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The subject of this article is how deadlocks in international negotiations may be solved. Despite the fact that deadlock is a common phenomenon in international negotiations, this subject has received little attention from negotiation theorists. This analysis, which is based on five instances of deadlocks that occurred during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, focuses on (a) the negotiating parties' attempts and ability to solve deadlocks by coercion and persuasion, package deals and fractionating, and innovations, (b) how non-controversial elements, uncertainty, vagueness, symbolic formulas and residual disagreement can be used to solve deadlocks, and (c) how the perceptions of the negotiation and the presence of internal negotiations may limit the negotiation parties' possibilities to solve deadlocks. The analysis shows that innovations that are non-controversial, in the sense that they are hard to relate to the positions of the parties in terms of concessions or retractions, may play an important role in solving deadlocks. Furthermore, it indicates that agreements that follow deadlocks are often characterized by uncertainty, vagueness, symbolic formulas and residual disagreement.

The primary aim of this article is to present an inventory of the propositions that have been made concerning the ways in which small states can exercise influence over Great Powers. The paradox of relatively resourceless states sometimes being able to exercise substantial influence in international relations received some attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The weak state — powerful state relations have, however, also been dealt with in a number of more recent studies, some of which have discussed the 'paradox of weak state power'. In this article we revisit the subject area and take stock of the work by presenting the factors which have been mentioned as conceivable explanations to the phenom enon. The factors are divided into two groups, with four and three subcategories, respectively. The first group consists of the propositions which focus on 'power bases' and statements about the effects of various basic conditions in the international system. The second group contain the propositions which discuss more 'direct' conceivable causes, such as certain strategies and tactics open to the smaller states.

Democratic family functioning has traditionally been interpreted as effects of parenting, leaving little room for the adolescent in shaping the democratic climate. Here we argued that an understanding of the democratic family functioning has to involve both adolescent and parental behaviors. We hypothesized that parental openness and fair treatment, and adolescent openness, each uniquely predict changes in democratic family functioning. Also, we argued that family functioning constellations characterized by parental openness and fair treatment, and adolescent openness, should be the constellations adolescents experience as democratic, and where parents know much about their adolescents' whereabouts outside home. We used a longitudinal study following a group of 13–15-year-old adolescents (N = 527) over 2 years. Results using variable-oriented methods confirmed that both adolescent and parental behaviors were prospectively linked to adolescents' perceptions of the democratic family climate. Person-oriented methods showed that adolescents perceived a highly democratic family climate, and that parents' knowledge was highest, in families characterized by both parental and adolescent openness and parental fair treatment. Over-time changes in family functioning corresponded to changes in parental knowledge and adolescents' perceptions of democratic family functioning. We conclude that conceptions of the democratic functioning of the family have to include the behaviors of both parents and adolescents, and that mutual responsivity is a marker of the democratic family functioning.

Bonham, G. M., Jönsson, C., Persson, S., Shapiro, M. J. Cognition and International Negotiation: The Historical Recovery of Discursive Space. Cooperation and Conflict XXII, 1987, 1-19.The research reported in this article represents a continuation of work begun earlier on developing a cognitive mapping approach to collective decision-making. It is based on two shifts in the structure of previous theoretical thinking. First, the emphasis is on discursive rather than psychological imagery. Second, the idea chain or "path" is privileged over the person or the "actor". The cognitive map is thus conceived less as a psychological template than as a discursive space. Rather than conceiving of persons having positions which they bring to decisions and then hold to them or alter them in confrontation with other positions, we conceive of positions as having persons. As a process of negotiations unfolds, its degree of success, within our conception, is to be related to the degree to which the parties can construct a shared discursive space, which amounts to their building of a shared "reality". The new model is situated with respect to extant game-theoretical, "manipulative", and "cybernetic" conceptions of bargaining. By way of illustration, applications of cognitive mapping to the negotiations on the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905 and the 1919 Paris Peace Conference are analyzed.