Suchergebnisse

Winner of the THESEUS promising award for Research on European Integration 2011.Sanctions are an important tool within the foreign policy of the European Union, which have until now remained obscure to both scholars and the general public. This book examines sanctions as a political tool of influence and evaluates the efficacy of sanctions imposed by the EU against third countries and their ability to bring about the desired outcome.While the principal sanctions activity of the EU takes place under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the author also consid

This text examines sanctions as a political tool of influence and evaluates the efficacy of sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) against countries from the early 1990s to present day.

At their inception in the early 1990s, conditionality clauses were introduced in the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) as an instrument for the protection and promotion of labour standards and human rights in the Global South. Conditionality in the GSP as an instrument of development and trade policy was conceived as separate from foreign policy tools in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Notwithstanding the very limited suspension practice, previous research highlighted indications of political contamination in withdrawal decisions. This article explores the question as to whether GSP withdrawals are becoming more similar to CFSP sanctions. Relying primarily on policy documents and legislation, the article discusses the evolution of GSP conditionality from its origins to present, including the proposal for a new Regulation governing the GSP tabled by the Commission in July 2021 and currently under consideration. With this aim in mind, it first outlines the evolution of the design of withdrawal mechanisms, taking issue with the changing focus of the GSP conditionality, which has expanded considerably while withdrawal practice remains marginal. Following that, the implications of the identified trend(s) for the European Union (EU) are teased out.
Economic sanctions, GSP, EU trade policy, labour standards, human rights, CFSP

The emergence of targeted sanctions in the mid-1990s was due to the humanitarian impact of embargoes, which were deemed unacceptable and compelled senders to shift to measures designed to affect only wrongdoers. Twenty years on, the present paper considers the extent to which autonomous sanctions are designed to affect those individuals and elites responsible for the behaviour the EU aims to condemn. How faithful has the EU remained to this concept in its sanctions policy? The enquiry scrutinizes diverse practices in three established sanctions strands of the EU, development aid suspensions, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions and Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) withdrawals. It shows that it has been more faithfully implemented in some strands of EU sanctions than in others. Specifically in the flagship CFSP sanctions practice, the due process motivated court challenges of its blacklists have led the EU to modify selection criteria in a way that renders them potentially less targeted.

European Union (EU) sanctions are agreed in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a framework where the unanimity rule prevails and where individual Member States have a formal veto. Thus, Member State compliance with sanctions can be expected to be optimal: If Member States have serious objections to the imposition of sanctions, they can veto their adoption in the Council. Yet, while implementation is comparatively satisfactory, Member States have availed of opportunities to undermine the application of EU sanctions regimes at various levels. On the basis of the theoretical framework provided by Saurugger and Terpan, the present article explores various ways in which Member States attempt to resist EU measures, categorizes them and explains Member States' choice of resistance techniques.

European Union (EU) sanctions are agreed in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a framework where the unanimity rule prevails and where individual Member States have a formal veto. Thus, Member State compliance with sanctions can be expected to be optimal: If Member States have serious objections to the imposition of sanctions, they can veto their adoption in the Council. Yet, while implementation is comparatively satisfactory, Member States have availed of opportunities to undermine the application of EU sanctions regimes at various levels. On the basis of the theoretical framework provided by Saurugger and Terpan, the present article explores various ways in which Member States attempt to resist EU measures, categorizes them and explains Member States' choice of resistance techniques. Adapted from the source document.

European Union (EU) sanctions are agreed in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a framework where the unanimity rule prevails and where individual Member States have a formal veto. Thus, Member State compliance with sanctions can be expected to be optimal: If Member States have serious objections to the imposition of sanctions, they can veto their adoption in the Council.Yet, while implementation is comparatively satisfactory, Member States have availed of opportunities to undermine the application of EU sanctions regimes at various levels. On the basis of the theoretical framework provided by Saurugger and Terpan, the present article explores various ways in which Member States attempt to resist EU measures, categorizes them and explains Member States' choice of resistance techniques.