Suchergebnisse

Nicht zuletzt durch den fortschreitenden Prozeß der europäischen Integration hat das wissenschaftliche Interesse an der Zuordnung finanzpolitischer Kompetenzen auf gebietskörperschaftliche Entscheidungsträger zugenommen. Während die traditionelle Theorie des Fiskalföderalismus auf die kostenminimale Bereitstellung von Kollektivgütern mittels föderativer Strukturen abstellt, sieht die politische Ökonomik die Hauptfunktion eines föderativen Systems in der Begrenzung staatlicher Macht durch vertikale Gewaltenteilung. In dieser Arbeit werden die Argumentationslinien beider Ansätze ausführlich dargestellt und im Rahmen eines konstitutionell-ökonomischen Denkansatzes integriert.

Nicht zuletzt durch den fortschreitenden Prozeß der europäischen Integration hat das wissenschaftliche Interesse an der Zuordnung finanzpolitischer Kompetenzen auf gebietskörperschaftliche Entscheidungsträger zugenommen. Während die traditionelle Theorie des Fiskalföderalismus auf die kostenminimale Bereitstellung von Kollektivgütern mittels föderativer Strukturen abstellt, sieht die politische Ökonomik die Hauptfunktion eines föderativen Systems in der Begrenzung staatlicher Macht durch vertikale Gewaltenteilung. In dieser Arbeit werden die Argumentationslinien beider Ansätze ausführlich dargestellt und im Rahmen eines konstitutionell-ökonomischen Denkansatzes integriert.

In 2013, the European Union and United States initiated a new political dialogue regarding a further deepening of bilateral trade and investment relations, the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). In some member states, anti-TTIP street protests and political activists received substantial support. The paper is concerned with the drivers of public support or disapproval of TTIP. In particular, we focus on the role of (dis-) trust in companies and in political institutions for attitude formation concerning economic regulation. We use data from a Eurobarometer Survey conducted in November 2014 to assess the determinants of individual approval or disapproval of TTIP by European citizens. By means of a mixed-level logit regression it can be shown that disapproval is highly correlated with a lack of trust in European institutions and in large companies. Our results moreover indicate that anti-TTIP political activism has a strong impact on TTIP-related preferences.

Stringent fiscal rules and budgetary procedures might generate incentives for political decision-makers to cut predominantly productive public investment during periods of fiscal consolidation. While the influence of the European Stability and Growth Pact on public investment received a lot of attention in the empirical literature, only a few studies consider the impact of different budgetary decision-making rules and procedures at the national level on government investment spending. We test empirically for the effect of political factors and the institutional framework of budgeting on public investment in EU 15 over the period 1990-2005. Our results show that stringent quantitative constraints limit government investment, but a centralisation of budgeting procedures by providing more agenda setting powers to the finance minister (delegation approach) or by the use of medium-term fiscal contracts are not related to public investment spending cuts.

SUMMARYWhile economic policy liberalization is a key to higher overall growth, reforms are often not implemented due to a fierce opposition from politically powerful prospective losers from reforms. In this respect, it is frequently claimed that economic crises can help overcome resistance to policy liberalization. Furthermore, political authorities not constrained by democratic checks and balances are supposed to be more decisive and are thus expected to carry out market‐friendly policy change in times of crises more easily. Rules of democratic participation and checks and balances may however also be good for policy reform, as they can serve as an institutional mechanism for peaceful conflict resolution.The paper investigates empirically the interaction between economic growth performance and political institutions in producing free‐market reform. We explore whether political regime types shape systematically government policy responses to good or bad growth performance, employing panel econometric techniques and using recently updated data for economic reform and political institutions. Contrary to conventional wisdom we find that a bad growth performance is conducive to reforms in democracies, but not in autocracies. Democracies not only carry out more liberal economic policies in general, but they are also more responsive to economic growth crises. Democratic rule seems to be favorable for policy liberalization, but a very good growth performance weakens liberalization incentives considerably.

The paper investigates empirically the interaction between economic growth performance and political institutions in producing free-market reform. In particular, we explore whether political regime types systematically shape government policy responses to good or bad growth performance, employing panel econometric techniques and using recently updated data for economic reform and political institutions. Contrary to conventional wisdom we find that a bad growth performance is conducive to reforms only in democracies, but not in autocracies. Democratic rule seems to be favourable for policy liberalisation in general, but a very good growth performance weakens liberalisation incentives considerably.

Empirical research has shown that both more economic freedom and a higher stability of policy variables are supportive for economic growth. Thus, the path of policy liberalization may have a considerable influence on a nation's growth performance. Using the Fraser‐index of economic freedom, this article shows empirically that policy volatility proves to be growth depressing, even if the state liberalizes the economy in the long‐run. Growth is significantly higher if liberalization occurs on a smoother path.

Nicht zuletzt durch den fortschreitenden Prozeß der europäischen Integration hat das wissenschaftliche Interesse an der Zuordnung finanzpolitischer Kompetenzen auf gebietskörperschaftliche Entscheidungsträger zugenommen. Während die traditionelle Theorie des Fiskalföderalismus auf die kostenminimale Bereitstellung von Kollektivgütern mittels föderativer Strukturen abstellt, sieht die politische Ökonomik die Hauptfunktion eines föderativen Systems in der Begrenzung staatlicher Macht durch vertikale Gewaltenteilung. In dieser Arbeit werden die Argumentationslinien beider Ansätze ausführlich dargestellt und im Rahmen eines konstitutionell-ökonomischen Denkansatzes integriert.

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