'Refuse of All Classes?' Social Indicators and Social Deprivation
In: Sociological research online, Volume 1, Issue 1
ISSN: 1360-7804
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In: Sociological research online, Volume 1, Issue 1
ISSN: 1360-7804
This article argues that electoral politics acts as an important constraint on presidential decision-making in war. Going beyond the existing literature's focus on cases of conflict initiation, it outlines how electoral pressures push and pull presidents away from courses of action which may otherwise be deemed strategically optimal. Importantly, however, these electoral constraints will not just apply on the immediate eve of an election but will vary in strength across the electoral calendar. Together, this conceptual framework helps explain why presidential fulfilment of rhetorical pledges made on the previous campaign trail may be belated and often inconsistent. To probe the plausibility of these arguments, case studies of the closing stages of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq are outlined, drawing on archival and elite interview material. These episodes demonstrate that electoral accountability can be a powerful factor affecting wartime decision-making, but its effect is non-linear, and not easily observed through a narrow focus on particular timeframes.
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How do electoral politics affect presidential decisionmaking in war? As both commander in chief and elected officeholder, presidents must inevitably balance competing objectives of the national interest and political survival when assessing alternative military strategies in war. Yet, how and when electoral pressures influence decisionmaking during an ongoing conflict remains unclear. Drawn from the logic of democratic accountability, two mechanisms of constraint may be inferred. First, presidents may delay making decisions that are perceived to carry excessive electoral risk. Second, electoral pressures may have a dampening effect, causing presidents to water down politically sensitive courses of action to minimize any expected backlash. Recently declassified documents and interviews with senior administration officials and military figures illustrate these mechanisms in a case study of decisionmaking during the second half of the Iraq War. Both George W. Bush's surge decision of 2007 and Barack Obama's decision to withdraw troops in 2011 are shown to have been profoundly influenced by concerns related to the domestic political calendar. These findings call for further study of the nuanced ways in which the electoral cycle shapes wartime decisionmaking.
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In: Journal of church and state: JCS, Volume 52, Issue 4, p. 712-728
ISSN: 0021-969X
In: Journal of church and state: JCS, Volume 52, Issue 1, p. 168-170
ISSN: 0021-969X
In: Journal of church and state: JCS, Volume 51, Issue 1, p. 165-168
ISSN: 0021-969X
In: Peace research abstracts journal, Volume 44, Issue 2, p. 25
ISSN: 0031-3599
In: Peace research abstracts journal, Volume 44, Issue 1, p. 917-925
ISSN: 0031-3599
In: Bulletin of Latin American research: the journal of the Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS), Volume 16, Issue 2, p. 269-270
ISSN: 1470-9856
In: Bulletin of Latin American research: the journal of the Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS), Volume 15, Issue 3, p. 403-404
ISSN: 1470-9856
In: The round table: the Commonwealth journal of international affairs, Issue 310, p. 207-222
ISSN: 0035-8533
In February and March 1986 there occurred the most recent in a long line of political disturbances involving university students in the Commonwealth Caribbean. The immediate issue was the imposition by the government of Jamaica of a charge on Jamaican students for part of the cost of their tertiary education. After receiving representations from the university authorities and instituting an enquiry, the Jamaican government retreated slightly and reduced the level of the new charges to be imposed on the students
World Affairs Online
In: The round table: the Commonwealth journal of international affairs, Issue 280, p. 381-388
ISSN: 0035-8533
ARTICLE EXAMINES POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN GRENADA SINCE ITS 1979 REVOLUTION, ASSESSING THE ABILITY OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAMS TO FOSTER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIVE SUCCESS IN RESTORING ORDER TO THE ECONOMY IS NOTED, AND, DESPITE THE RHETORIC OF NON-ALIGNMENT, GRENADA'S FOREIGN POLICY ALLIANCE WITH CUBA IS DESCRIBED.
In: Special report no. 2076