of the spirit of democracy and the development of a dialogue between the civil society and the state and as a deviation from the principles of representative democracy. The article analyzes the categories of public and private interests and it is shown that the interpretation of the role of interest groups and lobbying in a society depends on how we understand the interest and whom we consider as carriers of political interests. It is shown how in the XXth century a classical discussion was developing around the role of interest groups in politics and that this discussion has not lost its relevance today.